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Volume 7 of Space & Defense marks a 
broadening of our editorial interest.  We still 
aspire to be the premier journal for innovative 
ideas about military, civil, or commercial 
space that compel us to rethink defense of the 
nation.  Research in this rapidly evolving 
policy area celebrates the Air Force’s vital 
contributions to space studies dating back to 
the service’s inception sixty-six years ago.  
Yet, our heritage at the Eisenhower Center for 
Space and Defense Studies, U.S. Air Force 
Academy touches a wider range of concerns.  
It was, after all, USAFA’s Department of 
Political Science, the parent department of 
this Center, which in 1965 first conceived and 
published a graduate level textbook on 
American Defense Policy (ADP).   
 
President Eisenhower, from whom the Center 
takes much inspiration, was a founding father 
of both the Air Force Academy and the U.S. 
Space Program.  A most interesting aspect of 
his rich legacy as Commander-in-Chief, 
including his famous Farewell Address, was 
his clarion call for the nation to think through 
its defense in a transformed world.  The 
appeal of Soviet ideology in recovering 
Europe and post-colonial states, combined 
with the advent of nuclear fusion bombs and 
ballistic missiles, changed dramatically the 
old calculus of national security.  
Eisenhower’s administration picked up a 
wartime cue laid down by the former Office 
of Scientific Research and Development 
under President Roosevelt and reached out 
before the next hot war, sponsoring research 
at influential 1950s think tanks like RAND 
and at leading universities—not only for 
technology development but new knowledge 
in the social sciences, including economics 
and politics. 
 
Certainly, professors and researchers could 
not simply deliver all the right policy 
solutions to end the Cold War, but the 
intellectual effort, particularly during the late-
1950s and early-1960s, transformed both the 
discipline of Political Science and the practice 
of policy making in positive ways, which in 
turn helped America meet novel defense 
challenges.  The inkling that we may be 
entering another transformative period 
marked by globalized economic structures 
and security threats—this time with American 
values faltering abroad, despite, or perhaps in 
part because of, the lack of a recognizable 
superpower rival—prompted us several years 
ago to create the Center and launch this 
research journal on Space & Defense.   
 
Of course, our home military service and our 
main patron, the U.S. Air Force, remains 
intensely interested in the future of space.  We 
suspect that welcoming researchers from 
academia, government, and industry who 
share this interest and would take it as a novel 
vantage point from which to pursue broader 
questions of national defense in a world 
transformed—questions upending the old 
security calculus—will before long advance 
our original discussion on space.  
 
Twenty-first century domains such as space, 
cyber, and violent non-state networks remain 
distinct from one another, but the logics of 
dealing with them are connected in subtle 
ways, which we believe will become more 
intriguing and useful as we explore.  For 
example, because globalization shapes 
today’s security priorities, several 
contemporary national defense concerns force 
us to consider tensions between transnational 
cooperation and inter-state competition; 
among civil, commercial, and military 
activities; and between traditional versus 
bounded or pooled sovereignty.  We note how 
certain Cold War concepts such as deterrence 
frequently appear in these pages as they apply 
to space; elsewhere deterrence has come up 
for cyber and again for terrorism.  All these 
burgeoning literatures benefit from 
intellectual bedrock created during the 
Eisenhower era, but they have not, as yet, 
learned much from one another.  This is 
where our journal can make a difference, 
cultivating some articles without space in the 
title that nevertheless help us think about new 
domains for strategic competition or security 
cooperation and, by the same token, articles 
with space in the title that urge us to 
contemplate arenas beyond space where 
defense policy makers face political, 
economic, organizational, and technological 
dilemmas in the new world opening before 
them. 
 
This issue of Space & Defense, the first with 
our new editorial direction in mind, offers 
three peer-reviewed features, along with a 
special report from the Eisenhower Center 
and another installment of Publisher’s Corner.  
In the lead article, SAIC (Science 
Applications International Corporation) 
analysts Justin Anderson, Walt Conrad, and 
Sarah Jacobs Gamberini respond to the 
globalization Zeitgeist in current space policy.  
They follow their previously published article 
on proposals from China, Russia, and Europe 
to prohibit weaponization of space with a 
fresh evaluation of arms control prospects 
involving emerging space powers, 
emphasizing potential contributions from 
India, Brazil, and South Africa.  Jonty Kasku-
Jackson of the National Security Space 
Institute in Colorado Springs widens the arc 
of cooperation from multilateral agreements 
to transnational legal codes.  She explores the 
value of international liability law, presently 
observed by civil and commercial satellite 
operators, for supplementing national 
deterrence polices against attacks on space 
assets, including military satellites.  Our final 
feature, from Adam Lowther of the Air Force 
Research Institute and Casey Lucius of the 
Naval War College, serves as a point of 
departure, a marker for the limits on 
cooperation in space once the United States 
has settled, concretely and explicitly, upon its 
vital interests.  This issue concludes with two 
products from the Eisenhower Center.  The 
first is a special report, which was 
commissioned last year by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) in order to help 
the Department think through future policy 
dilemmas of Space Verification.  The last 
item is our eagerly anticipated “Publisher’s 
Corner.”  Former diplomat and founding 
director of the Eisenhower Center, 
Ambassador Roger Harrison, reflects on why 
discourse—specifically, how the policy 
machinery chooses to name a new national 
security domain such as “cyberspace”—
matters so much when allies and adversaries 
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International Space Negotiations, Emerging Space Powers, and U.S. 
Efforts to Protect the Military Use of Space 
 
Justin Anderson, Ph.D., Walt Conrad, Ph.D., and Ms. Sarah Jacobs Gamberini 
 
In recent years strategists and diplomats 
from space faring nations have engaged in debates 
with their foreign counterparts (and in some cases, 
with each other) on a range of issues related to 
norms and laws – or the relative lack thereof – 
applicable to the military use of space.1  Questions 
have run the gamut from the very broad (should 
the slim volume of outer space law relevant to 
military platforms and operations be expanded?) 
to the very specific (what new technical tools are 
available for the verification regime of a notional 
future space arms control agreement?).   
As a major space power and a country that relies 
on the safe and secure use of space for a broad 
range of vital military functions both on the 
ground and across the “high frontier,” the process 
and outcome of these debates are critically 
important to the United States.  In the post-Cold 
War era, U.S. policymakers and space experts 
have differed over what role the United States 
should play within these deliberations.  Should it 
take the lead in proposing new measures? Or 
should it generally oppose any changes or 
additions, viewing them as possible constraints?  
The Obama administration has strongly supported 
the former, contending that U.S. leadership is vital 
to developing multilateral agreements and 
arrangements designed to mitigate an increasingly 
“congested, contested, and competitive” (often 
referred to as the “3 C’s”) space environment.2  
                                                          
1 All three authors are employees at Science 
Applications International Corporation (SAIC).  The 
views in this article are those of the authors and do not 
reflect the views of SAIC or any of its U.S. 
Government clients. 
2 In March 2012 testimony before Congress, 
Ambassador Greg Schulte, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Space Policy, noted “We are taking a 
leading role in international efforts to promote 
responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space …. A more 
cooperative, predictable environment enhances U.S. 
national security and discourages destabilizing crisis 
behavior. We are supporting development of data 
The administration has also articulated a clear 
litmus test for U.S. approval of any international 
proposal addressing the state use of space, to 
include draft space security or arms control 
agreements – they must be “equitable, effectively 
verifiable, and enhance the national security of the 
United States and its allies.”3 
During 2013 a number of proposals intended to 
address the challenge posed by the 3 C’s, and 
suggesting various transparency measures or other 
mechanisms relevant to the military use of space, 
came up for discussion between major space 
powers or debate within international forums.  
These include a draft International Code of 
Conduct currently under development by the 
European Union (EU), United States, and other 
states and a number of recommendations issued 
within the July 2013 final report by the UN Group 
of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency 
and Confidence Building Measures in Outer 
Space.4   
As a major space faring nation and leading 
military space power, U.S. support for these and 
other initiatives proposing norms, rules, or laws 
relevant to the military use of space will play a 
significant role within the decision-making 
processes of other space actors weighing a 
decision to endorse or oppose these measures.  At 
the same time, however, the support of the United 
States and its allies alone cannot necessarily 
                                                                                          
standards, best practices, transparency and confidence-
building measures, and norms of behavior for 
responsible space operations[.]”  House Armed 
Services Committee, Ambassador Greg Schulte, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 
Policy, Statement, March 8, 2012: 5.   
3 White House, National Space Policy of the United 
States of America, June 28, 2010: 7.  
4 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the 
Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and 
Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space 
Activities (A/68/189), July 29, 2013.  
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guarantee the success of any proposed multilateral 
space initiative or agreement.  Emerging space 
powers are increasingly making their voices heard 
on space issues, and represent important potential 
partners in future coalitions assembled to counter 
the 3 C’s.  The 15-member GGE, for example, 
includes representatives from states such as Brazil, 
South Africa, Chile, Romania, and Nigeria.   
In the sections below, we consider the space 
programs, objectives, and views on international 
space law, military use of space, and space arms 
control held by three emerging space powers: 
India, Brazil, and South Africa.  They represent 
three different points on the spectrum of emerging 
space powers, to include a state aspiring to join 
the first rank of space powers (India), a state with 
an ambitious space agenda balancing domestic 
programs and significant bilateral assistance from 
a major space power (Brazil), and a state that has 
chosen to focus its relatively limited resources on 
key niche capabilities (South Africa).  The 
varying space policies, capabilities, and ambitions 
of these three states provide a good sample of the 
diverse programs and perspectives on space found 
across the population of emerging space powers.5  
The views of these states, and other space-faring 
nations outside of the traditional space powers, are 
increasingly important to international debates on 
outer space, and their support – or lack thereof – 
for future U.S. or international proposals on the 
use of space may make or break multilateral 
efforts to address the 3 C’s and other key issues 







                                                          
5 Emerging space powers are defined here as space-
faring nations outside of the major space powers 
(United States, Russian Federation, China, and the 
European Union).  Different data sets provide varying 
answers regarding the current number of space-faring 
nations, reflecting a lack of consensus on the definition 
of a “space-faring” state.  The number of states 
participating in UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), however, provides a good 
indicator of the number of states claiming space 
equities.  At present, UNCOPUOS has 74 members.  
INDIA 
 
Civilian and Military Space Programs 
 
India is an increasingly important 
geopolitical player that is determined to attain 
recognition as a great power.  Past and present 
Indian government leaders, while varying in their 
politics, have unanimously agreed that 
advancements in science and technology are 
critical to the future development and security of 
their state.  The country established a Department 
of Space in 1972 and has long linked its national 
space program with the realization of broader 
national goals; its stated determination to achieve 
“self-reliance in Space Technology,” for example, 
is an ambition with important implications for the 
country’s future economic and defense planning.6   
Eager to explore space, capture a share of the 
growing international space market, and project 
power across and beyond South Asia – and wary 
of the economic growth and military space 
developments of China – India is devoting 
significant resources to civilian and military space 
projects.  The country currently has one of the 
world’s largest space budgets (by one estimate, 
the sixth largest in 2010-11).7  The Department of 
Space’s research arm, for example, announced a 
67 billion rupee (US $1.3 billion) budget for the 
2012-13 fiscal year.8   
Within the current community of space-faring 
nations, India is one of the few states outside of 
the major space powers to develop its own launch 
vehicle.  Its Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle 
(PSLV), first launched in 1993, is the country’s 
                                                          
6 Government of India, Department of Space, Outcome 
Budget 2011-2012, n.d.: 1.  
7 Ajey Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality? 
(New Delhi: Springer India, 2013): 60; Deloitte, 
Overview of Indian Space Sector 2010, n.d.: 6. 
http://www.deloitte.com.br/publicacoes/2007/A&D_O
verview_Indian_Space_Sector2010.pdf (accessed April 
24, 2013).  
8 The Roscosmos budget for 2013, as a comparison, is 
$5.6 billion USD.  “India Steps Up Space Program 
with Big Budget, Bigger Satellites and a Leap to 
Mars,” RT.com, September 30, 2012, 
http://rt.com/news/india-space-satellite-budget-331/ 
(accessed April 24, 2013).  
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major space launch platform and has enjoyed a 
string of 18 successful launches since its last 
failure.9  With an official payload capacity 
allowing it to place “1,600 kg satellites in 620 km 
sun-synchronous polar orbit and 1,050 kg satellite 
in geo-synchronous transfer orbit,” it has carried 
both Indian and foreign satellites into space.10  
The country has also developed a 
Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle 
(GSLV) capable of launching larger payloads (up 
to 2.5 tons) into geosynchronous orbit.  This 
platform, however, has a mixed record.  The 
Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) lists 
five successes and three failures from the GSLV’s 
eight launches; expert commentators view the 
number of full or partial failures as higher.11  India 
is also developing a larger GSLV Mark III 
designed to place 4-ton payloads into space.12   
In addition, India is devoting significant resources 
to space exploration programs.  The country 
launched a robotic Mars probe (15 kg payload) in 
November 2013 that is scheduled to reach the 
planet in late 2014.13  The Indian Air Force has 
                                                          
9 Stephen Clark, “India Launches Surveillance Satellite 
in ‘Grand Success’,” Space.com, April 26, 2012, 
http://www.space.com/15440-india-rocket-launch-
surveillance-satellite.html (accessed April 24, 2013).   
10 Government of India, Department of Space, “Launch 
Vehicles,” n.d. http://dos.gov.in/launchvehicles.aspx 
(accessed April 24, 2013); William Graham, “Indian 
PSLV Successfully Lofts Multiple Satellites,” 
NASASpaceflight.com, February 25, 2013, 
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2013/02/pslv-launch-
multi-sats/ (accessed April 24, 2013).   
11 Lt Col James Mackey, USAF, “Recent US and 
Chinese Antisatellite Activities,” Air and Space Power 
Journal (Fall 2009), 
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/f
al09/mackey.html (accessed April 24, 2013); Indian 
Space Research Organisation, “GSLV,” n.d. 
http://www.isro.org/Launchvehicles/GSLV/gslv.aspx 
(accessed April 24, 2013); Graham, “Indian PSLV.” 
12 Indian Space Research Organisation, “GSLV Mark 
III,” n.d.  
http://www.isro.org/Launchvehicles/GSLVMARKIII/
mark3.aspx (accessed April 23, 2013).  
13 PTI, “Budget 2012: ISRO Gets Rs 125 cr for Mars 
Mission, Eyes Nov 2013 Launch,” March 16, 2012, 
http://www.dnaindia.com/scitech/report_budget-2012-
isro-gets-rs125-cr-for-mars-mission-eyes-nov-2013-
launch_1663315 (accessed April 23, 2012); 
Snuderarajan P., “India to Launch Mars Mission Next 
also started recruiting candidates from its ranks 
for future manned space flights.14  Furthermore, 
India is determined to compete with major players 
in the increasingly lucrative commercial space 
launch market and has successfully launched 
twenty-nine commercial satellites into outer 
space.15  
India has also devoted significant resources to 
developing remote-sensing satellites designed to 
address pressing national needs, such as close 
monitoring of factors affecting crop yields and 
providing a range of data assisting disaster 
management response.16  The ISRO proudly touts 
its current constellation of eleven satellites as the 
largest of its kind in the world.17  While the bulk 
                                                                                          
Year,” The Hindu, March 16, 2012, 
http://www.thehindu.com/sci-
tech/technology/article3003109.ece (accessed April 23, 
2013). 
14 “IAF Developing Parameters for India’s Manned 




process-iaf (accessed May 2, 2013).  
15 India launched its first commercial satellite (the 
Italian AGILE satellite) in 2007.  Frank O’Donnell, 
“India’s Space Ascent Gains New Boost,” Geopolitical 
Monitor, May 11, 2011,  
http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/indias-space-
ascent-gains-new-boost-4363 (accessed April 23, 2013) 
and Radhakrishna Rao, “The Indian Space Programme 
in 2012: A Review,” IDSA Comment, Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analysis, January 2, 2013, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheIndianSpaceProg
rammein2012_rrao_020113 (accessed April 23, 2012).  
See also the promotional brochure produced by the 
ISRO for the PSLV: Indian Space Research 
Organization, “PSLV-C21: 100th Indian Space 
Mission” (Bangalore, n.d.), http://www.isro.org/pslv-
c21/pdf/pslv-c21-brochure.pdf (accessed April 23, 
2013).   
16 For a detailed official Indian government briefing on 
the system, see Deviprasad Karnik, “Indian Remote 
Sensing Satellites,” presentation, Civil Commercial 
Imagery Evaluation Workshop, Fairfax, Virginia, 




17 ISRO, “Earth Observation Satellites,” n.d., 
http://www.isro.org/satellites/earthobservationsatellites
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of India’s space remote sensing resources are 
devoted to civilian uses, the 1998 Kargil conflict -
- fought to reclaim positions in high mountain 
areas covertly occupied by Pakistani troops -- led 
India’s military to request improved space 
surveillance capabilities.  The ISRO subsequently 
developed low-earth orbit satellites expressly 
designed for military use, to include imagery data 
on Pakistan’s military forces and movements 
(with a focus on its ballistic missile arsenal).18 
India’s civilian space programs reflect its 
determination to establish itself as a first-order 
space power that can match the space launch, 
space exploration, and manned and unmanned 
programs (both legacy and under development) of 
the United States, EU, Russia, and China.  While 
India faces a number of challenges in advancing 
major programs (such as the GSLV), and its use 
of major fiscal, scientific, and technical resources 
on space programs has faced a number of 
domestic and international critics, it is a leading 
member of the emerging space powers.19   
India has also started to consider whether to 
compete with major space powers by developing a 
military space program.  China’s successful 2007 
test of a ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) 
weapon prompted Indian military leaders to call 
for the country’s armed forces to develop both 
space officers and a range of space capabilities.  
At present, the military has a “small Integrated 
Space Cell” that may form the nucleus of a future 
“Indian Military Space Command,” possibly 
reflecting a degree of wariness by Indian political 
leaders – and opposition from its well-established 
                                                                                          
.aspx (accessed November 27, 2013).  
http://calval.cr.usgs.gov/JACIE_files/JACIE10/Present
ations/WedAM/Karnik_Deviprasad_JACIE2010FINA
L.pdf (accessed November 27, 2013).  
18 Gautum Sen, ed. Conceptualizing Security for India 
in the 21st Century (Atlantic: New Delhi, 2007): 146.  
19Palash Ghosh, “Red Planet Blues: India to Launch 
Mars Space Mission but some Question Priorities,” 
International Business Times, February 22, 2013, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/red-planet-blues-india-launch-
mars-space-mission-october-some-question-priorities-
1101142# (accessed May 2, 2013).    
civilian space program – to standing up a major, 
new, military space entity.20    
The country has made significant progress, 
however, in regard to space systems with either 
military or dual civil-military applications.  India 
has successfully developed and launched RISAT-
1, an earth imaging satellite with monitoring 
capabilities that serve both civilian and national 
defense needs.21  The country is also planning to 
build its own national equivalent to the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) satellite constellation, 
recognizing the importance of these dual-use 
systems to the U.S. military and reluctant to rely 
on a foreign power for an important defense 
capability.22   
The most important military space development 
catalyzed by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test, 
however, was the decision by India’s Defense 
Research Development Organisation (DRDO) to 
state that it was prepared to rapidly construct and 
deploy, if needed, an ASAT to match Beijing’s.  
V.K. Saraswat, head of DRDO, has repeatedly 
stated that India already possesses the “building 
blocks” of an ASAT system due to earlier or 
ongoing work on rocket, missile guidance, and 
missile defense systems developed for other 
national security programs.23   
Indian government officials and non-government 
analysts discussing the need for an indigenous 
ASAT program cite the development of ASAT 
systems by Russia, the United States, and China 
as key factors driving New Delhi’s pursuit of this 
type of capability.24  Former Indian Air Force 
                                                          
20 Craig Covault, “India Races China in Space for 
Asian Prestige, Military Security,” Spaceref.com, 
December 13, 2012, http://spaceref.com/asia/india-
races-china-in-space-for-asian-prestige-military-
security.html (accessed April 23, 2013).   
21 Rao, “The Indian Space Programme in 2012.” 
22 Ibid.  
23 T.S. Subramanian and Y. Mallikarjun, “Capability to 
Neutralise Enemy Satellites Proved,” The Hindu, 
March 7, 2011, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/capability-to-
neutralise-enemy-satellites-proved/article1515159.ece 
(accessed April 23, 2013).  
24 Both Russia and the United States, however, retired 
their ASAT programs before the end of the Cold War.  
Victoria Samson, “India and Space Security,” The 
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Chief P.V. Naik stated in a January 2010 address 
that India’s increasing reliance on satellites made 
these assets potential targets in future conflicts.  
Without expressly mentioning China, Naik stated, 
“Our satellites are vulnerable to ASAT weapon 
systems because our neighborhood possesses one,” 
and advocated the development of Indian ASAT 
capabilities.25  Naik and other Indian strategic 
thinkers, recognizing the inherent difficulty of 
developing means to shield fragile satellites from 
attacks, argue that an offensive ASAT weapon 
offers the best deterrent – and only defense – for 
the country’s civilian and military assets in outer 
space.  Saraswat, for example, has stated that 
India remains firmly committed to a policy of not 
threatening to “attack anyone in space,” but given 
the threat of foreign ASAT programs, “we have 
all the technology elements required to integrate a 
system through which we can defend our satellites 
or take care of future requirements.”26   
                                                                                          
Space Review, May 9, 2011, 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1838/1 
(accessed April 23, 2013); Bharath Gopalaswamy and 
Gaurav Kampani, “Piggybacking Anti-Satellite 
Technologies on Missile Defense,” Carnegie 




approach/3l6#3 (accessed April 23, 2013); A. 
Adityanjee, “Pining for PAROS or Parity?,” C3S Paper 
# 111, http://www.c3sindia.org/us/193 (accessed April 
23, 2013).  
25 Bhargavi Kerur, “Air Chief Marshal PV Naik wants 




satellites_1338174 (accessed April 23, 2013).  
26 Indrani Bagchi, “India Working on Tech to Defend 
Satellites,” Times of India, March 6, 2011,  
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-
06/india/28659986_1_missile-defence-asat-test-space-
systems (accessed April 23, 2013); “India has 
Technology to Defend Satellites,” The Economic 
Times, February 11, 2011, 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-02-
11/news/28540512_1_cruise-missile-agni-v-satellites; 
Siddharth Srivastava, “India Hones its Missile Shield,” 
Asia Times, April 16, 2011, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MD16Df01
.html (accessed April 23, 2013). 
There is limited public information available, 
however, about the technical specifications of an 
Indian ASAT system or the strategy or operations 
concepts that would guide its use.  Saraswat has 
described Indian research and development of an 
ASAT system as embedded within broader efforts 
to design, test, and field a range of ballistic 
missile defense systems.  In April 2012, Saraswat 
described an Indian ASAT’s “kill vehicle” as 
travelling aboard an Agni-V ballistic missile and 
using “advanced seekers … to home in to the 
target satellite.”27  These details indicate the 
DRDO is opting for a ground-based, rather than a 
space-based, ASAT.  India likely views a ground-
based offensive weapon as providing a means to 
respond to potential attacks on its satellites 
without “weaponizing” outer space.  Saraswat, for 
example, has explained that India is not planning 
to develop “offensive space capabilities.”28  The 
DRDO has also stated it has no future plans to test 
an Indian ASAT in space and will rely on a series 
of ground-based tests and simulations to test 
system components.29   
In the absence of testing, and with the DRDO 
implying it would construct an ASAT using 
technology and systems designed for other 
purposes, skeptics have suggested India may have 
underestimated the difficulty of constructing and 
employing an anti-satellite kill vehicle.30  
Nevertheless, India’s stated interest in an ASAT 
reflects its interest in catching up with the 
sophisticated military space capabilities fielded by 
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major powers.  India may soon conclude that a 
military space program – to include a command 
structure, specially trained personnel, and 
purpose-built capabilities – is both an additional 
requirement of membership within the top tier of 
space powers and necessary to protect and deter 
attacks on valuable satellites in an increasingly 
hostile space environment.   
Views on Proposed Space Agreements, Military 
Use of Space, and Space Arms Control 
Within international negotiating forums, 
Indian officials stress the importance of ensuring 
outer space remains free and open to all states31 
and emphasize the vital role that current 
international treaties and international law 
(including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)) 
play in safeguarding space as a global commons.32  
Speaking to the UN Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) in May and June 2012, Indian Ambassador 
Sujata Mehta called on the international 
community to take steps to protect the sovereign 
right of all states to access outer space.33  She also 
stated that India opposes the “weaponisation” of 
                                                          
31 “We believe that it is essential to preserve and 
promote the benefits flowing from advances in space 
technology by ensuring access to and use of space.”  
Ambassador Sujata Mehta, Permanent Representative 
of India to the Conference on Disarmament, UN 
Conference on Disarmament Plenary statement, May 
15, 2012,  
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)
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32 “We support the development and continuous 
evolution of law for the peaceful use and exploration of 
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COPOUS Legal Subcommittee 768th Meeting, April 1, 
2008, COPOUS/LEGAL/T.768: 3. 
33 Permanent Mission of India to the Conference on 
Disarmament, Ambassador Sujata Mehta, Statements, 
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space.  Ambassador Mehta suggested that 
ensuring space remains a peaceful environment 
will require space-faring nations to negotiate a 
legally binding treaty addressing state use of outer 
space.  This process, however, could be 
“complemented” by the negotiation and 
implementation of a series of politically binding 
transparency and confidence-building measures 
(TCBMs).  
India is against the weaponization of 
space … it is essential to preserve and 
promote the benefits flowing from 
advances in space technology [by 
preserving free access to space].  This 
would require a step-by-step approach 
wherein legal measures are complemented 
with TCBMs that are non-discriminatory 
and evolved through an inclusive process 
with the participation of all space faring 
nations.34 
Indian diplomats and space officials also express 
concerns regarding the increasing amount of 
debris in outer space.  While stating that 
international cooperation is necessary to address 
the problem, they also assert that states most 
responsible for generating space debris should 
take the lion’s share of the responsibility for 
cleaning it up.35   
Within UN bodies, India has provided general 
support to measures opposing the “weaponization” 
of space, regularly voting in favor of “Prevention 
of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS) 
resolutions in the General Assembly.36  It has also 
stated that it supports “consideration” of these 
resolutions within the CD.  It has stopped short, 
                                                          
34 Ambassador Sujata Mehta, UN CD Plenary 
statement, May 15, 2012.   
35 “Rogue Activity Can Cause Major Space Debris 
Problems in Future: Expert,” The Hindu, August 7, 
2011; R.G. Nadadur, UN COPOUS statement.  
36 For many years, PAROS resolutions were regularly 
passed in the UN General Assembly, often with only a 
handful of opposing votes (significantly, however, the 
United States never supported these resolutions and 
either voted against PAROS or abstained).  However, 
recent discussions in the General Assembly and other 
UN bodies on preventing the “weaponization” of outer 
space have shifted attention to the Russian-Chinese 
PPWT or other proposals.  
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however, of endorsing the Russian-Chinese Treaty 
on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in 
Outer Space (PPWT) draft accord, which these 
two countries view as rooted within the PAROS 
resolutions.37  In addition, the Indian government 
has not taken an official position for or against the 
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities (ICoC), the multilateral successor to 
earlier attempts by the European Union to develop 
a space Code of Conduct.  In a March 2013 
statement to the CD, India said it was working 
with the EU and other parties on new space 
TCBMs, while also reiterating its view that states 
should negotiate a new, legally binding treaty to 
address concerns about the possible future 
placement of weapons in space.38   
A number of Indian press and think-tank reports 
in 2011, however, stated that New Delhi was 
unhappy with its lack of engagement in the EU 
CoC drafting process and objected to several key 
tenets of the proposed code.39  For example, in a 
series of articles in foreign publications (including 
Strategic Studies Quarterly) and presentations to 
international audiences in 2012, Rajeswari Pillai 
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., of the Observer Research 
Foundation, a New Delhi think-tank, argued the 
EU fundamentally erred in failing to directly 
involve India and other non-European states in 
developing the text of the draft Code of 
                                                          
37 Ambassador Sujata Mehta, UN CD Plenary 
statement, June 5, 2012.   
38 United Nations Office at Geneva, “Conference on 
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Outer Space,” press release, March 19, 2013, 
http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(htt
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500C9D?OpenDocument (accessed April 23, 2012). 
39 Micah Zenko, Council on Foreign Relations, CFR 
Policy Innovation Memorandum #10, November 2011; 
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Gopalswamy and Gaurav Kampani, “Governing Space: 
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(accessed April 23, 2013); Victoria Samson, “India and 
Space Security.” 
Conduct.40  In her assessment, the document 
broadly failed to address the concerns of India, 
other emerging space powers in Asia, or 
developing states struggling to gain access to 
space.  She also criticized the draft code’s lack of 
enforcement mechanisms and argued that its 
request that states share information on national 
space policies and space defense strategies was 
wholly unrealistic – noting, for example, that this 
latter provision was flatly rejected by China.41   
Other Indian commentators agreed with 
Rajagopalan, stating the EU should have 
consulted India in drafting the Code of Conduct 
and accusing the organization of taking a 
Western-centric approach to outer space that, if 
implemented, would restrict the ability of India 
and developing states to use space.42  However, 
with the Code representing a voluntary, 
politically-binding agreement, these criticisms 
likely reflected a general concern that major space 
powers might overlook (or deliberately ignore) 
India’s views on space rather than specific 
objections to provisions in its text.  In response to 
these and other critiques that it did not include 
enough states in its earlier dialogues on the EU 
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Studies Quarterly (Spring 2012):142-145; “Code of 
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Issues and Challenges,” Observer Research Foundation 
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http://www.orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/
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CoC, the EU invited other space-faring nations, 
including India, to actively participate in the 
International Code of Conduct multilateral 
discussions. 
In official statements, however, Indian diplomatic 
representatives have offered little detail regarding 
the standards or mechanisms it would include 
within a new space arms control or space use 
treaty.  Rather than put forward its own initiatives 
on space, India may prefer to have key space-
faring nations solicit its opinion and court its vote 
on future multilateral accords.  As a country that 
continues to achieve important milestones with its 
national space program and is not afraid to openly 
discuss the development of a deterrent capability 
that can match or exceed the capabilities fielded 
by other space-faring nations, New Delhi may 
calculate it can afford to take a wait-and-see 
approach to ongoing discussions and debates 
between the traditional space powers on matters 
such as the military use of space.  Projecting 
confidence in its ability to develop and defend 
space assets necessary for 21st century national 
security needs, but cautious and cagey with regard 
to the military space programs of other states, it is 
likely to support future multilateral space TCBM 
agreements – so long as the major space-faring 
states agree to fully participate.    
BRAZIL 
 
Civilian and Military Space Programs 
From the 1960s to the present day, 
Brazilian leaders have viewed the development of 
a national space program as an important part of 
broader efforts to solidify its status as a major 
geopolitical and economic power.  Its current 
space program, however, embodies the significant 
challenges faced by many emerging space powers 
in attempting to develop a scientific, technical, 
and industrial base capable of designing, testing, 
and building space launch vehicles and satellites, 
and sustaining the infrastructure necessary to 
support and control them.   
In the past, Brazil has realized important 
achievements in space – a Brazilian astronaut, for 
example, has served as part of the multinational 
crew manning the International Space Station.  
Today, however, it remains heavily reliant on 
foreign states for key space capabilities such as 
launch vehicles.  Its dreams of breaking into the 
first ranks of space powers will require the 
country to make significant progress in improving 
its national space capabilities in the near future or 
risk falling behind other emerging space powers.  
In the words of Jose Raimundo Braga Coelho, 
president of Agencia Espacial Brasilieira (AEB), 
Brazil’s national space agency:  “[T]he truth is, in 
terms of space, we need to take a leap.  A 
qualitative leap.  A transforming leap. And with 
all possible haste.”43   
Brazil’s views on space and security are rooted in 
the belief that its national defense, economic, and 
space goals are closely intertwined.  For example, 
the country has a large, diverse geography that 
includes extensive areas, such as the Amazon 
rainforest, that are difficult to monitor or traverse 
from the ground.  This complicates efforts by 
Brazil’s military and security forces to protect its 
borders and, in turn, its extensive and highly 
valuable natural resources. 
This places a premium on national development 
of space platforms capable of performing data and 
imagery monitoring and reporting functions.  
Brazil does not at present have any dedicated 
military assets in outer space, but the development 
of a Geostationary Defense and Strategic 
Communications Satellite (SGDC), a system 
designed to provide the country with its first space 
platform for secure communications, is a current 
priority for the country’s national space 
program.44  The SGDC represents a critical 
capability for realizing a number of goals 
contained within National Strategy of Defense, 
Brazil’s most recent (December 2008) national 
defense guidance document.  The National 
Strategy discusses space as one of three “strategic 
sectors” (in addition to cyber and nuclear) that are 
critical to the country’s national security.45  It 
advocates for the development of a range of 
monitoring technologies, to include satellites in 
                                                          
43 Government of Brazil, Brazilian Space Agency 
(AEB), National Program of Space Activities: 2012-
2021 (PNAE), 2012: 5. 
44 PNAE, 9, 24.  
45 Government of Brazil Ministry of Defense, National 
Strategy of Defense, 2008: 32.  
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space, that do not rely on foreign assistance, 
arguing that the country can never view jointly 
developed capabilities as fully secure.46  Brazil’s 
military also hopes the SGDC will improve its 
command-and-control capabilities, facilitate 
future joint operations, and boost the ability of its 
forces to monitor and defend the country’s land 
borders, airspace, and waterways.47  
Brazil’s views on the relationship between space 
and economic development also reflect the 
government’s determination to leverage the 
country’s existing economic strengths and 
diversify its goods and services to address the 
demands of a high-technology 21st century 
marketplace.  Brazil, for example, is a major 
producer and exporter of agricultural products.  
Information provided by, and communications 
supported by, space assets are vital to protecting 
this critical part of the country’s economy and the 
country’s population from natural disasters.48  As 
summarized by Marco Antonio Chapman, an 
administrator at Brazil’s National Institute for 
Space Research, Brazil’s space policy is aimed at 
“mastering space technology to solve major 
national problems …When we look at global 
warming, pollution, [and] deforestation, we see 
that there are a number of important issues that 
have direct impact on Brazilian society.”49 
In addition, Brazil views its space program – and 
associated science and technical programs – as 
critical to diversifying its economy and equipping 
its population for success in the Information Age.  
It wants to become a provider of high-technology 
products (to include those related to space) and 
grant its entrepreneurs access to communications 
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47 Government of Brazil, Ministry of Defense, National 
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The Space Review, August 27, 2012, 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2143/1 
(accessed April 25, 2012).  
48 PNAE, 8.  
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in 2012,” press release, April 5, 2012, 
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2010/04/05/brazil-
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and information services allowing them to 
successfully navigate the global information 
economy.  Brasilia has concluded that the 
infrastructure of a domestic space industry (e.g., 
launch facility, satellite control center, 
communication links) and the platforms required 
for cell phones, broadband services, and other 
important contemporary tools of communication 
and business all point to the need for a robust 
national space program.50 
Brazil’s conviction that the realization of 
important national security and economic goals 
requires space systems underlines the importance 
of satellites such as the SGDC that, by providing 
secure communications to the country’s 
government, is viewed as critical to a number of 
important state civil and military functions.  Brazil 
believes its “national strategy of defense is 
inseparable from [our] national strategy of 
development” and views a truly independent 
national space program as important to both 
defending its national sovereignty and realizing 
future economic growth. 
While Brasilia envisions a future where the 
country is a self-sufficient space power marketing 
a broad range of space goods and services to an 
international market, many observers believe it is 
not close to becoming a fully sufficient space 
power.51  The country experienced early success 
in building its Sonda series of sounding rockets, 
with successful launches of Sonda I in 1967 and 
Sonda II in 1969.52  In 1979, the country 
announced its ambitions to become a first-tier 
space power, unveiling plans to develop its own 
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satellites, launch vehicles, and spaceport.53  
Recognizing the value of constructing the 
spaceport near the equator, the country began 
construction of its Alcantara Launch Center in 
1982 and hosted a successful Sonda-2 launch in 
1990.54    
A series of setbacks for its domestic rocket 
programs, however, followed this initial progress.  
Brazil’s efforts to construct a larger rocket – titled 
the Veículo Lançador de Satélites [Satellite 
Launch Vehicle] (VLS) – resulted in three failures, 
in 1997, 1999, and 2003, with the third exploding 
on its launch pad and causing the deaths of 21 
technicians.55  The accident highlighted a number 
of problems with the country’s efforts to develop 
space capabilities, including general problems 
with funding (which came in fits and starts from 
Brasilia) and tensions between civilian and 
military elements of the country’s space 
program.56  The accident led to efforts to better 
synchronize Brazil’s scientific, military, and 
industry players involved in space matters and 
confirmed a process, already underway, of 
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consolidating most of Brazil’s space activities 
under the civilian control of the Agência Espacial 
Brasileira (AEB).  
The failures forced Brazil to shelve plans to send 
satellites into space aboard Brazilian launch 
vehicles and accelerated efforts to seek foreign 
partnerships in building a range of rockets and 
satellites.57  This led Brazil to forge a close 
relationship on space matters with China.  The 
two countries first signed a bilateral space 
cooperation agreement in 1988 and worked 
closely together on developing the China-Brazil 
Earth Resource Satellite (CBERS) satellite series, 
described by AEB as “medium resolution remote 
sensing satellites” with “agribusiness, 
environment (and) defense” applications.58  This 
ongoing collaboration between Brazil’s National 
Institute for Space Research (the country’s lead 
civilian space research body), AEB, the Chinese 
Academy for Space Technology, and the China 
National Space Administration has produced three 
satellites:  CBERS-1 in 1999, CBERS-2 in 2003, 
and CBERS-2B in 2007.  All three were launched 
into space aboard Chinese rockets; while the most 
recent launch (December 2013) failed, additional 
launches are planned for 2014.59   
Significantly, CBERS-1 was the first imaging 
satellite put into orbit by both countries that did 
not rely on technology or assistance from other 
space powers, reflecting the importance both 
capitals placed in this collaborative effort (and the 
state of technological advancement of their 
respective programs in 1999).60  In addition, both 
states have viewed the CBERS satellites as 
platforms for international diplomacy, voluntarily 
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making images taken by CBERS-2B publicly 
available online to developing nations.  In doing 
so, the two countries state that nations in Africa 
and around the world that currently lack their own 
satellites can freely use this data for disaster 
planning, agriculture, and other purposes.61   
Brazil has also established separate partnerships 
with Ukraine and Russia in order to develop space 
launch vehicles.62  Brazil and Ukraine are 
developing a three-stage liquid-fueled rocket, 
based on the latter’s proven Cyclone rocket series, 
designed to place 1,600 kg payloads in 
geostationary orbit.63  Although the project has 
experienced a number of delays, the first launch 
from Alcantara is planned for late 2014.64  The 
Brazilian-Russian project is focused on helping 
the troubled VLS program by using technology 
from Russia’s Angara rocket series, although this 
collaboration – initially featuring five types of 
launch vehicles – is now restricted to two rockets 
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planned-for-end-of-2014-323136.html (accessed July 
25, 2013).  
(VLS-Alpha and VLS-Beta), possibly due to 
budget concerns. 65  
Brazil’s civilian space program thus has close ties 
with China’s space program and working 
relationships with Ukraine and Russia.  Its 
relationship with the United States on space 
matters has proven more complex due to U.S. 
efforts to protect American space technology and 
halt the proliferation of ballistic missiles, efforts 
that extend to include a range of dual-use goods, 
services, and relevant scientific and technical 
knowledge.66  In the past, these efforts have 
represented a source of friction between the two 
countries.  In 2000, for example, a number of 
Brazilian politicians objected to the U.S. 
government’s insistence Brazil sign a space 
Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) as a 
precursor to cooperation between their respective 
space programs, strongly criticizing Brasilia for 
initially accepting this request.  During the 
subsequent ratification debate within Brazil’s 
Congress, opponents of the agreement charged the 
executive branch with “essentially ceding part of 
Brazil's national territory to be used as a restricted 
American base of operations.”67  The government 
failed to assemble enough votes in favor of 
ratification, complicating bilateral initiatives 
between the two countries’ space programs, and 
questions raised during the congressional debate 
left many Brazilians wary of working with the 
United States on space issues.68  Cooperation 
appears to have improved since 2010, however, 
with NASA and AEB agreeing to collaborate on 
the multi-national Global Precipitation 
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Novosti, November 23, 2004.  
66 Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, “The Brazilian 
Bomb” The New Republic, August 13, 1990: 10-11; 
Brian Chow, Emerging National Space Launch 
Programs: Economics and Safeguards (RAND: Santa 
Monica, CA, 1993): 1-4, 7-12; Wyn Bowen, “Report: 
Brazil’s Accession to the MTCR,” Nonproliferation 
Review (Spring-Summer 1996): 86-88. 
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Measurement Mission and a future ozone study.69  
The two countries also held a Space Security 
dialogue in April 2012.70 
Views on Proposed Space Agreements, Military 
Use of Space, and Space Arms Control 
 Brazil has sought a role in international 
negotiations on the state use of space, including 
military space and space arms control issues.  It 
views itself as a key player in disarmament 
debates, citing its generally peaceful history, lack 
of military enemies, and long support for a range 
of arms reduction and weapon-ban initiatives 
(both in terms of nuclear arms and weapons in 
outer space) at the UN General Assembly and the 
UN CD.71 As both a developing country and a 
space power, Brazil believes it can speak to the 
concerns of a broad range of current and future 
space actors. 72  The Brazilian government states 
that protecting outer space as a peaceful 
environment free of weapons and armed conflict 
is essential for developing states, who 
increasingly rely on space systems (particularly 
satellites) for economic growth but lack the 
capabilities to protect these systems from the 
actions or conflicts of major space powers.73  It 
has sounded the alarm in international negotiating 
forums regarding what it fears is the impending 
militarization of space, with its representative to 
the UN CD stating in October 2012,  
                                                          
69 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Brazilian Space 
Cooperation,” fact sheet, April 9, 2012. Brazil is one of 
several international partners participating in the GPM 
project, which is led by NASA and the Japanese 
Aerospace Exploration Agency.  Luis Machado of 
Brazil’s Instituto Nacional De Pesquisas Espaciais is a 
member of the GPM’s Precipitation Measurement 
Mission Science Team.  See Precipitation 
Measurement Missions Website, NASA Goddard 
Flight Center, http://pmm.nasa.gov/PMM-science-team 
(accessed November 19, 2013 
70 Ibid.  
71 Ambassador Luiz Felipe de Macedo Soares, 
statement, UN First Committee, November 2, 2009, 
http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/09d-lfms-icommittee-
cluster3-0211.html (accessed April 26, 2012).  
72 Eduardo Da Costa Farias, statement, UN COPUOS 
618th meeting (COPUOS/T.618): 7. 
73 Ibid. 
The use of outer space for military 
purposes is firmly underway. The 
international community must work hard 
and united in order to prevent the next 
step: the placement of weapons [in 
space].74 
Brazil warns that a failure to make progress on 
space arms control courts disaster, stating a future 
conflict involving space systems could lead to a 
total “global black-out” of modern 
communications systems. 75   
In surveying the current state of international 
space law, Brazil believes discussions within UN 
forums have revealed “the need of a multilateral 
legal instrument to plug the loopholes remaining 
in International Law on the matter of preventing 
an arms race in outer space.” 76  It presses for 
negotiation within the UN CD of a multilateral, 
legally binding treaty to ban the threat or use of 
force against space systems or the placement of 
any kind of weapon in outer space. 77   
Brazil welcomed Russia and China’s introduction 
of the PPWT in 2008 and praised the draft treaty 
as a “constructive and concrete contribution” to 
diplomatic discussions addressing the issue of 
weapons in space.  It also noted, however, that “in 
its present wording [the PPWT] is still a 
schematic framework” requiring “more precise 
language” before becoming a comprehensive 
treaty fully addressing the concerns of Brazil and 
like-minded states.78  However, Brazil preferred 
the PPWT’s approach to the EU’s Code of 
Conduct, which it believed too broad in its 
language and, as a politically binding agreement, 
too weak to address near-term challenges in 
                                                          
74 Antonio Guerreiro, statement, UN First Committee, 
October 23, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/special/meetings/firstc
ommittee/67/pdfs/Thematic/23%20Oct%20TD%20Clu
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76 Ambassador Soares, statement, UN First Committee, 
November 2, 2009. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ambassador Soares, statement, UN CD, February 8, 
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regard to the militarization of space.  It has 
specifically criticized the code’s express reference 
to a state’s inherent right of self-defense to defend 
its space assets, arguing this “could be interpreted 
in a way that justifies the use of force in outer 
space. That is a scenario we cannot afford to 
contemplate, not even in theory.”79   
Brazil has also disparaged – without naming any 
specific state – governments that support 
negotiation of a politically binding, rather than a 
legally binding, agreement on space security 
issues, dismissing their arguments as “not 
sustainable” in the long-term and “impossible” for 
most of the international community to understand.  
States that delay participation in diplomatic talks 
aimed at preventing a future arms race in space, it 
argues, are ultimately responsible for the 
“increased mistrust” between them and space-
faring nations supportive of drafting a 
comprehensive space arms control treaty.80   This 
advocacy on behalf of a legally binding approach 
to the military use of space has led Brazil to issue 
a publicly ambivalent statement on the UN GGE’s 
pursuit of politically binding TCBMs, saying it 
“does not refuse intermediate measures” that can 
build trust and increase transparency between 
space-faring states, so long as these are 
recognized as an interim step preceding future 
multilateral talks on a new space treaty.81  
However, Brazil has contributed an expert to the 
GGE, and this involvement may lead to support 
for the group’s future recommendations. 
                                                          
79 Antonio Guerreiro, statement, UN First Committee, 
October 23, 2012.  The language on self-defense is 
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European Union, Revised Draft Code of Conduct for 
Outer Space Activities, October 11, 2010 (14455/10): 
4.2. 




_Brazil.pdf (accessed April 26, 2013); Ambassador 
Soares, statement, UN First Committee, November 2, 
2009; United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 
“Conference on Disarmament Hears Address from 
Foreign Minister of Georgia and Observes 
International Women’s Day,” press release, March 8, 
2011.  
81 Ambassador Soares, statement, UN CD, February 8, 
2011.   
Brazil remains committed to its vision of 
becoming a major space power, and it has realized 
a number of important goals for its national space 
program.  With a civilian space program that 
remains dependent on other states for key forms 
of assistance and a military deeply interested in 
using space but waiting for its first (shared) 
satellite, Brazil is a good example of an emerging 
space power that recognizes and aspires to the 
broad, networked civilian and military capabilities 
available to space-faring nations such as the 
United States and China.  But Brazil faces 
challenging near-term decisions on national 
resources and bilateral cooperation that may 
determine whether it can keep pace with countries 
such as India or fall back into the growing pack of 
countries that can build satellites but not launch 
them into space.   
Brazil is an emerging space power and over the 
course of a generation has realized impressive 
achievements in aviation and aerospace 
engineering and manufacturing.   It is also aware, 
however, of the difficulties, hazards, and costs of 
sending objects into space, and of the distance that 
continues to separate it from the civilian and 
military programs of major space-faring nations.  
As a result, its views on military space reflect both 
an interest in developing its own capabilities 
contributing to tasks such as border defense and a 
concern that major powers such as the United 
States will take steps – whether direct or indirect – 
jeopardizing the safety and security of smaller 
space-faring nations.   
SOUTH AFRICA 
Civilian and Military Space Programs 
 
South Africa boasts a long history of 
involvement in efforts to observe and explore 
outer space.  Its location in the Southern 
Hemisphere has proven ideal for charting stars 
and the course of human-made satellites.  The first 
South African space observatory was built in 1820 
in Cape Town, and the English astronomer Sir 
John Herschel conducted much of his research 
(including his observation of Halley’s Comet in 
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1835) while living in the country.82  South Africa 
also has a long-standing relationship with NASA.  
During the first Space Age, the United States 
partnered with South Africa to design and 
manufacture a satellite that was launched on a 
NASA Delta II rocket, and the space agency also 
constructed and operated key satellite tracking 
facilities within the country.83  This cooperation 
was later suspended due to congressional 
opposition to Pretoria’s apartheid policies, but re-
started in the 1990s following the election of 
President Nelson Mandela.84  In 1999, for 
example, South Africa’s first satellite, the 
Stellenbosch University Satellite (SUNSAT), was 
launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base.   
Into the 21st century, South Africa has remained 
an important partner of the United States and 
other space-faring nations.  In 2011, for example, 
it was selected by NASA as a key provider of 
tracking data for the Curiosity Mars Rover 
mission, and in 2012 it was chosen (along with 
Australia) as the host of installations associated 
with the Square Kilometre Array, which upon 
completion will represent the world’s largest radio 
telescope.85  It has also taken a lead role in 
                                                          
82 Ambassador Xolisa Mabhongo, statement, UN 
COPUOS, June 1, 2011, 
http://www.sacsa.gov.za/COPUOS/STATEMENT_A
MBASSADOR_XOLISA_MABHONGO.pdf 
(accessed April 26, 2013) and “Sir John Herschel, 1st 
Baronet,” Encyclopedia Brittanica, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/263809/Si
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83 In 1965, for example, an 85-foot-wide dish antenna 
located in Johannesburg tracked NASA’s Mariner 4 
Mars Satellite. Walter Sullivan, “Mariner 4 Makes 
Flight Past Mars,” New York Times, July 14, 1965. 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bi
g/0714.html#article.  South Africa was the site of a 
NASA Deep Space Network antenna, associated 
tracking station, and also a separate Spaceflight 
Tracking Data Network (STDN) station.  NASA, SP-
4012 NASA Historical Data Book: Volume III, 
“Programs and Projects 1969-1978,” 
http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4012/vol3/ch6.htm 
(accessed April 26, 2013).     
84 NASA, SP-4012.  
85 “South Africa to Assist NASA Mars Mission,” 
SouthAfrica.info, November 18, 2011, 
http://www.southafrica.info/about/science/samars-
181111.htm#.UVRedmdpYrs (accessed April 26, 
working with fellow African states to advance 
regional space initiatives.  South Africa is a key 
member of the African Resource Management 
Constellation (ARMC), a four-state coalition 
(together with Algeria, Nigeria, and Kenya) 
building a satellite network that aims to “make 
space technology more accessible to African end-
users in areas such as environmental monitoring, 
land use, water management, and public health.”86 
South Africa has devoted considerable political 
and economic capital to building up its national 
space program.  The country’s 2008 National 
Space Policy recognizes that “in the 21st century, 
countries capable of utilizing space systems will 
enjoy considerable advantage over those who do 
not” and notes the country is already “critically 
reliant on space science and technology.”87  In an 
effort to consolidate and advance the country’s 
efforts to boost its involvement in outer space, 
South African President Jacob Zuma signed the 
National Space Agency Act in 2009, bringing 
together all of the country’s space programs and 
missions under one unified agency -- the South 
African National Space Agency (SANSA).88  
National legislation directs SANSA to  
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2013).  
86 Ambassador Xolisa Mabhongo, statement, UN 
COPUOS, June 1, 2011.  
87 Republic of South Africa, Department of Trade and 
Industry, National Space Policy, “2. Executive 
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http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/spacelaw/national/sa
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also SANSA Corporate six-panel brochure, March 18, 
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Africa National Space Agency” (SANSA), brochure, 
March 18, 2011, 
http://www.sansa.org.za/images/resource_centre/broch
ures/6-Panel%20brochure%202011.pdf (accessed April 
26, 2013).  
88 Government of South Africa, “South African 
National Space Agency Act,” Government Gazette 
Vol. 522, no. 31729, December 15, 2009, 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=
94358 (accessed April 26, 2013).  
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Provide for the promotion and use of 
space and co-operation in space-related 
activities, foster research in Space Science, 
advance scientific engineering through 
human capital, support the creation of an 
environment conducive to industrial 
development in space technologies within 
the framework of national government 
policy.89 
 
The agency’s current strategic plan focuses on 
four missions: (1) Earth observation (2) space 
operations (3) space science and (4) space 
engineering.90  While recognizing it cannot 
compete at the same level as the major space 
powers, South Africa believes current investments 
in its space program and in the development of 
human capital in space-supporting fields will 
allow it to “capture a global market share for 
small to medium sized space systems” within a 
decade.91  Pretoria believes that becoming a 
vendor within the growing international space 
market will help the country realize its goal of 
increasingly shifting to a modern knowledge-
based economy.92   
The country also views investments in space 
programs and capabilities as critical to its 
security—with “security” encompassing both 
traditional national security issues (such as 
protecting national borders) and human security 
matters (such as responding to natural disasters or 
addressing water shortages affecting the health of 
people and crops).93 South Africa does not have a 
dedicated military space program, but recognizes 
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February 2011:8, 
http://www.dut.ac.za/sites/default/files/space_science/S
ANSA%20Strategy.pdf (accessed April 26, 2013).  
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93 Ambassador Mabhongo, statement, UN COPUOS, 
February 15, 2013, 
http://www.sacsa.gov.za/COPUOS/UNCOPUOS_Febr
uary2013_Agenda_item3.pdf (accessed April 26, 2013) 
and SANSA, SANSA Strategic Plan, 2011/13-2013/14: 
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the importance of space assets to national defense 
(including tasks such as border control), regional 
security initiatives, and arms control verification, 
stating that it will develop space assets capable of 
supporting “defense, peacekeeping, and treaty 
monitoring” initiatives.94 
Views on Proposed Space Agreements, Military 
Use of Space, and Space Arms Control 
South Africa’s determination to become 
an important player amongst emerging space 
powers has led the country to devote domestic 
political capital to developing its national space 
program and international diplomatic capital to 
gaining recognition as a key participant within 
negotiating forums on space treaties and 
agreements.95  It became the first African member 
of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1994 and is currently 
one of the most active states within the committee.  
In regard to international space law, in 2011 it 
established a national registry of space objects as 
part of its effort to accede to the 1976 Convention 
on the Registration of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space, and in 2012 it completed ratification 
of the 1972 Convention on International Liability 
for Damage Caused by Space Objects.96    
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Space Programme,” presentation, UNCOPUOS 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, February 18, 
2010, Vienna, Austria and SANSA, SANSA Strategic 
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95 Mothibi Ramusi, “South African Space Affairs,” 
presentation November 22, 2005 
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/sap/2005/nigeria/splawproc
05.pdf in United Nations Office for Outer Space 
Affairs, Meeting International Responsibilities and 
Addressing Domestic Needs, workshop proceedings 
(United Nations: Vienna, 2006): 198-225 and 
Ambassador Mabhongo, statement, Special Committee 
on Decolonization, October 13, 2010, 
http://www.southafrica-
newyork.net/speeches_pmun/view_speech.php?speech
=5864139 (accessed April 26, 2012).  
96 Ratifying and implementing these two treaties is 
viewed by many space-faring states as important 
signals that an emerging space power plans to follow 
treaty and customary international law in its use of 
outer space.  South African Council for Space Affairs, 
“South Africa now Party to Two United Nations 
Conventions on Outer Space,” press release, February 
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“As an emerging space actor,” explained South 
African diplomat Megan Govendar in an October 
19, 2012 General Assembly address on outer 
space issues, “South Africa wishes to contribute to 
the orderly, peaceful and safe utilisation of the 
space environment, for the benefit of all 
nations.”97  Pretoria believes these contributions 
are best made through the United Nations system, 
viewing bodies such as COPUOS as the best 
means for negotiating and implementing accords 
that will address challenges associated with the 3 
C’s and protect the interests of emerging space 
powers.98  South Africa believes it is important to 
support “the development of international norms 
for the use of outer space,” with these norms 
grounded in “principles of fairness, equal access 
and non-discrimination” that protect space – and 
the “benefits” derived from it – for all states, 
including those that are not yet space-faring 
nations.99   
South Africa has also indicated, however, that it 
believes an international agreement or mechanism 
attempting to address space sustainability “need[s] 
to take into account the different circumstances, 
particularly each State’s contribution to the 
evolution of a particular problem and its ability to 
prevent, reduce and control the extent of that 
problem.”100  This echoes the language of other 
emerging space powers (such as India), who 
believe that, while all current space powers must 
act responsibly in space, major space powers bear 
an additional responsibility for clearing debris and 
otherwise taking steps to resolve problems created 
by their past use of space.    
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=5706622 (accessed April 26, 2012).  
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October 13, 2010.  
99 Ambassador Mabhongo, statement, Special 
Committee on Decolonization, October 13, 2010. 
100 Val Munsami, statement, UN COPUOS, February 
18, 2013, 
http://www.sacsa.gov.za/COPUOS/UNCOPUOS_Febr
uary2013_Agenda_item_13.pdf (accessed April 26, 
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In the past, South Africa has supported 
multilateral initiatives aimed at negotiating an 
international legal framework for limiting or 
banning armaments from outer space.  It has 
regularly supported PAROS resolutions at the UN 
General Assembly, for example.101  It has also 
argued at the UN CD that the international 
community must take steps to prevent the 
deployment of weapons in space, with South 
African representative Michael Combrink stating 
in February 2011, “If we wait for space to become 
weaponized before we take action, it will not be 
long before we have to find yet another cure for 
something that could have been prevented—the 
proliferation of weapons in outer space.”102    
Beyond PAROS, however, Pretoria has stopped 
short of directly endorsing a new international 
space draft treaty or agreement.103  Within his 
February 2011 statement, for example, Combrink 
stated that South Africa “particularly appreciates 
the efforts of the Chinese and Russian delegations 
and their ideas on moving the process forward,” 
but did not expressly support the PPWT.  South 
Africa, he continued, supported the CD 
“negotiating an international instrument” on 
preventing arms competitions in space.104  The use 
of general terms such as “ideas” and “instrument” 
(the latter could refer to a legally binding treaty or 
politically binding agreement) within his 
statement likely reflects Pretoria’s interest in 
participating in future space arms control talks 
without tipping its hand regarding what type of 
diplomatic agreement it is prepared to support.   
                                                          
101 South Africa, for example, supported the last three 
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South Africa’s current engagement with 
international efforts to address the 3 C’s is 
through a scientific and technical expert: Peter 
Martinez, Ph.D., Chair of South Africa’s Council 
on Space Affairs.  At present, he is the Chair of 
COPUOS’ Working Group on the Long Term 
Sustainability of Outer Space Activities and is 
also a member of the UN GGE.105  The Working 
Group will report its findings to the United 
Nations in 2014, with the final text prepared by 
Martinez.106  South Africa’s national delegation at 
COPUOS firmly backs the efforts of Martinez and 
his colleagues on both expert committees. 107   
Although not tasked with addressing the military 
use of space, the work of the Sustainability 
Working Group may produce findings and 
recommendations that are relevant to ongoing 
international debates on national security and 
outer space.  The group is currently investigating 
possible “best practices” for addressing current 
threats to the safety of space operations (such as 
space debris) and assessing current regulatory 
frameworks (at both national and international 
levels) governing or guiding the use of space, with 
an eye toward identifying general “technical 
standards” and “guidance” that could serve as 
possible benchmarks for all space actors.108  
Martinez’ views on addressing the challenge of 
maintaining the “sustainability” of space may 
reflect South Africa’s experience as a partner of 
both established and emerging space powers.  He 
has noted, for example, that major powers are 
primarily concerned with enhancing space 
“security” (in order to protect their current 
operations and assets in space), while emerging 
powers with few space assets worry more about 
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0Oct%202011.pdf (accessed April 26, 2013).  
preserving space accessibility for future potential 
operations and assets.  The latter thus oppose any 
measures making it more difficult or expensive to 
place or operate objects in space and are generally 
wary of major powers endorsing measures that act 
as “double standards” preserving their use of 
space at the expense of others.109 
South Africa is an emerging space power that 
recognizes the potential benefits of space assets 
for the security of its citizens, whether in terms of 
securing its borders or protecting its population 
from natural disasters.  It is interested in the future 
development of a military space program, 
although it would likely initially pursue systems 
with dual civilian/military uses – a path Brazil is 
pursuing and not dissimilar to the EU’s approach 
to developing satellites with capabilities that will 
be shared by civilian agencies and military 
services.110  Civilian science and commercial 
programs, however, come first for South Africa – 
and many emerging space powers – due to limits 
on resources and an interest in strategic 
investment in capabilities that will either generate 
future revenue (allowing a country to capture a 
niche in the international space market) or save 
costs (by improving use of water and other scarce 
resources).  This focus on civilian applications, 
and recognition that South Africa will not possess 
space defense/deterrence capabilities in the near 
future, leads Pretoria to preach caution on issues 
surrounding the military use of space and urge all 
states to protect outer space as an open, peaceful 
environment.  However, as a state that, on space 
issues, is outside of the complex dynamics driving 
competition between some of the larger space 
powers, South Africa – and the country’s space 
                                                          
109 Peter Martinez, “The UN COPUOS Working Group 
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experts, such as Martinez – can play an important 
role in exploring avenues of potential cooperation, 
to include possible confidence-building measures, 
for all space-faring nations.  
 
UNITED STATES AND EMERGING SPACE 
POWERS:  POTENTIAL AREAS OF 
AGREEMENT AND ISSUES TO ADDRESS 
What conclusions can we draw from this 
survey of the civilian and military space programs 
of these three emerging space powers and their 
views on the military use of space and space arms 
control?  
1. The United States must continue to 
patiently and persistently counter statements 
from other states regarding the possible near-
term or “imminent” weaponization of space 
and/or the likelihood of major powers initiating 
an arms race within space.   
The United States represents the world’s only 
current superpower, both on Earth and in outer 
space.  Of importance, even a rising space power 
such as India, which claims it can quickly 
assemble an ASAT, currently only possesses a 
nascent and relatively limited military space 
program (whether measured in terms of personnel 
or capabilities).  Brazil’s military is still waiting 
for its first satellite, and South Africa recognizes 
the defense applications of a military space 
program but currently devotes all of its resources 
to civilian space assets.  As a military space power 
with dedicated constellations of military satellites, 
an air force major command devoted to space, and 
military space assets and operations fully 
integrated across critical mission areas, the United 
States remains far ahead of the military space 
programs of even the most capable emerging 
space powers.  
As a result of this imbalance, many emerging 
space powers – including those on friendly terms 
with the United States – are wary of U.S. military 
space programs and future U.S. intentions 
regarding the development of new military 
capabilities for space.  Moreover, they have 
observed the United States consistently voting 
against PAROS resolutions within the UN 
General Assembly – often as a minority of one – 
and registering its opposition to initiatives seeking 
legally binding measures to ban weapons and 
conflict in outer space.  Inasmuch as only a 
handful of space-faring states have fully supported 
draft texts such as the PPWT, many emerging 
space powers have communicated their concern 
that military competition in space, however 
realized, may make access to space too dangerous 
and costly for actors that cannot afford to develop 
or deploy sophisticated military space assets.  
These concerns are readily on display in the 
public statements made by emerging space powers 
at the UN First Committee, UN CD, UN 
COPOUS, and other diplomatic forums.   
The prospects of a major power arms race in outer 
space are extremely remote.  Significantly, during 
the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union 
reached agreement on leaving the Moon and other 
celestial bodies free of military fortifications and 
banning nuclear weapons tests and deployments in 
outer space.  Moreover, both countries voluntarily 
suspended their ASAT programs due in part to a 
realization these weapons, even if successful in 
destroying enemy satellites, would cause debris 
that could damage or destroy the attacking states’ 
own space systems.  The large price tags 
associated with developing, placing, and operating 
weapons platforms in space are also likely to 
dissuade many governments from considering 
these types of systems.    
In this context, warnings regarding possible arms 
races in space can appear curiously misplaced, a 
relic of the darker days of the Cold War.  This is 
not to overlook the potential problems posed by 
China and India’s interest in ground-based ASATs, 
but these systems – while representing threats to 
space-based assets – are a far cry from the threat 
to space safety, security, and stability posed by an 
orbital weapons platform.   
Fortunately, such a military system exists only in 
the realm of science fiction.  Statements by 
emerging space powers on potential arms races in 
outer space, however, reflect a real fear that their 
space assets are highly vulnerable and that they 
cannot, for the foreseeable future, come close to 
the military space programs (however configured) 
of the established space powers.  Left unaddressed, 
these concerns threaten to seriously complicate 
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efforts by the United States and its allies to focus 
attention on the 3 C’s.  They also increase the 
likelihood that emerging powers will support 
broad proposals seeking to limit military activities 
in space that the United States will oppose either 
due to their lack of verification measures or 
infringement upon the lawful use of space by U.S. 
military assets.  The United States should continue 
to patiently and persistently reiterate in 
international negotiating forums – and bilaterals 
with emerging space powers – that it has no plans 
to build, test, or deploy space-based offensive 
weapons systems.   
2. Key emerging space powers will, 
however, increasingly distinguish between non-
weaponized military space systems and “space 
weapons,” opening opportunities for direct 
dialogues and quiet diplomacy on military 
space matters. 
While a number of emerging space 
powers fear the possibility that major powers 
might place weapons in space, the increasing 
availability of satellite technology – and 
increasing importance of satellite communications 
and imagery – has also led several of these states 
to recognize the significant national security 
benefits of placing non-weaponized military 
satellites (or dual civilian-military satellites) in 
outer space.  For example, of the three emerging 
space powers discussed in this analysis, Brazil 
represents the strongest proponent of a legally 
binding ban on weapons in outer space and is a 
vocal critic of states that have not agreed to 
discuss this type of ban within the CD.  Brazil, 
however, also views the development of a 
military-civilian secure communications satellite 
as a top priority for its national space program.  
As discussed above, it recognizes that satellite 
imagery is vital to protecting its borders and 
natural resources from state and non-state actors.   
Moreover, India, Brazil, and South Africa 
all seek synergy between national space policies, 
defense strategies, and economic development 
priorities.  The increasing integration of defense, 
development, and space goals reflects their 
realization that having a presence in space – to 
include systems wholly or partly assigned to 
national security tasks – is critically important in a 
globalized, networked, 21st century geopolitical 
environment.   
These developments help create opportunities for 
positive dialogues between the United States and 
emerging space powers on the legitimate, peaceful 
use of space through the deployment of military 
assets.  Many emerging space powers have either 
espoused – or been influenced by – negative 
arguments positing the military use of space as 
inherently dangerous and destabilizing.  This 
dichotomy, however, appears to be breaking 
down; in its place, the United States is well-
positioned to advocate on behalf of military 
systems using outer space in the same manner that 
the international community recognizes the right 
of military vessels to use the high seas.  
Furthermore, while the United States does not 
discuss the economic benefits of space in terms of 
“development,” the development/defense/space 
concept held by emerging space powers is similar 
to long-standing U.S. views that a robust military 
space program helps create the conditions for the 
free, open, and safe use of space by all responsible 
space actors – conditions that, in turn, are vital to 
peace and economic prosperity.   
In short, the increasing normalization and 
regularization of military space systems to the 
national plans of emerging space powers will 
likely allow future bilateral discussions between 
the United States and these countries on the 
military use of space to focus on areas of 
agreement and perhaps even identify areas of 
future potential cooperation (such as activities 
related to verification of multilateral treaties).      
3. Emerging powers support exploring 
new transparency and confidence-building 
measures (TCBMs) to address some or all of 
the 3 C’s and also support the UN GGE 
approach to developing these proposals.   
Emerging space powers are broadly supportive of 
greater transparency between national space 
programs, welcoming exchanges of information 
on space policies and activities.  Many believe 
efforts to improve space security are hampered by 
the major powers’ reluctance to share more 
information about their space activities.  States 
such as Brazil and South Africa, for example, do 
not believe they currently face any military 
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adversaries in space.  As such, they do not 
anticipate any risks in sharing information on their 
space programs with foreign states.   
Emerging powers also welcome discussion of new 
TCBMs for state activities in outer space.  India, 
for example, despite its concerns regarding 
China’s potential military space capabilities, has 
indicated it can support TCBMs as an interim step 
toward a future legally binding agreement on 
space.  India may calculate that helping overcome 
Beijing’s general reluctance to share information 
on its military space- or ground-based ASAT 
programs provides greater long-term benefits than 
the costs of sharing some information on its own 
(relatively limited) military space program.   
In addition, it appears that a number of emerging 
space powers have joined established space-faring 
states in concluding that the PPWT and ICoC 
approaches to addressing elements of the 3 C’s 
both failed to garner a broad base of support 
across the community of space-faring nations.  
For many states, TCBMs to ameliorate specific 
problems such as space traffic management or 
kinetic energy ASAT testing represent a potential 
third way to break this impasse.  While states such 
as Brazil and India have stated that TCBMs are 
not a substitute for a legally binding treaty 
addressing space security issues, they have also 
stated that these measures could represent either 
catalysts or building blocks for a future accord.   
Furthermore, the inclusion of experts from a range 
of space-faring nations within the UN GGE 
addresses the emerging space power concern that 
they are often shut out of major power discussions 
on important space issues.  The participation of 
Brazilian and South African experts in the GGE 
increases the likelihood these states will support 
the recommendations of the group on proposals 
for new space TCBMs.  With both states viewing 
themselves as bearing a responsibility to speak on 
behalf of the community of emerging space 
powers, these experts bring a broad perspective to 
space security and stability issues that will help 
the GGE develop TCBMs that can gain the 
approval of a broad range of space-faring states. 
CONCLUSION:  CONFRONTING THE 3 C’s 
WITH EMERGING SPACE POWERS 
WHILE PROTECTING THE LEGITIMATE 
MILITARY USE OF SPACE 
Emerging space powers share many of the 
same concerns as the United States on the 3 C’s.  
This raises the prospect of future cooperation in 
addressing these challenges—cooperation that 
could include efforts to negotiate future 
international space agreements.   
In discussing, drafting, or reviewing these 
agreements, however, the United States must 
ensure it protects its critical military operations 
and assets in outer space.  In working with 
emerging powers, the United States should 
recognize that many of these states lack robust 
military space programs, are uncertain of the 
future military space plans of the United States, 
and are deeply concerned that major space powers 
may undertake military actions that, whether 
directly or indirectly, severely limit or prevent 
their own access to space.  As a result, their 
efforts to address aspects of the 3 C’s may include 
inequitable, unverifiable, or simply unworkable 
proposals with the potential to negatively impact 
the U.S. military’s legitimate use of space.  
However, emerging powers increasingly 
recognize their economies and populations can 
reap significant benefits from national or shared 
space assets and, moreover, that military space 
operations can play a key role in enabling and 
protecting these systems within an insecure space 
environment.   
As a result, the United States will likely find it 
increasingly possible to have useful dialogues 
with these countries on a broad range of TCBMs 
or other multilateral space accords that approach 
the military use of space as a potential “force 
multiplier” for the public good—and help them 
protect their limited, valuable space assets that 
have dual national security/civilian applications.  
Building bridges between established and 
emerging space powers will help the United States 
find partners in ongoing efforts to improve the 
safety, security, and stability of outer space and 
will also protect the U.S. military’s ability to 
continue the responsible, legal use of space to 
enable critical missions around the globe and 
across the “high frontier.”  
 Article  
 
 





The world relies heavily on services 
provided by satellite assets, but ensuring the 
safety and security of those assets is extremely 
difficult.1  Classic deterrence approaches rely 
almost exclusively on the threat of force to 
dissuade one state from acting against the interests 
of another.  Although classic deterrence was 
arguably successful against a single adversary 
during the Cold War, it seems insufficient in the 
current multipolar strategic environment.   In 
addition to state actors, the strategic environment 
is complicated by a number of non-state players in 
space. Some scholars present a theory in which a 
state could dominate earth if it could only achieve 
military control of space.2  This article does not 
address that approach nor does it address 
weaponization although it does touch on dual use 
of space.  Instead, it addresses whether it may be 
time to examine additional, complementary 
actions that could supplement classic deterrence 
actions.   Specifically, this paper examines the 
potential to use international arbitration and 
litigation mechanisms to complement classic 
deterrence actions.  
The Current Space Strategic Environment 
The global economic and security arenas 
rapidly are becoming information based.  States 
increasingly rely on space capabilities to send and 
receive information they must have to pursue their 
security interests. Under some current economic 
                                                          
1 Ms. Kasku-Jackson teaches space related policy and 
strategy at the National Security Space Institute.  She 
holds a Juris Doctorate from New England School of 
Law and a BA from Oregon State University.  The 
conclusions and opinions expressed in this document 
are those of the author.  They do not reflect the official 
position of the U.S. Government, Department of 
Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air 
University.  
2 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical 
Geopolitics in the Space Age, (London:Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2002), Chapter 6. 
theories, information is also an essential element 
that impacts a state’s economy.3  While there are a 
number of ways to move information from place 
to place, commercial space capabilities play a 
critical role in transporting that information.  That 
role is reflected in the growth in the commercial 
space industry.   
In 2012, the global space industry (commercial 
space revenues and government space spending 
together) was assessed to be $304.31B. 
Commercial space products and services 
accounted for $115.97B.  The market for satellite 
communications (SATCOM), assessed to be 
$113.61B, is expected to continue to increase.  
Some research assesses there will be 220 million 
homes in 80 countries that receive Direct-to-
Home Television (DHT) services by 2017.4  
While some might not consider DHT information 
services essential to a state, they are used for tele-
education and telemedicine, which are important 
state interests.  The DHT market also reflects the 
growing individual and business interest in 
SATCOM.   
In 2012 revenue for the SATCOM sector was 
assessed to be $19.32B, and approximately half of 
those revenues were generated by only four 
providers - Intelsat, SES, Eutelsat, and Telsat.   
The growing  market for space capabilities to 
support state and non-state players indicates the 
vested interest  both users and providers of space 
services have in ensuring satellites transporting 
critical information remain untouched.  Because 
SATCOM makes up such a large portion of the 
space industry, it will serve as a good context to 
examine whether international dispute resolution 
                                                          
3 Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy, 
Understanding the International Economic Order, 
(Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2001), 
discussing his “New Economic Theories.” 
4 The Space Report The Authoritative Guide to Global 
Space Activity, The Space Foundation (2013), 31. 
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mechanisms (arbitration and litigation) could be 
suitable complements to deterrence.   
Deterrence Then and Now 
It is useful to examine the development of 
classic deterrence and consider its weakness 
before examining international dispute resolution 
mechanisms.  Deterrence strategy was developed 
by U.S. policy makers during the Cold War and 
was intended to prevent two superpowers with 
nuclear weapons from using those weapons. Each 
superpower attempted to influence the other to 
prevent an undesired behavior.  Each state 
weighed the potential cost of its proposed action 
against the potential benefit of that action.  Three 
elements were, and still are, required for 
deterrence to work.  First, the state wishing to 
dissuade the other must have the capability for 
coercion.  Second, it must be perceived to have 
the intent to use that capability. Finally, it must 
clearly communicate that intent to the state it 
wishes to deter.  As deterrence strategy matured 
during the Cold War, two aspects developed.  One 
aspect, general deterrence, is based on current 
power relationships and attempts to prevent an 
adversary from seriously considering any kind of 
military challenge because of expected adverse 
consequences. 5   [Emphasis added]. The second 
aspect, immediate deterrence, has been described 
as “specific” and it attempts to forestall an 
anticipated challenge to a well-defined and 
publicized commitment.  It is practiced when 
general deterrence is thought to be failing.6   
[Emphasis added].  It is essential to note that 
deterrence has been developed as a way to prevent 
undesired action between states and not nationals 
or corporations within the state.   
A primary weakness with classic deterrence is that 
it was developed to focus on a single state in a 
bipolar environment.  According to Avery 
                                                          
5 Richard Ned Lebow, “Deterrence” (New York: 
Routledge Handbook of Security Studies, 2010), 397, 
quoting P.M. Morgan’s Deterrence: A Conceptual 
Analysis, 2nd Edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1983). 
6 Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st 
Century, China, Britain, France, and the Enduring 
Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution, (Stanford CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), 22-24. 
Goldstein, a state must not only consider what an 
opposing state believes, it must also consider 
allies and partners in its calculations.7 This was 
not a problem during the Cold War when there 
were only two players but it is now in the current 
multipolar environment.  He also asserts a large 
state may not act against smaller states with 
impunity or its reputation might be damaged and 
that it must protect smaller partners from 
undesired actions of others in order to preserve its 
own reputation.8  In space there are a handful of 
major space players but numerous smaller players 
and each has its own interests to protect. This 
environment provides many opportunities for 
complications and misunderstandings.  Applying 
deterrence to that environment is problematic.   
Another weakness of deterrence is that it assumes 
each state’s definition of “rational” is the same.  
As Keith Payne points out, a key assumption of 
nuclear deterrence between the United States and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
was that each state was rational.  During the Cold 
War the United States believed the USSR was a 
rational actor as the United States defined 
“rational.”  According to U.S. calculations both 
states were assessed to be mutually vulnerable to 
the other’s nuclear arsenal.  Therefore neither 
would initiate a nuclear war since it would lead to 
the mutual destruction of both.  The United States 
believed this ability to mutually destroy each 
other created stability.  It appears however that the 
U.S. and USSR definitions of “rational” differed 
considerably.  The United States considered 
nuclear war to be unthinkable and assumed the 
USSR believed the same. Evidence now shows 
that USSR war plans actually included use of 
nuclear weapons in Western Europe during the 
very early stages of a war.  The USSR expectation 
of the United States appeared to be shaped more 
by ideology than by Western deterrence theory.9   
This most basic misunderstanding seems to be 
exacerbated by the fact that the personal interests 
                                                          
7 Goldstein, Deterrence and Security,  22-24. 
8 Ibid.   
9 Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War 
Deterrence and a New Direction, (Kentucky, The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 18-26. 
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and beliefs of a state leader may significantly 
influence what a state considers to be rational.10    
Difficulties with “Space Deterrence” 
 
There have been a number of recent 
attempts to adapt classic deterrence theory into 
“space deterrence.”  Under space deterrence, as in 
classic deterrence, relative dominance between 
states is very important.  Deterrence will likely be 
less effective if there is little relative difference 
between the players since a significantly weaker 
power, such as North Korea, has little to lose and 
much to gain.  Although the major spacefaring 
nations may be competing to dominate the space 
medium, numerous other states have a limited 
presence in space or aspire to have a presence in 
space.  While the prestige associated with a 
presence in space is great, small or aspiring states 
rely very little on space to directly secure their 
national interests.  This leads to a situation where 
a handful of major actors, heavily reliant on space, 
are disproportionally vulnerable to many small 
states.  The stability previously promised by 
mutually assured destruction between two major 
states is lost.  It may therefore be dangerous to 
extrapolate classic nuclear deterrence into space 
deterrence.   
Another key weakness in applying classic 
deterrence to space is the difficulty in attributing 
interference with a satellite to a specific actor. 
There is general agreement that interference 
ranges from temporary and non-destructive to 
complete destruction.  However, there appears to 
be no specific, generally accepted definition of 
“interference”.  The Outer Space Treaty11 does not 
specifically define interference although it 
requires parties to undertake appropriate 
consultations if their activities in outer space 
“would cause potential harmful interference with 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 40-46.  For example, Saddam Hussein was said 
to glorify war; Mao Zedong viewed himself as god-like 
and unaccountable; and Syria’s Defense Minister 
Mustafa Tlas was greatly fond of an Italian film star 
and ordered his forces to not harm Italian soldiers 
during a truck bombing. 
11 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 
January 1967.  
activities of other States Parties…”12   The 
proposed Treaty on the Prevention of the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat 
or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects uses 
the terms “use of force” and “threat of force”13  
instead. The proposed Code of Conduct 14 defines 
anti-satellite weapons and space weapons but not 
interference.   
 
Since treaties do not define interference, states are 
free to interpret as they see fit. The U.S. National 
Space Policy specifically mentions both 
interference and attack.15  Japan’s Basic Plan on 
Space Policy uses the term interference only in the 
context of navigation satellites being susceptible 
to “interference from other radio stations.” 16  The 
English translation of the Whitepaper on China’s 
Space Activities in 2011 does not even use the 
term “interference”.17  The absence of a clear 
definition of interference may provide a great 
amount of flexibility to the states to protect their 
interests.  It also may provide the greatest amount 
of instability as states are uncertain what activities 
would be considered interference and therefore 
likely to provoke a response.  
 
Assuming an interfering actor could be identified, 
it is highly unlikely a state would retaliate due to 
                                                          
12 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 
January 1967. Article IX. 
13 The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force 
Against Outer Space Objects. Article I(e).  
http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/0D6E0C64D34F8CF
AC32573EE002D082A. 
14 Model Code of Conduct for the Prevention of 
Incidents and Dangerous Military Practices in Outer 
Space. http://www.space-
library.com/0407HLSC_CodeOfConduct.pdf. Article I 
5,6. 
15  National Space Policy of the United States of  
America, 28 June 2010. “Principles.”  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_
space_policy_6-28-10.pdf. 
16 Basic Plan on Space Policy, Strategic Headquarters 
for Space Policy, Government of Japan. 25 January 
2013. 
17 China’s Space Activities in 2011, Information Office 
of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China, 
Beijing, December 2011. 
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intentional much less accidental inference.  There 
is too high a chance that retaliation could escalate 
a conflict out of control.18  It would also be very 
difficult for a state to meaningfully retaliate 
against the interfering actor—especially if it had 
little or no presence in space.  In addition to the 
technological limitations associated with 
identifying who is interfering with a satellite, 
there are other political and legal factors to 
consider.  Goldstein points out that a state must 
not only consider what an opposing state believes, 
but must also consider allies and partners in its 
calculations.  Furthermore, he asserts a large state 
may not act against smaller states with impunity 
or its reputation might be tarnished.  Conversely it 
must protect smaller partners from undesired 
actions of others in order to preserve its 
reputation.19   
In space there are only a handful of major players 
but there are numerous smaller players that must 
be considered.  Payne posits a framework that 
focuses on identifying potential challengers and 
building a profile of each to develop deterrence 
actions.20  A framework that profiles each small 
state challenger is almost essential to conduct cost 
benefit analyses.  However, this approach, tailored 
to specific challengers, would require significant 
resources.  Practical application also would be 
daunting as developing and considering profiles of 
60 or more states would complicate calculations 
to the point of uselessness.  Additionally, a state 
would need to consider any unintended 
consequences to each state for every action it 
takes. 
In contrast to Payne, Forest E. Morgan examines a 
first-strike capability in which two or more states 
are mutually deterred not to attack first, thus 
creating stability.  It focuses on each side’s force 
posture and the balance of capabilities and 
vulnerabilities that could make a crisis unstable 
should a confrontation occur.21  Although nuclear 
                                                          
18 Damon Coletta, “Space and Deterrence”, 
Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space 
Politics & Policy (November 2009).  
19 Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st 
Century, 22-24. 
20 Payne, Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence, 104-114. 
21 Forest E. Morgan, Deterrence and First-Strike 
Stability, A Preliminary Assessment (Santa 
weapons are not involved, Morgan sees a number 
of parallels to a first-strike capability in space.  He 
notes that satellites are difficult to defend and that 
it could be very costly if deterrence fails.  
Additionally he asserts that both nuclear and 
space deterrence have significant thresholds 
which could lead to reprisal and escalation if they 
are crossed.22  Morgan seems to extend the 
fundamental tenets of nuclear deterrence to space 
deterrence.   
However, he also asserts that thresholds of 
deterrence would differ depending on the specific 
space system involved and the level of war.  
Reversible attacks would be less severely 
punished while destructive attacks that create 
debris would be more severely attacked.  Nuclear 
detonations in space, for example, would be most 
severely punished.23  Morgan’s approach also 
assumes that space deterrence would become a 
function of escalation and that “a savvy adversary 
might continue to abstain from destroying U.S. 
satellites in a limited war for fears of escalating 
the conflict…”24  However, he also notes there are 
some circumstances in which an adversary might 
not be deterred from using any level of destructive 
force in space, particularly if the state feels an 
existential threat or if it believes it can absorb the 
punishment necessary to benefit from its actions.25  
For example, North Korea insists it needs nuclear 
capabilities to protect itself from being annihilated 
by the U.S.  However its reliance on space is 
virtually non-existent.  Therefore, it is very 
unlikely it would be deterred from using any level 
of force in space.  There is also the underlying 
problem that Payne identifies where a leader’s 
personal beliefs will impact the definition of 
“savvy” and any cost benefit analysis conducted.  
Furthermore, it complicates attempts to deny an 
adversary the benefits of its actions, and Morgan 
                                                                                          
Monica:RAND Corporation, 2010), 2, citing Glenn A. 
Kent and David E. Thaler, First-Strike Stability: A 
Method for Evaluating Strategic Forces (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989). 
22 Ibid., 2. 
23 Ibid., 17. 
24 Ibid.,18. 
25 Ibid., 20-21, 26. 
 Kasku-Jackson/International Commercial Avenues 30 
suggests emphasizing resilience of space systems 
to mitigate that issue.26 
Jay Finch and Shawne Steene continue the line of 
reasoning laid out by Morgan.  Unlike Morgan, 
they assert critical differences between space 
systems and nuclear weapons necessarily change 
how deterrence theory would be applied.  Similar 
to Morgan they base their analysis on the 
assumption that counterspace weapons range from 
those that cause reversible damage to a target to 
those that permanently destroy a target.27  Finch 
and Steene assert that because of this, space 
deterrence should work on two levels.  On one 
level, deterrence threats should discourage actions 
that cause either reversible or permanent harm to a 
satellite system.  On a second level, stability in 
space must also be considered in a broader 
deterrence relationship between potential 
adversaries. 28  They point to developing 
international norms as a means to condition 
adversaries as to what is acceptable and what is 
not.29   
Norms are common understandings, accepted by 
most participants.  Given the difficulty of getting 
the major space players to agree on a set of norms 
regarding activities in space, it is unlikely that 
those who don’t agree with the norms would be 
deterred.  The authors do examine enhancing 
resilience, augmentation, and the ability to operate 
in a degraded environment, and they recommend 
tailoring specific approaches to specific 
situations.30   There seems to be broad recognition 
of difficulties with extrapolating classic 
deterrence into space.  It is particularly difficult in 
the event of interference with a consortium-owned, 
commercial satellite.  
The practical difficulties in applying 
classic deterrence to space seem to argue for 
additional complementary non-deterrence actions 
to dissuade interference with satellites.  Karl 
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Mueller includes a “rewards and reassurance” 
aspect to his discussion of deterrence in which a 
state “seeks to make aggression or escalation less 
attractive by making the status quo look more 
beneficial or less dangerous to the potential 
adversary.”31   Using international dispute 
resolution mechanisms could contribute to 
increasing the appeal of the status quo, thus 
contributing to Mueller’s “rewards and 
reassurance” subset of deterrence.  Because 
dispute resolution is not state specific, it is 
considered to be a contributor to deterrence and 
not a subset of deterrence. Actions that are not 
state-focused might be useful when commercial 
entities are involved.   
 
Determining what is commercial, however, is 
difficult since the terms of the space treaties do 
not determine whether activities are for national 
security, civil, or commercial purposes.  Often, 
security-civil and commercial space activities 
blend together into dual use.  This is exacerbated 
by the way in which states organize their space 
programs.  For example the U.S. has a civil sector, 
a defense/intelligence sector and a commercial 
sector.  The commercial sector includes 
corporations whose primary customers are the 
civil and defense/intelligence sectors.  However, 
they are still considered commercial.  China does 
not differentiate between its sectors and the exact 
role played by the military, the corporations and 
the different academic institutions is unclear.32  
Many of its corporations are state owned but are 
still arguably commercial since they are not an 
official state agency.   
 
Since it is possible to define commercial to 
include entities with significant state involvement, 
the option to use dispute resolution channels may 
be available. Commercial satellite service 
providers sell a wide variety of services to an 
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Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, 
Michael Krepon & Julia Thompson, eds. (Stimson, 
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extensive clientele that may or may not be states.  
Due to that wide clientele and their relative 
monopoly on satellite services, commercial 
satellite providers seem to wield increasing 
influence in the current global economic 
environment.  Deterrence, as previously discussed, 
applies to states not individuals.  It is worthwhile, 
then, to examine different concepts of state 
sovereignty as they could influence any course of 
action chosen. 
   
Deterrence approaches assume the current 
Westphalian definition of sovereignty, which 
delineates a clear relationship between 
sovereignty, territory, and the state.33  This poses 
some difficulty when discussing activities in space 
since the Outer Space Treaty forbids claims of 
sovereignty.34  Jill Stuart argues for an alternative 
concept of sovereignty in which outer space has 
been delinked or “unbundled” from territory.35  
Her idea of cosmopolitan sovereignty would treat 
outer space as an issue-area, inherently 
transnational, which contributes to its greater 
sense of global community.36  Under this new 
formulation individuals are the primary political 
agents,37 which would seem to support using 
systems designed to be used by individuals rather 
than states.   
However, it is unclear whether cosmopolitan 
sovereignty is achievable or desired.  Even if 
space is considered to be inherently transnational, 
there will almost certainly be actions or effects 
within inter-state politics.  Some sort of dispute 
resolution mechanisms would still need to be 
developed.  Rather than attempting to change the 
current sovereignty definitions and concepts, it 
would be simpler and more achievable to use 
current dispute resolution processes.  Using 
international dispute resolution mechanisms, 
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available to both nationals of a state and the states 
themselves, would preclude neither Westphalian 
sovereignty nor the cosmopolitan concept of 
sovereignty.  Indeed, agents within this regime 
collectively could support traditional Westphalian 
sovereignty or construct cosmopolitan sovereignty 
as desired.   
International Business Interests and Dispute 
Resolution Processes 
 Although applying deterrence alone 
within the current strategic space environment 
may be insufficient, using a complementary, non-
deterrence approach could be useful.  Such an 
approach would not be based on the international 
space treaties but would be based on international 
dispute resolution laws and processes.  Since the 
world today is dependent on information in a way 
not historically seen, the focus of any actions 
should be on protecting that information.  Rather 
than focusing on the threat of force, let the U.S. 
consider leveraging economic entanglement 
between commercial space providers and the 
states.   
Commercial space providers supply invaluable 
global information transportation capabilities.  
States, individuals, nongovernmental 
organizations, and businesses all contract for 
space services.  Arguably, commercial space 
providers may be seen as having a 
disproportionate amount of economic and political 
influence due to their near monopoly of the 
market.  Since there are very few providers of a 
particular space service, a provider may choose 
not to sell services to a customer it deems a risk to 
future revenues.  A provider could also charge a 
higher price for one customer than another 
regardless of whether the customer is a state, an 
individual, or another non-state entity.   Because 
of this, it seems sensible to look at international 
business interests and dispute-resolution processes.   
International business practices, dispute resolution 
processes, and enforcement mechanisms are fairly 
well documented and accepted.  There are a 
number of international business norms and 
international legal regimes designed to regulate 
and enforce contractual obligations among 
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international business organizations.38  Using 
established dispute resolution processes sidesteps 
the political sensitivities associated with 
deterrence and its focus on use of force. Using 
both dispute resolution and deterrence are possible 
since, in general, both states and businesses are 
concerned with two foundational interests.   
Both are concerned with security and prosperity in 
one form or another.  Commercial entities appear 
to be interested in profit and secure markets.  
States are concerned with national security and 
prosperity.  Both commercial and state interests 
are inextricably intertwined.  In order for a state to 
be secure, it must have sufficient resources, labor, 
and technology to defend itself from external 
threats and care for its domestic population.  
Traditionally, resources are considered to be 
physical materials that reside within a state’s 
borders.  In the context of this article, the primary 
resource in question is information that routinely 
crosses state borders.  Secondary resources are 
considered to be the commercial SATCOM 
satellites transporting that information.  The states 
have an interest in protecting both the information 
and the SATCOM satellites themselves.  However, 
in order for the commercial SATCOM providers 
to transport the information states require, the 
providers must be profitable and stable.  To be 
profitable, commercial SATCOM providers need 
a stable environment in which they can conduct 
business.  They seek to establish a reputation for 
reliability that will facilitate an expanded 
customer base and secure long term markets.  The 
responsibility of the state is to provide that stable 
environment.  However, the state needs 
information to inform and shape the actions it 
needs to take to ensure that stability.  States and 
commercial providers, therefore, are mutually 
reliant on the other.   
In some cases, immediate or short-term interests 
may conflict.  For example, a state might have a 
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security requirement that requires it to remain 
technologically more advanced than its neighbors.  
If the state chooses to satisfy that need by strictly 
regulating technology, it may adversely affect the 
commercial providers it relies on.  If the controls 
are too onerous, then commercial SATCOM 
providers may lose the opportunity to partner with 
other commercial providers or might not even be 
allowed to provide services to other parties.  The 
result could be commercial providers are no 
longer able to compete in the international market, 
threatening short-term profitability and long-term 
markets.  In one sense, the state is more secure 
because the flow of technology has been reduced, 
allowing it to stay ahead of other states.  In 
another sense the state’s security is actually 
reduced because information it needs to pursue its 
security interests is no longer available from 
commercial providers.  In some cases, states 
become primary customers for SATCOM services, 
regardless of a politically stable environment, 
simply to ensure that commercial providers 
survive.39  
Given the importance states place on the 
information they receive from commercial 
providers, entanglement of interests is 
unsurprising.  It is also unsurprising because states 
typically desire to protect technological 
advantages developed by the commercial space 
sector.  Scott Pace asserts dual-use space 
technologies “have a great potential to shape 
which national capabilities actually occur and 
whether American interests are advanced or 
harmed as they are adopted in global markets.”40  
Adoption of technology that shapes the ways a 
state pursues its national interests is important, 
and the information provided by that technology 
is as important.   
There is some concern about potential 
ramifications of commercial businesses providing 
space capabilities for an adversarial actor that 
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might be unable to develop its own capabilities.41  
However, the number of states and commercial 
entities that can do this is extremely limited.  Few 
have the monetary and intellectual capital 
necessary to develop, build, and operate any 
satellite system, much less sophisticated, 
expensive, communications satellites.  Of more 
concern is the fact that commercial SATCOM 
providers are usually made up of a consortium of 
actors.  These satellite communications companies 
are also often in partnership with each other.  
Commercial SATCOM providers effectively 
monopolize space capabilities states need to 
pursue their national interests giving them 
disproportionate influence in political and 
economic arenas.  According to Robert Gilpin, 
even in democracies, a relatively elite group of 
players tend to determine national interest and 
foreign policy within a state.42  Commercial space 
providers could be considered one such powerful 
elite.  If their domination of the SATCOM market 
did not make them powerful actors in itself, then 
the states’ heavy reliance on their services and 
technologies would.  
International Commercial Business 
Interests 
As a powerful group, it would not be 
surprising if commercial space providers were to 
attempt to influence international markets to their 
advantage.43  The commercial sector has already 
demonstrated its global influence when it created 
data associations in which satellite companies 
share data amongst themselves.  The Space Data 
Association (SDA) was created in order to 
supplement or replace the data previously 
provided via state resources.  In 2009, an Iridium 
satellite and an inactive Russian-owned Kosmos 
satellite collided.44  In 2010, a communications 
                                                          
41 Annals of Air and Space Law, Vol. XXX-II, 
(Montreal:McGill University, 2005), 398. 
42 Gilpin, Global Political Economy, 18 
43 Ibid., 78.  Gilpin presumes that states, multinational 
corporations, and other powerful actors attempt to use 
their power to influence the nature of international 
regimes. 
44 Peter B. de Selding, “Intelsat Moving Recovered 
Galaxy 15 to Test Location”, Spacenews, (7 January 
2011), http://www.spacenews.com/article/intelsat-
moving-recovered-galaxy-15-test-location.  First, in 
satellite with active transponders drifted from its 
assigned orbital slot.  That satellite still had active 
transponders, creating potential interference with 
neighboring satellites.  Both incidents illustrated 
the potential for severe harm to commercial 
SATCOM providers.  In the first case, the 
providers lost all revenue generated by the Iridium 
satellite.  In the second case, the potential for 
harm was significantly greater since the rogue 
satellite could have impacted up to 15 other 
communications satellites owned by SES, Telesat, 
and Satmex.45  Intelsat would not only have lost 
revenue from its satellite but could also have been 
liable for interference with the other satellites.  
In reaction to the latter Galaxy 15 incident, 
Inmarsat, Intelsat, and SES created the 
aforementioned Space Data Association (Eutelsat, 
the fourth member of the ‘top four,’ joined 
later).46  The SDA was created to provide the 
necessary legal and technical framework to 
improve the accuracy of collision avoidance 
predictions, which could be seen as protecting and 
increasing revenue.47  The technical framework 
facilitated the actual sharing of data among 
competitors.  Data sharing minimizes the chance 
of collisions and interference between satellites, 
thereby minimizing potential loss of revenue by 
members.  Importantly, the SDA legal framework 
is designed to enforce appropriate behavior of all 
                                                                                          
February of 2009, Iridium 33 and Kosmos-2251 
collided at high velocity, destroying both.  Second, In 
April 2010, Intelsat lost control of its Galaxy 15 
communications satellite which drifted away from its 
orbital slot with still active transponders, creating 
potential interference with neighboring satellites.  
Satellite control was reestablished on 23 December 
2010.  





sers_Mtg_p.m._Session_FINAL.pdf.  As of May 2013, 
fifteen operators, controlling a little over half (227) the 
geosynchronous satellites, participate in SDA.  Another 
five operators controlling ninety-two low earth orbit 
satellites also participate (last accessed 23 July 2013). 
47 http://www.space-data.org/sda/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2013/03/20130318_SDA_u
sers_Mtg_p.m._Session_FINAL.pdf (last accessed 21 
July 2013). 
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participants.48  The legal framework protects each 
company’s data, thus facilitating sharing of that 
data.  Without that legal framework, the 
companies would probably not share their data 
with competitors regardless of their technological 
capability to do so.  One could consider this 
visionary and well-designed framework as 
positive indication that the SDA is one of those 
“powerful organizations” identified by Gilpin.   
Although the SDA could be a ‘powerful 
organization’, it cannot directly avail itself of 
current international space treaties.  Among state 
actors, these treaties codify the importance of 
space.  The International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), for example, recognized the 
importance of SATCOM in its constitution and 
drafted provisions to coordinate efforts to 
eliminate harmful interference between different 
states.  It also required members to operate in a 
manner that would not cause harmful interference 
to another state’s telecommunications.49  In 
another instance, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) 
assigned states international responsibility for 
national activities in outer space (Article VI).  
Since states are responsible for any interference to 
another state’s space assets, they have incentive to 
regulate private entities within their jurisdiction.  
These regulatory regimes are intended to meet 
states’ international legal liability obligations, not 
to facilitate business interests.  Just as deterrence 
constraints only are effective if they are reciprocal 
among all major actors,50 commercial agreements 
and regulations must also be mutually enforceable.    
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49 Constitution of the International Telecommunication 
Union, 22 December 1992, International 
Telecommunication Union’s website, 
http://www.itu.int/publications/cchtm/const/art58.html, 
Preamble and Article 45.  However, under Article 34, 
the Constitution specifically reserved to its members 
the right to stop transmissions that are contrary to a 
state’s laws, public order, or decency. 
50 Roger G Harrison, “Space and Verification, Volume 
I: Policy Implications”, Eisenhower Center for Space 
and Defense Studies (February 2011), republished in 
this volume of Space & Defense. 
In the SDA, the legal agreements are enforceable 
against all members of the SDA, in accordance 
with the domestic laws of the Isle of Man (where 
the SDA was established as a legal entity).  This is 
consistent with current business practices and 
international laws. Like deterrence, some business 
norms and dispute resolution processes discourage 
bad actions with the threat of punishment.   
However, that punishment is by way of a financial 
penalty rather than forceful retaliation.  Unlike 
deterrence, part of the goal of dispute resolution is 
to compensate the injured party as well as to 
punish the acting party.  Also of note, under 
business practices, intent to harm does not always 
matter.  Specific action, whether intentional or not, 
can be penalized.  Therefore, financial penalties 
for both intentional and unintentional harm should 
create greater incentives to prevent accidental 
interference. That is an important aspect, since 
classic deterrence is not designed to discourage 
accidental behavior.  Additionally, a company 
may be penalized for each instance of interference 
or may be repeatedly penalized for harmful 
activities.  In this case, interference is treated as a 
private, individual issue rather than a state, 
security issue. 
Much attention has been focused on the space 
treaties and their lack of enforcement 
mechanisms.51  Many have called for creating new 
treaties or amending the current treaties.  Others 
advocate a supranational organization with fully 
enforceable, absolute, legal authority over space 
activities.52 Even if a supranational organization is 
the desired state, it will take significant time and 
significant changes in attitude before that occurs.   
                                                          
51 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 
January 1967. Article IX. States are required to 
“undertake appropriate international consultations” 
before conducting any activity that could potentially 
harmfully interfere with another state’s activities in 
space.  
52 See Gerardine Meishan Goh, Dispute Settlement in 
International Space Law, A Multi-Door Courthouse for 
Space (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007).  
James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 
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Moving toward using already existing 
international commercial and contract 
enforcement mechanisms provides an alternative 
to the ineffectual space treaties but does not move 
toward a supranational, enforcement mechanism 
advocated by some53  or toward less state-oriented 
sovereignty.54  Although space treaties are 
generally considered ineffective at enforcing their 
provisions, they do recognize the importance of 
space and activities conducted in space.  The 
treaties do not determine whether activities are for 
national security, civil, or commercial purposes.  
They simply require space activities to be for 
peaceful purposes.  Although that provides a great 
deal of flexibility it can also cause complications 
since the same space assets may be dual use and 
used for both state and commercial purposes.   
Many of the proposed treaties or amendments to 
current treaties focus on state liability obligations.  
However, Julian Hermida points out that current 
international space treaties and conventions are 
“not all together responsive to the needs of the 
private sector, especially with respect to the 
impossibility of making direct claims for 
compensation under the Liability Convention…”55  
Given the dual use nature of most space assets, a 
non-state, business avenue that provides for 
compensation seems called for. 
It is possible the Liability Convention provides an 
initial avenue that does meet the needs of the 
private sector.  Under Articles II and XI of the 
Liability Convention, a launching state is liable to 
pay compensation for damage caused by its space 
object [emphasis added].56  The Convention 
allows for establishing a claims commission to 
determine the specific compensation to be paid.  It 
also acknowledges a state’s right to pursue a claim 
                                                          
53 Goh, Dispute Settlement and Moltz, The Politics of 
Space Security. 
54 Jill Stuart, “Unbundling sovereignty.” 
55 Julian Hermida, Legal Basis for a National Space 
Legislation, (Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2004), 178-179. 
56 Convention on the International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects, 24 usT 2380, TIAS 
7762,961 UNTS 187, 29 March 1972. 
in a launching state’s courts, administrative 
tribunals, or agencies of that state.57   
In 1982 a UN General Assembly Resolution, 
recognizing the significant impact of direct 
broadcasting via satellite systems, also recognized 
that domestic entities acting under the state’s 
jurisdiction might be primarily involved rather 
than the state itself.58 The state does not have to 
be the primary participant in dispute resolution as 
would be the case under the space treaties.   More 
specifically, the 2006 Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of other States specifically allows 
non-state parties into the dispute resolution 
process.59   In order to take advantage of that, 
judgments and financial penalties must be 
enforceable across the states.  Fortunately there 
are a number of international conventions and 
treaties that recognize the validity of domestic 
judgments and facilitate their enforcement 
internationally.60 
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58 Principles Governing the use by States of Artificial 
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37/92, UN Docs. A/RES/37/92 a. Convention Relating 
to the Distribution of  Programme-Carrying Signals 
Transmitted by Satellite, International Bureau of World 




59 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of other States.  ICSID 
Convention, Regulations and Rules, ICSID/15, April 
2006. “…In accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention, ICSID provides facilities for conciliation 
and arbitration of investment disputes between 
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting 
States.” 
60 New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 usT, 2517 
TIAS 6997, 330 UNTS 38, 10 June 1958.  OECD 
Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises,15 ILM 967,  June 21, 1976.  
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Between States and Nationals of Other States, 17 usT 
1270, TIAS 6090, 575 UNTS 159, March 18, 1965.   
Principles Governing the use by States of Artificial 
Earth Satellites for International Direct Television 
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There are two types of activities that interfere with 
the information transported via satellite.  In the 
first case a contract may be breached; in the 
second a tort may have been conducted.  (A tort is 
a wrongful action that results in the harm to 
another’s person or property and for which a 
remedy may be obtained.)  Determining whether 
an action is a breach of contract or a tort is 
important when deciding which international 
business mechanisms to use.   
If the dispute is contractual and the parties to the 
contract have agreed to an arbitration clause then 
the matter is rather straightforward. Per the clause 
in the contract, the dispute is arbitrated in 
accordance with agreed upon rules of procedure, 
choice of law and by an agreed upon arbiter.  
Furthermore, parties agree the results are binding 
and awards from arbitration are enforceable 
between the parties. Arbitration is typically used 
in commercial contracts since it is generally 
considered to more efficient, confidential, and less 
expensive than litigation.61  When parties agree to 
arbitration they give up their right to litigate in a 
state’s legal system,62 but this may not be desired 
                                                                                          
Broadcasting, 1982, General Assembly Resolution 
37/92, UN Docs. A/RES/37/92 a. 
61 Joseph Lookofsky and Ketilbjorn Hertz, EU-PIL 
European Union Private International Law in Contract 
and Tort, (Copenhagen:DJOF Publishing, 2009), 160. 
62 Mitsubishi v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473us 614 
(1985).  A Japanese corporation that manufactured 
automobiles entered into a distribution and sales 
agreement with a Puerto Rico corporation.  The 
agreement contained a clause providing for arbitration 
by the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association for 
all disputes arising out of certain articles of the 
agreement or the breach thereof.  The Japanese 
corporation then brought an action in U.S. Federal 
District Court under the Federal Arbitration Act and 
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, seeking to compel arbitration 
of the disputes in accordance with the arbitration 
clause.  The Puerto Rico corporation claimed that the 
federal antitrust issues raised in the case were 
inappropriate for enforcement through arbitration.  The 
court held that the antitrust claims were arbitrable 
stating : “Concerns of international comity, respect for 
the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, 
and sensitivity to the need of the international 
commercial system for predictability in the resolution 
of disputes, all require enforcement of the arbitration 
if there is little established law that pertains to the 
potential issues. 
A drawback to arbitration is that the parties must 
have had the foresight to draft an appropriate 
arbitration clause to address an anticipated dispute.  
Foresight could be based on current laws and 
norms or might be based on some new or 
controversial issue.  For example, the SDA might 
have had reason to insert an arbitration clause into 
its membership contract. That contract addresses 
misuse of members’ data and allows members to 
enforce the terms of the contract directly against 
other members.  It would not be unreasonable for 
the parties to insert an arbitration clause.  Such an 
arbitration clause might require disputes via 
arbitration rather than via a particular state’s legal 
system. In this case, resolving disputes via an 
arbitration clause could set precedence.  Since 
arbitration results are binding and awards are 
enforceable, actors considering similar future 
actions could be dissuaded from taking those 
actions. 
Although the SDA provides an example to 
examine the merits of arbitration, it does not 
provide a good example for examining the merits 
of litigation.  However a context in which to 
examine litigation can be found in a case of 
intentional interference already observed.  In 2010 
Iran intentionally interfered with Voice of 
America broadcasts and collaterally interfered 
with the British BBC, German Deutche Welle and 
Eutelsat, stopping television and radio 
broadcasts.63  The harm done by Iran clearly 
impacted more than just one state.  The VOA, 
BBC, and Deutche Welle issued a joint statement 
condemning the action, pointing out Iranian 
authorities "are using the same satellite services to 
broadcast freely around the world including 
broadcasts in English and Arabic…”  Had they 
chosen to, they could have brought suit against 
Iran.   
Tort actions may be pursued through a state’s 
domestic court system. Litigation is more 
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63“Voice of America, “EU Confronts Iran on Satellite 
Jamming,” March 18 2010,  
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complicated than arbitration since there is no 
agreed upon course of action and no agreed upon 
jurisdiction.  An essential, but complicating, 
element of litigation is determining which state 
has jurisdiction over a dispute.  Since domestic 
law varies from state to state, parties try to litigate 
their disputes in the jurisdictions with the laws 
most favorable to them.  Jurisdiction is typically 
determined in three ways.   
In the first, lex loci delicti commissi, jurisdiction is 
determined by where the harmful action (tort) 
occurred.64 This could be problematic if the 
harmful action took place in space since, under 
the OST, there are no sovereignty claims to space 
itself.   If the tort was conducted from the earth, 
then jurisdiction would be in the state where the 
interference was conducted.  In the case of Iran’s 
interference with Eutelsat’s Hot Bird 8 satellite, 
jurisdiction would be in Iran.  The second way to 
determine jurisdiction,  lex loci damni, is 
determined by where the harm was experienced.65  
Depending on interpretation of the facts, one 
could argue the harm was done to a satellite in 
orbit.  Since states claim jurisdiction over their 
satellites in accordance with the OST,66 
jurisdiction would then be in the state with 
jurisdiction and control of the satellite.  
Alternatively, the harm suffered could be 
considered to be in any state where information 
was disrupted.  When Iran interfered with Hot 
Bird 8, the United States, Great Britain, and 
Germany all experienced disruption of their data.  
All three could therefore claim jurisdiction.  In the 
third case, jurisdiction is based on the degree of 
                                                          
64 Latour v Guiraud (1948) D. 375 (as summarized in 
Lookofsky and Hertz, EU-PIL).  During the Spanish 
Civil War, a truck driven by an employee of a French 
firm collided with a Spanish railway engine in Spain. 
Another French driver from a different firm died due to 
the fire resulting from the collision.  Even though both 
drivers were French residents, Spanish law was applied 
since the collision occurred in Spain. 
65Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 Of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the 
law Applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome 
II), Articles 16-19.  Under the Rome II Regulation, the 
law of the country in which the damage occurs shall 
apply.   
66 Outer Space Treaty, Article VIII. 
connection to the laws of the states.67 In this case, 
since Eutelsat is based out of Paris France, one 
could argue that French jurisdiction should 
apply.68  One could also argue that Italian 
jurisdiction should apply since Eutelsat has 
teleports in Italy.   
It is a given that forecasting arbitration clauses to 
include in a contract is difficult.  It is also very 
complicated and difficult to determine the 
jurisdiction to pursue a cause of action.  However, 
since awards from arbitration69 and judgments 
from domestic courts are enforceable,70 the 
difficulty may be worthwhile.  Awards or 
judgments from these venues seem to offer 
another set of actions that might help discourage 
interference with satellites.  However, just as in 
deterrence, an actor such as North Korea with 
little to lose in the way of space assets or finances 
may very well not be dissuaded from interfering 
with a satellite.   Financial penalties, enforceable 
across the states, might provide incentives to 
reconsider harmful interference with a satellite, 
lest they are similarly penalized.  Also, litigation 
proceedings tend to be open to the public, and 
could focus unwanted attention on an actor.  
Finally, bad actors might have an incentive to 
refrain from interfering with space capabilities if 
                                                          
67 Roerig v Valiant Trawlers Ltd, EWCA Civ 21, Case 
No: B2/3001/1501, (28th January 2002).  This case 
concerned damages sought by the wife of a Dutch 
citizen killed in an accident with an English trawler.  
The factors considered by the court may be indicative 
of the types of connections that may be considered 
when determining which state’s law should apply.   
68 Hermida, 246 noting that “French law applicable to 
space activities consists of a series of scattered 
contractual, administrative regional norms and 
arrangements which have been adopted for each space 
program as the needs arose.”  Pursuing an action in a 
French court could be overly complicated and 
uncertain. 
69 New York Convention, Article III, Brussels 
Convention, Article 26. 
70 EC Convention on Jurisdiction and the Environment 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
European Union. 1968, 
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/ec.jurisdiction.enforcement.j
udgements.civil.commercial.matters.convention.brussel
s.1968/portrait.pdf.  Note this Convention is applicable 
to Europe but could expand or serve as a basis for a 
more encompassing treaty at a later date.  
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they believe they might be refused service or 
might be charged higher prices due to their past 
behavior that has required a provider to pay a 
penalty.  Additionally, a state would not face a 
potentially unfavorable precedence in 
interpretation of one of the space treaties.   Those 
two factors might make a state more willing to use 
the dispute resolution processes - especially if a 
state considers litigation and penalties a relative 
threat to its national security.  In combination with 
deterrence actions, using the dispute resolution 
process could be a more effective way to 




Classic deterrence strategy as developed 
during the Cold War seems insufficient when 
applied to the current multipolar space 
environment.  There are too many actors to 
consider when conducting deterrence calculations, 
and many of those actors are non-state, 
commercial entities.  Very often the relationships 
between the states and the commercial providers 
are extremely entangled, and space capabilities 
have become largely dual use.  Deterrence relies 
on force and was developed to dissuade states 
from acting in an unwanted manner and is largely 
insufficient to address business concerns.   
Given the current complex environment, it seems 
an opportune time to explore additional avenues 
that might complement deterrent actions. Using 
commercial dispute resolution processes could 
create pressures to dissuade interference with 
space capabilities.  In conjunction with deterrence 
actions, legal measures could create a more secure 
environment in which to operate space assets.  
This, most importantly, could in turn provide 
more protection for the valuable information 
















As the Department of Defense (DoD) 
continues to shift its focus from Europe to the 
Asia-Pacific while also attempting to meet 
budgetary challenges, academics and analysts are 
examining the nation’s difficult financial outlook 
and contemplating not only the kind of military 
the United States needs, but the kind it can 
afford.1 Such considerations are, however, putting 
the cart before the horse. A much more basic 
challenge faces the country. Simply stated, the 
United States has no clearly defined and broadly 
accepted set of national interests. Instead, as one 
report noted, “Many find it difficult to distinguish 
between America’s national interests and 
whatever interests them personally.”2 The call for 
clearly defined national interests has been a 
refrain of military and civilian leaders for many 
years and yet the lack of clearly articulated 
national interests has proven the bane of 
Republican and Democratic administrations. In 
1947, George Kennan advised President Truman 
to distinguish between vital and peripheral 
interests. Kennan insisted that interests be used as 
the standard by which to evaluate threats, not the 
other way around. He argued that threats had no 
meaning unless in reference to interests.3  
 
This article, rather than testing an existing theory 
or developing a new theory, focuses on a large 
policy issue that, in our view, has received too 
                                                          
1 Adam Lowther is Research Professor at the Air Force 
Research Institute (AFRI), Maxwell Air Force Base; 
Casey Lucius is Associate Professor at the Naval War 
College, Monterey, CA.  This work represents the 
opinions of the authors and is not necessarily endorsed 
by the Department of Defense, the Air Force Research 
Institute, or the Naval War College. 
2 Commission on America’s National Interest, 
America’s National Interest (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University, 1997), 13.   
3 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A 
Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy During the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 
2005), 31. 
little attention in the post-Cold War years—
resulting in a poorly understood and defined 
concept of what is “the national interest.” In 
arguing for a broader discussion of American 
interests, we suggest that it is time for the 
American people and their leaders to engage in an 
open dialogue that focuses attention on interests 
and values so that the country may reach a 
consensus, or as close to one as possible, 
concerning what comprises the United States’ 
national interest. In doing so, it may be possible to 
provide decision-makers a clearly delineated set 
of preferences when evaluating possible foreign 
policy decisions. 
 
The nation’s strategic documents offer little 
clarification as to the composition of the national 
interest. The latest National Security Strategy 
(2010) is a case in point. It says, 
American interests are enduring. They are:  
The security of the United States, its citizens, and 
U.S. allies and partners; A strong, innovative, and 
growing U.S. economy in an open international 
economic system that promotes opportunity and 
prosperity; Respect for universal values at home 
and around the world; and An international order 
advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, 
security, and opportunity through stronger 
cooperation to meet global challenges.4 
 
The National Security Strategy is a broad 
document that represents an administration’s view 
of the challenges facing the nation and its 
approach to addressing those challenges. It is 
fundamentally a political document of limited 
value in understanding American grand strategy.5 
                                                          
4 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 7. 
5 Although not specifically defined in formal 
government publications, grand strategy may best be 
thought of as the developing, applying, and 
coordinating of the instruments of national power to 
achieve objectives that contribute to national 
security—a concept derived from several definitions in 
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This shortcoming is unfortunate, because a lack of 
a clearly defined set of interests makes it difficult 
to craft an effective grand strategy that links 
national policy to all elements of national 
power—in order to secure the nation’s interests 
and objectives. Grand strategy can also refer to 
the nation’s overarching approach to international 
affairs such as isolationism, collective security, 
selective engagement, primacy, and so forth. 
Strategy implies a goal or goals, and establishes 
priorities. It is the role of policy makers to set 
goals, and in some cases these goals can limit 
strategic alternatives. In the 2010 NSS, readers 
should be able to identify how the President 
understands national interests in relation to 
security, and how he will prioritize and protect 
these interests.   
 
Unfortunately, the description of the nation’s 
interests provided above is vague and serves 
limited utility in creating a clear understanding of 
what matters most to the United States and its 
citizens. American citizens deserve to know who 
we are, what we stand for, and why we undertake 
the policies we do.  Planners, strategists, scholars, 
and military leaders are eager for such clarity, 
which does not exist currently. Such is necessary 
for the development of foreign policy and military 
strategy that are effective in protecting what 
matters most to the nation.   
 
CONSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST 
 
If, as is suggested, the lack of a clearly 
defined set of national interests has made it 
difficult to develop effective foreign policy, a 
central question must be addressed; what are the 
nation’s vital interests? Addressing a second 
question is also instructive; how should the 
nation’s vital interests be determined? In 
answering both of these questions, the remainder 
of this article advances a framework for 
understanding the key concepts under 
examination and offers an initial construction of 
vital American interests. After completing our 
analysis, it became clear that a robust dialogue 
between the American people and their elected 
                                                                                          
the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms.   
leaders is necessary if the nation is to successfully 
develop a widely accepted understanding of 
national interests.  
 
As the former Commission on America’s National 
Interest wrote more than a decade ago, “For the 
decade ahead, the only sound foundation for a 
coherent, sustainable American foreign policy is a 
clear public sense of American interests.” That 
understanding is as important in a post-
Iraq/Afghanistan era as it was in a post-Cold War  
era. Further, in advocating the development of a 
clear and consistent set of national interests that 
transcends administrations, the desire is to create a 
forcing function that makes it more difficult for 
presidential administrations to pursue foreign 
policies that stray beyond the nation’s identified 
interests. While some may disagree with efforts to 
constrain a president’s freedom of action in 
foreign policy or view such efforts as overly 
idealistic, setting a higher bar for presidents, 
before they exercise American power abroad, is 
consistent with congressional and constitutional 
intent and should be palatable to Americans 
across the political spectrum.6   
 
To achieve such an objective, identifying the 
nation’s vital, major, and peripheral interests is 
central. The first step in such a process is offered 
by presenting a review of historical approaches to 
foreign policy development and international 
relations theory. Second, we offer to open the 
dialogue advocated by presenting six vital 
national interests that are likely to drive future 
foreign policy. In doing so, we argue for a 
transition from a value-focused foreign policy to 
an interest-focused foreign policy. Such a 
transition will provide the president and Congress 
with a clear set of enduring interests around which 
to build a stable foreign policy. Before continuing, 
                                                          
6 While there are certainly varying interpretations of 
the U.S. Constitution, the powers of Congress, 
enumerated in Article I, and the powers of the 
president, enumerated in Article II, were originally 
designed to create a more limited role for the executive 
in foreign policy. With the War Powers Act serving as 
an example of congressional effort to constrain the 
president’s ability to use military power, it is clear that 
new efforts to constrain the executive branch’s use of 
American power abroad are not without historical 
precedent.     
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it is important to clarify that our conception of 
“enduring vital interests” does not preclude vital 
interests from evolving over time. Rather, the 
term is used to underscore the relative stability 
and often gradual change that occurs to the 
nation’s interests as technological development 
occurs and the United States grows and changes.      
Admittedly, an interest focused foreign policy will 
constrain the aspirations of presidents on the left 
and right, but at a time when the nation is facing 
great economic and strategic challenges, it may be 
time to set aspirational goals aside and follow 
former Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s axiom. 
When asked why the United States was working 
with Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, Hull 
reportedly quipped, “He may be a son-of-a-bitch, 
but he’s our son-of-a-bitch.”7 In short, it may be 
time for values to take a backseat to cold, hard 




 Given this article’s objective of providing 
useful policy guidance, Richard Kugler’s, Policy 
Analysis in National Security Affairs: New 
Methods for a New Era, provides a rigorous 
method for framing and analyzing policy oriented 
national security challenges.8 While not 
appropriate for theory generation or testing, 
Kugler’s approach provides researchers a means 
to identify interests, goals, and policy options.  
 
The first step in employing Kugler’s methodology 
requires the researcher determine whether the 
policy problem under examination is strategic, 
systemic (systems analysis), or operational 
(operational research) in nature.9 We determined 
the problem discussed here to be strategic in 
nature, thus Kugler’s process of “strategic 
evaluation” is utilized. Broadly, this approach 
assists in determining American interests and how 
they are affected; strategic goals (desired end-
state); and available policy options. 
                                                          
7 Robert D. Crasswell, Trujillo: The Life and Times of 
a Caribbean Dictator (New York: McMillan, 1966), 
213. 
8 Richard Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security 
Affairs: New Methods for a New Era (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 2006). 
9 Ibid., 35-60. 
 
The second step focuses on developing an 
analytical framework. For this purpose, Kugler 
provides a set of twenty-five framing questions 
that should be answered before completing the 
analysis and selecting a policy recommendation. 
They include such questions as; what are the 
expected effectiveness, benefits, and losses? What 
assumptions, uncertainties, and biases may affect 
the selected policy recommendation? What 
tradeoffs are made in the selection of a policy 
recommendation?10 In answering each question, a 
more complete understanding of the variables at 
play is developed and the strengths and 
weaknesses of possible policy options come to 
light. As Kugler notes, “The analysis should begin 
by describing each option, including its rationale, 
aims, actions, and implementation strategy.”11 The 
analysis then concludes with an appraisal of the 
likely effectiveness of the policy option 
recommended.  
 
Step three focuses on the dissemination of the 
final product, which Kugler includes in his 
methodology because he considers this aspect of 
policy analysis is given short shrift all too often. 
Thus, he provides a more rigorous approach to 
determining how best to develop and present 
analytical results. For our purposes, steps one and 
two were of greatest utility. Kugler’s approach 
increased the rigor of this study and ensured a 
more comprehensive analysis of the affect 
potential variables could have on a policy 
recommendation. For the sake of clarity and 
succinctness, we do not discuss each of Kugler’s 
framing questions in the analysis. Rather we focus 
on the results of the larger analytical process and 
policy recommendations. Kugler’s approach does, 
however, leave room for further analysis of the six 
vital interests described below.    
 
Building on Previous Conceptions of the 
National Interest 
 
The literature on national interests is 
extensive and includes early classics from 
Morgenthau, Kennan, and Lippman, to more 
modern work from Steel, Waltz, Nye, and Jervis. 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 43.  
11 Ibid., 53. 
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This section will provide a brief review of the 
national interest literature and identify how this 
article contributes to the discourse on this 
important topic.  
 
The most famous work on the national interest 
was generated by Hans Morgenthau in the early 
1950s. His theory of political realism defines 
national interests in terms of power. Morgenthau 
suggested that interest is the essence of politics 
and should be unaffected by the circumstances of 
time and place.12 His In Defense of the National 
Interest (1951) argued that the national interest 
must be the ultimate standard for developing 
policy. Morgenthau also took the opportunity to 
divorce morality from political action, suggesting 
that moral principles in the international sphere 
have no concrete universal meaning.13  He 
encouraged statesmen to “distinguish with 
Lincoln between their ‘official duty,’ which is to 
think and act in terms of the national interest, and 
their ‘personal wish,’ which is to see their own 
moral values and political principles realized 
throughout the world.”14 
 
In 1977, Morgenthau took up the topic again in, 
“Defining the National Interest–Again: Old 
Superstitions, New Realities.” Clearly frustrated 
by the partisan nature of politics, Morgenthau 
highlighted that the national interest must not be 
defined by the whim of a man or the partisanship 
of party, but rather must rest on an objective view 
and a rational application of foreign policy. He 
cited the Monroe Doctrine and the European and 
Asian balances of power as having guided U.S. 
foreign policy since the nation’s existence, and he 
encouraged political leaders to stay true to the 
realist path. Morgenthau warned that without 
consistency in American foreign policy, U.S. 
decision makers will simply demonize the enemy 
rather than recognize the real threat and the state’s 
real power. He also cautioned political leaders not 
to allow U.S. foreign policy to be determined by 
Soviet foreign policy, or any other nation or 
                                                          
12 Hans Morgenthau, revised by Kenneth Thompson, 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggles for Power and 
Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985), 10. 
13 From In Defense of the National Interest (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), chapters 1 and 8. 
14 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 7. 
movement for that matter—opposing a reactive 
foreign policy.15 Morgenthau was careful to 
distinguish between political power and the use of 
force. He explained that an economic, territorial, 
or military policy may be undertaken for its own 
sake, because there are economic, territorial, or 
military advantages, but it is also possible that 
such policies would be pursued because they 
increase the power of the nation. In the 
development of foreign policy, what should be 
considered, Morgenthau argued, is the effect 
policies have on the power of the nation.16  
     
George Kennan, like Morgenthau was a political 
realist. He believed in asking critical questions 
about U.S. intervention into world affairs and he 
encouraged decision makers to focus primarily on 
national interests. Kennan, through a series of 
essays, books, and lectures examined the political 
and intellectual motivations of American foreign 
policy. He concluded that when it came to U.S. 
intervention and war in particular, there lacked 
real deliberation and discussion of national 
interests. Speaking of the Spanish-American War, 
he noted, “As for the manner in which we 
employed our armed forces once we had launched 
ourselves in that war, I found that we were guided 
not by any very thoughtful concept of what it was 
we wanted to achieve, and why, but rather by 
popular moods, political pressures, and inner-
governmental intrigue.”17 Kennan acknowledged 
that in other interactions, especially with China 
and Japan, the United States tried to apply its own 
legal and moral standards rather than searching 
for a stable balance of power among the forces 
active in the region.  
 
Kennan, like Morgenthau, argued for the need to 
separate morality from national interest, 
suggesting that World War I was a great moral 
cause in which the United States should not have 
been involved.18 Kennan was also critical of U.S. 
                                                          
15 Hans Morgenthau, “Defining the National Interest – 
Again; Old Superstitions, New Realities,” in Kegley 
and Wittkopf, eds. Perspectives on American Foreign 
Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 33-37. 
16 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 36. 
17 George Kennan, American Diplomacy (University of 
Chicago Press, 1979), 159. 
18 Ibid., 158. 
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intervention in the Second World War, the Korean 
War, and the Vietnam War. While Morgenthau 
emphasized America’s demonological approach to 
foreign policy, Kennan supported that notion by 
highlighting America’s need to search at all times 
for a single external center of evil, to which all 
our trouble could be attributed.19 
In 1985 Kennan wrote in Foreign Affairs to 
clarify his position on national interests. He 
suggested the interests with which governments 
have to concern themselves are those of military 
security, the integrity of political life, and the 
well-being of the people.20 Kennan was explicit 
that American interests must be distinct from 
political tastes. He reminded readers, just as he 
had advised previous presidents, that effectively 
using resources is also in America’s interest, and 
it is essential to recognize the nation’s limited 
resources and limited military power. Kennan 
argued that the United States should only interfere 
in the internal workings of other countries under 
two conditions: 1) if it is in our national interest, 
and 2) if we have the means to successfully 
intervene and we can afford the costs. Kennan 
was clear that foreign policy should be a reflection 
of U.S. national interests.21  
  
Although less influential than Morgenthau and 
Kennan, Walter Lippman was one of the earliest 
to discuss these issues in U.S. Foreign Policy: 
Shield of the Republic (1943), which highlighted 
the need to return to the fundamental principle of 
foreign policy. He described this principle as 
bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus 
of power, the nation’s commitments and the 
nation’s power.22 Morgenthau and Kennan later 
called this simply “balance of power.” Lippman 
argued that, from 1898 until his book was 
published, the United States chose a set of ideals 
over national security. He spoke to the ideals of 
disarmament and collective security, which 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 164. 
20 George Kennan, “Morality and Foreign Policy” 
Foreign Affairs, Winter 1985/1986, 64, 002, p. 206. 
21 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment; A 
Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy During the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 
2005), 96. 
22 Walter Lippman, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the 
Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), 
9-10. 
detracted from our most vital interest: national 
security.23  
 
Lippman argued that the United States should not 
strive to achieve peace, but should instead focus 
on independence and security. He wrote, “A 
nation has security when it does not have to 
sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is 
able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.”24 
Lippman rejected the Wilsonian notion of 
collective security because it assumed a certain 
unity among unequal states rather than accepting 
the evolution of a union from a nucleus of firmly 
allied strong states.25 He charged that Wilson was 
trying to establish collective security without 
forming an alliance. Lippman concluded that from 
1898 to 1941 the United States engaged in three 
wars without ever having formed a real foreign 
policy. He reminded readers that the measure of a 
policy is its soundness; if it is sound, it will prove 
acceptable to the American people.26  
  
In defining vital national interests, Lippman stated 
clearly that the American people will fight and 
give their lives for what they regard as vital 
interests. The defense of American territory 
against foreign powers is an interest that has 
become nationally accepted, according to 
Lippman, and we need not make any apologies 
when putting this vital interest first.27 In fact, 
Lippman argued that our allies and partners would 
benefit from an American foreign policy founded 
on our own national interests.   
  
Lippman, Kennan, and Morgenthau were clear 
realists, and this article advocates a realignment of 
U.S. foreign policy and realist thinking. However, 
there are many authors who make strong and 
cogent arguments on this topic although it is not 
always clear as to which school of thought they 
belong. Somewhere between realism and 
liberalism is Samuel Huntington. He advocated 
the balance of power, national security, and an 
emphasis on interests, but he also left room for 
social and economic issues to influence foreign 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 47-48. 
24 Ibid. 51. 
25 Ibid. 73. 
26 Ibid. 85.  
27 Ibid. 165. 
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policy. Huntington, unlike Morgenthau and 
Kennan, did not separate national interests and 
morality. Instead he understood national interests 
as a combination of security and material 
concerns on the one hand, and moral and ethical 
concerns on the other. Huntington explained that 
it is American identity and values that drives the 
use of and provides a purpose for American power.  
Huntington described a set of ideals and principles 
stemming from America’s founding documents, 
which included liberty, equality, democracy, 
constitutionalism, liberalism, and limited 
government.28   
 
While Huntington was open to including ideals in 
U.S. foreign policy, he also argued that American 
policy had been unduly influenced by economic 
and ethnic considerations. He admitted that ethnic 
groups have played active roles in politics 
throughout American history, also promoting 
American interests outside the United States. 
Huntington referenced former Secretary of 
Defense James Schlesinger who, at a 1997 Center 
for Strategic and International Studies lecture, 
said, “The United States has less of a foreign 
policy in a traditional sense of a great power than 
we have the stapling together of a series of goals 
put forth by domestic constituency groups….the 
result is that American foreign policy is 
incoherent.”29 Huntington called this “the 
domestication of foreign policy.” While foreign 
policy should be driven by the interests of the 
state in a world of competing states, instead he 
suggested it is driven by economic and ethnic 
interests in American domestic politics.  
  
Similarly, Robert Jervis also notes that the most 
vital interest of any country is security from 
invasion or attack. He argues that the second most 
vital interest is the ability to protect the state’s 
closest allies, and a third interest is in economic 
prosperity.30 Jervis acknowledges that there is 
always agreement that the protection of the 
                                                          
28 Samuel Huntington, “The Erosion of American 
National Interests,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5 
(Sept/Oct 1997), 28-49. 
29 Ibid. 
30 R. Jervis, “U.S. Grand Strategy: Mission 
Impossible,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 
3 (1998), 22-26. 
country comes first, but after that, consensus 
breaks down.31 He makes the case that in the 
United States, foreign policy is heavily influenced 
by domestic economics, American democratic 
values, and ethnic considerations. Jervis admits 
that because the United States has a fragmented 
political system, no single interest, threat, or value 
will dominate the development of foreign policy.   
 
Alternatives to Classical Realism 
  
Another author of national interest who 
falls into the liberalism school of thought is 
Joseph Nye. He writes, “In a democracy, the 
national interest is simply the set of shared 
priorities regarding relations with the rest of the 
world.  It is broader than strategic interests, 
though they are part of it.  It can include values 
such as human rights and democracy, if the public 
feels that those values are so important to its 
identity that it is willing to pay a price to promote 
them.”32 Nye also admits that the United States 
has an interest in maintaining international order. 
He notes that Americans want to influence distant 
governments and organizations on a variety of 
issues and, to do this, it needs hard power 
resources. While he recognizes the need to call 
upon the military to protect national interests, he 
also comingles interests and values. Nye argues 
that Americans want to see strong moral 
preferences in their foreign policy, which is why it 
has become acceptable to use the American 
military to support humanitarian interests 
abroad.33 
 
                                                          
31 Ibid. 
32 Joseph Nye, “Redefining the National Interest,” 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4 (1999), 22-35. 
33 For a more complete discussion of international 
relations liberalism see Immanuel Kant, Perpetual 
Peace: A Philosophical Essay (Washington, DC: 
American Peace Society, 1897, c1795); Robert 
Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord 
in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984); and Bruce Russett and John 
Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, 
Independence and International Organizations (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2000). These works are among 
the most influential within the idealist/liberal approach. 
They reflect the transition liberalism has undergone.  
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Authors such as Ronald Steel point out that other 
elements including resource scarcity, population 
growth, urbanization, mass migration, 
environmental degradation, terrorism, and 
economic exploitation can and do threaten 
national security. He argues that there are interests 
impervious to borders, and therefore, we must be 
careful about devising policy based solely on a 
defined national interest.34 Steel argues that the 
problem with realist notions of national security is 
that they assume that states are the primary actors 
which both provide security and threaten security. 
Instead, he promotes what he calls a new kind of 
realism. Steel identifies vital, secondary, and 
tertiary American interests, and submits that U.S. 
policy should primarily serve to protect the 
American homeland from destruction and 
preserve U.S. institutions and a democratic form 
of government, while still recognizing the various 
other elements that can impact policy making.35  
  
Like Steel, neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz 
explain that states are not the only actors in the 
international system, and therefore developing 
foreign policy cannot be as simple as identifying a 
clear list of national interests that support the 
security of the state. Neorealists, liberals, 
constructivists, and radicals all accept other actors 
as playing an important role in foreign policy 
development. For neorealists like Waltz, however, 
the most important unit to analyze is the structure 
of the international system, namely the absence of 
overarching authority, and the distribution of 
capabilities among states.  
 
Both realists and neorealists share the core 
principle of balance of power, but neorealists 
advance the idea that the balance of power is 
largely determined by the structure of the 
system.36 Waltz accepts the idea of balance of 
power, but admits that it does not serve to explain 
the particulars of a state or its policies.  He spends 
a great deal of time studying the roles of human 
behavior, society, the structure of states, and 
                                                          
34 Ronald Steel, “A New Realism,” World Policy 
Journal Vol. 12, No. 2 (1997), 1-9. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics 
(Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1979), 102-128. 
emotion in international relations.37 Waltz points 
out the hitch between national politics and the 
international political system, writing that national 
politics is consumed with authority, 
administration, and laws while international 
politics focuses on power, struggle, and 
accommodation.38 Those statesmen charged with 
developing foreign policy must reconcile these 
differences to bring together the interests of the 
state within an international framework. 
 
Those authors who fall into a liberal school of 
international relations leave room for new actors 
like multinational corporations, non-governmental 
organizations, and social groups to influence the 
making of foreign policy. Within international 
relations liberalism, there is also a growing view 
that not only do international organizations play 
an important role in establishing international 
norms and promoting peace, as Immanuel Kant 
theorized in the eighteenth century, but that 
democracies do not fight one another, thus the 
promotion of democracy and liberal values is 
central to ensuring the perpetual peace Kant 
sought.39 
   
While authors like Jervis and Huntington may 
reject the basic premise of liberalism, they also 
recognize that the variables examined by the 
liberal school do influence the behavior of state 
actors. Jervis even includes cognitive dissonance 
as having a role in policy development, explaining 
that once foreign policy is developed and 
implemented; decision-makers will justify it even 
if it means rearranging their beliefs to gain 
increased support for the action taken.40 This leads 
to inconsistency in policy and unpredictable 
political calculations.  
 
Constructivism differs in that it promotes a 
normative view of national interests. 
                                                          
37 See Kenneth Waltz, Man the State and War (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), Intro. 
38 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 113. 
39 See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Bruce 
Russett and John ONeal, Triangulating Peace.    
40 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in 
International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 382-387. 
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Constructivists like Alexander Wendt, support the 
promotion of democracy and human rights around 
the world, but they also recognize that these are 
ever-evolving concepts. For constructivists, 
national interests are not consistent, but rather 
they are social constructs that must be flexible to 
changing identities.41 Individual elites are also 
important in constructivist thinking, assuming that 
major shifts in policy can be driven by one or two 
influential decision-makers, especially in times of 
crisis or political instability.    
 
In response to the wide spectrum of views counter 
to classical realism, we argue that many of the 
propositions advocated by liberals, constructivists, 
and even neo-realists are both lofty and costly. 
Rather, we advocate the adoption of policies that 
take heed of the dangers authors like Lippman and 
Kennan warned of and the need to clearly 
articulate the nation’s interests—developing a 
foreign policy that supports and protects those 
interests. Further we advocate a path that moves 
the United States away from the Wilsonian belief 
that there is a moral imperative to aid in the 
political regeneration of other nations.  
 
ENDURING VITAL INTERESTS 
  
The American approach to foreign policy 
and national interest has shifted greatly from the 
nation’s founding to the present. When President 
George Washington published his farewell 
address on 17 September 1796, he laid out a 
concept of foreign policy designed to preserve the 
national interest. Washington’s recognition of 
interstate commerce’s importance is exemplified 
in his famous statement: “The great rule of 
conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in 
extending our commercial relations, to have with 
them as little political connection as possible. So 
far as we have already formed engagements, let 
them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let 
us stop.” He went on to add that the United States 
should be a “friend to all and enemy of none” as 
the nation sought to “avoid the entangling 
                                                          
41 See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), Intro.  
alliances of Europe.”42 A policy of commercial 
internationalism and military non-interventionism 
served the philosophical standard, if not always 
the operational standard, for American foreign 
policy until the 20th century.43 During the half-
century long Cold War, two generations of 
Americans grew to adulthood during a time in 
which the United States maintained an average of 
535,000 troops overseas—a decided departure 
from Washington’s ideal.44   
 
 With the Cold War’s end, President Bill Clinton 
sought to redefine the national interest during the 
1990s by combining commercial internationalism 
with the spread of democracy and international 
institutions. Many American troops returned to 
the United States, and the nation’s reliance on 
decisive military action declined. Much like the 
approach to foreign policy and the national 
interest prior to the Cold War, President Clinton 
exploited the “peace dividend” and focused on 
expanding America’s commercial ties and 
influence. With what Francis Fukuyama described 
as the “end of history,” liberal internationalism 
attempted to unseat realism from its perch atop the 
foreign policy hierarchy.  
 
Like his predecessor, George W. Bush was from 
the liberal internationalist school of thought. 
Where President Clinton sought to make the 
world safe for democracy through globalization, 
President Bush arguably sought to achieve similar 
objectives through the imposition of democracy. 
And with the United States exiting Iraq and 
Afghanistan while also undertaking an Asia-
Pacific pivot, few are attempting to frame the 
debate surrounding these conflicts within the 
context of a well-defined national interest. 
 
Contrary to the view of Joseph Nye, who argues 
that the national interest is, “simply what citizens, 
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after proper deliberation, say it is;”45 we suggest 
the national interest and the interests (vital, major, 
and peripheral) that comprise it have developed 
over many years and endure across Republican 
and Democratic administrations. The national 
interest is not defined by a sitting president’s 
political agenda. It transcends short-term political 
objectives. In order to provide greater clarity as to 
the composition of the national interest, the 
following pages define the concept and offer a 
detailed examination of America’s vital 
interests.46 
  
Levels of Interests 
 
While there are alternative conceptions of 
the national interest, Dennis Drew and Donald 
Snow offer a straightforward explanation of the 
concept.47 They suggest the national interest has 
three components: vital, major, and peripheral 
interests. They define a vital interest by two basic 
characteristics. First, compromise of a vital 
interest is unacceptable to the state. Second, the 
resort to war is a legitimate, and likely, action in 
the defense of a vital interest.48 Huntington held a 
similar view defining a vital interest as one that is 
worth expending “blood and treasure.”49 As James 
Thomson suggests, “Vital interests arise from an 
enduring combination of the nation’s geographic 
                                                          
45 Joseph Nye, “The American National Interests and 
Global Public Goods,” International Affairs Vol. 78, 
No. 2 (Spring 2002), 237. 
46 One recent volume is dedicated to examining the 
various understandings of national interest within 
various schools of thought. Scott Burchill, The 
National Interest in International Relations Theory 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
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national interests.  
48 Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making 
Twenty-First-Century Strategy (Maxwell AFB, AL: 
Air University Press, 2006), 32–35. 
49 Huntington, “Erosion of American National 
Interests,” 35. 
position, political culture, economy, and power.”50 
A third characteristic of vital interests is 
continuity over time. Rarely does a vital interest 
develop overnight nor is it common for the nature 
of a vital interest to fluctuate significantly. More 
commonly, interests are constant and enduring in 
their importance to the nation.  
 
Historically, preservation of the nation’s 
commercial interests was seen as the sine qua non 
of vital interests because they were and are the 
foundation for economic prosperity, which serves 
as the foundation of the nation’s military strength. 
However, territorial integrity rose to prominence 
during the Cold War as the fear of nuclear war 
captured the national conscience. In the 
generation since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the United States has found no peer competitor 
capable of challenging its vital commercial or 
territorial interests. Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq 
posed an existential threat to the United States, 
just as al-Qaeda and its affiliates remain limited in 
their ability to threaten the nation and its citizens. 
Thus, the debate over vital interests has strayed 
beyond its traditional bounds. 
  
Major and peripheral interests do not require a 
state to resort to war if threatened. Here an interest 
involves a situation where “a country’s political, 
economic, or social well-being may be adversely 
affected but where the use of armed force is 
deemed excessive to avoid adverse outcomes.”51 
Many interests fall into these two categories and 
can be addressed in a number of ways. The United 
States frequently employs diplomatic and 
economic tools to secure its major and peripheral 
interests. Without identifying the nation’s vital 
interests, we have no way of knowing when or 
how the nation should respond, and strategists and 
policy makers are forced to choose between action 
or inaction as options to declare what is important 
to national security.  
 
Clarity, in many instances, only comes when an 
adversary acts provocatively, forcing decision- 
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makers to weigh the costs and benefits of possible 
actions. For example, the American reaction to 
human rights atrocities in Darfur is a typical 
response to the violation of a peripheral interest. 
Although the United States expressed strong 
disapproval of what took place, neither the 
president nor Congress undertook strong 
economic sanctions or military action.52 Such acts 
of inhumanity violate the cultural and moral 
norms of Americans, but they do not offend the 
nation enough to warrant a strong military 
response.   
     
Six Vital American Interests 
 
After more than two centuries of 
independence, the United States’ vital interests, in 
our evaluation, have largely remained consistent 
over long periods of time, with transformative 
technologies serving as the single greatest reason 
for change in American interests. In many 
respects, two centuries of growth and change only 
served to filter and clarify what is and is not in the 
national interest. By reinforcing the enduring 
nature of the nation’s interest, events such as 
World War I & II, the Cold War, and the attacks 
of September 11, 2001 have not fundamentally 
reshaped what matters most. It is the propensity of 
Americans and their leaders to forget what matters 
that has long been the problem. What then are the 
nation’s vital interests? 
 
Trade and Economic Prosperity 
Since the earliest days of the republic, commercial 
or economic interests have never ceased to serve 
as the lifeblood of the nation. Originally built on 
the export of raw materials and the import of 
manufactured goods, the United States was 
successful because the nation focused almost 
exclusively on economic growth. Challenges to 
the nation’s commercial interests came first from 
the Barbary Pirates and then from the British 
Navy.53 In both instances the nation went to war. 
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53 Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten 
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Soon after entering the industrial age the United 
States would become the world’s largest economy 
and a net exporter—well before World War II. 
During the twentieth century, the Soviet Union 
presented the clearest threat to American 
economic interests, as two competing economic 
systems engaged in an epic struggle for 
supremacy.54 With the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
capitalism prevailed. America’s “unipolar 
moment” did not, however, completely shift the 
focus from commercial interests.55 Since 1991 
every national security strategy has devoted 
significant discourse to the president’s grand 
strategy for defense of the nation’s economic 
interests—albeit through policies that often do not 
survive to the succeeding administration.  
 
Energy Supply 
Some argue that the history of U.S. foreign 
policy—since at least the Cold War—is the 
history of America’s thirst for oil.56 Although 
meant as a condemnation of the American way of 
life, it is a reality that the world—advanced and 
developing—is dependent on hydrocarbons 
derived from such sources as coal, natural gas, 
and petroleum.57 These resources drive the 
economy and the American way of life. Cutting 
the nation’s or its trading partner’s energy supply 
would cause the economy to grind to a halt. No 
other natural resource is as pervasive in its impact 
on society.    
 
While many Americans find the idea of waging 
war to secure the nation’s energy supply 
unacceptable, no president, Democrat or 
                                                                                          
Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic 
World (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007). 
54 For an early understanding of the underlying 
differences in the two systems see Ludwig von Mises, 
“Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im Sozialistischen 
Gemeinwesen” [“Economic Statement in the Socialist 
Community”], Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und 
Sozialpolitik 47 (1920), 86–121. 
55 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” 
Foreign Affairs Vol. 70, No. 1 (Winter 1990/1991), 
23–33. 
56 Stephen Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy 
since World War I: For Profits and Security (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007). 
57 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, 
Money, and Power (New York: Free Press, 2008). 
49 Space & Defense  
 
Republican, is willing to place the nation’s energy 
supply at risk. Few would disagree that the first 
Gulf War sought to protect Middle East oil 
supplies from an aggressive despot.58 Some also 
claim that the second Iraq war was a bolder 
attempt to secure America’s oil supply.59 What 
most policy-makers will agree on is the 
importance of hydrocarbons to the continued 
success of the U.S. economy.  
 
By 2030 global energy demand is estimated to be 
50 percent higher than today.60 Absent a 
technological breakthrough in renewable energy, a 
transformational increase in domestic drilling 
(like hydraulic fracturing), or a turn to nuclear 
power, energy will play an increasingly important 
role in economic and security policy. The need for 
critical resources has a long history of generating 
conflicts.61 Oil and natural gas have the greatest 
potential to be the resources over which much 
blood is spilled in the coming years.62    
 
Freedom of the Seas 
In addition to economic and energy security, 
freedom of movement is a vital national interest 
and America’s military works to ensure freedom 
of navigation, not just for the United States, but 
for all nations. When Mahan wrote The Influence 
of Sea Power upon History (1890), he was the 
first to develop a unified thesis linking supremacy 
of the seas to national greatness. His study of 
British and French maritime strategy convinced 
Mahan that Britain’s control of the transoceanic 
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lines of commerce and communication enabled an 
island nation (Britain) to become an empire. If 
America were to take its rightful place among the 
great powers, it too must master the seas. As 
Mahan noted early in his work, “The profound 
influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and 
strength of countries was clearly seen long before 
the true principles which governed its growth and 
prosperity were detected.”63 
  
In previous centuries, “supremacy” enabled 
countries to restrict interstate commerce, but the 
United States saw the benefits of open trade 
enabled by secure trade routes. As the single 
largest economy in the world for nearly a century, 
no other nation has derived greater benefit from 
the U.S. Navy’s maintenance of secure oceans. 
With more than 6.76 billion tons of goods moving 
by sea each year (90 percent of all interstate trade), 
a loss of such freedom would adversely affect the 
national interest in ways that are complex and 
difficult to accurately calculate.64  
 
Freedom of action at sea also ensures that the 
lines of communication remain open. Currently, 
undersea cables carry more than seven trillion 
bytes per second of information across more than 
150,000 kilometers of fiber optic cable.65 If they 
were cut, the United States’ ability to 
communicate and conduct commerce with the 
world would be greatly degraded. 
 
Over the next generation, trade will continue to 
flow across oceans and undersea cables will 
continue to carry large quantities of data. While 
the United States’ relative position in the 
international system is likely to decline as 
countries such as China, India, and Brazil grow, 
maintaining American freedom of action at sea 
will remain a vital interest. Defending the global 
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The United States also seeks freedom of action in 
space. A 2012 Department of Defense directive 
correctly notes, “The sustainability and stability of 
the space environment, as well as free access to 
and use of space, are vital to U.S. national 
interests.”67 Space plays a critical role in 
communications (strategic and commercial), 
intelligence (imagery and electronic), navigation 
(commercial and military), and early warning.68 
One recent look at a theoretical loss of 
commercial and military access to space from 
attack paints a plausible picture that demonstrates 
the United States’ susceptibility to such an attack 
and the devastation it could wreak.69  
 
The years and decades ahead will see space-
related technology mature and spread, making 
space accessible to friend and foe alike while also 
increasing American reliance on space assets. 
According to the 2011 National Security Space 
Strategy, as many as 9,000 satellite 
communications transponders are expected to be 
in orbit by 2015. As the demand for bandwidth 
increases and more transponders are placed in 
service, there will be greater likelihood of radio 
frequency interference and increased strain on 
government resources to minimize that 
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interference—along with potential threats posed 
by adversaries.70 
   
Absent some unforeseen shift in policy and 
technological development, the nation will 
increasingly rely on space in the decades ahead. If 
space is weaponized, as is frequently suggested, it 
will play an even greater role in national 
defense.71 Thus, space is likely to increase rather 
than decrease in its importance to the national 
interest.   
 
Cyber Security 
Similarly, cyber security has grown over the past 
sixty years from a new technology—with early 
computers that helped the United States and 
Britain decrypt Nazi messages—to what is 
arguably the most pervasive and economically 
relevant technology of the present and future.72 
Thus, with its rise to prominence over the 20th and 
early 21st centuries it is now possible to 
definitively call cyber security a vital interest. In 
its opening paragraph the Cyberspace Policy 
Review (2009) notes, “The globally 
interconnected digital information and 
communications infrastructure known as 
‘cyberspace’ underpins almost every facet of 
modern society and provides critical support for 
the U.S. economy, civil infrastructure, public 
safety, and national security.”73  
 
As recently as a decade ago, suggesting that cyber 
security was a vital interest would have drawn 
harsh criticism. Technological developments, 
however, have deepened the nation’s reliance on 
cyberspace over that time. Currently, every 
economic sector and government agency is 
dependent on cyberspace for the transmission of 
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data.74 Disrupting that flow would have serious 
consequences for the United States. As 
technology advances in the coming years, cyber-
dependence will grow. Thus, maintaining freedom 
of action in cyberspace is an increasingly 
important vital interest, even as it illustrates 
Huntington’s claim that specific interests do 
indeed evolve and develop, with cyberspace 
serving as the single best example of a rapid rise 
in importance.  
 
Homeland Security 
With an exact definition of “homeland security” 
remaining elusive as the Department of Homeland 
Security and U.S. Northern Command engage in a 
wide range of security and emergency 
management activities, this is perhaps the most 
amorphous and expansive vital interest. A look at 
homeland security literature offers at least seven 
definitions of the term, ranging from an emphasis 
on terrorism to jurisdictional hazards to quality of 
life. When fifty practitioners of homeland security 
were asked what the term meant to them, 14 
percent said “terrorism,” 18 percent said “all 
hazards,” and 38 percent admitted that homeland 
security is undefined.75 While there is no 
consensus on how homeland security is defined, 
most Americans would likely agree that protection 
of territorial sovereignty and integrity is indeed a 
vital interest. 
 
According to the 2012 Defense Strategic 
Guidance, “U.S. forces will continue to defend 
U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-
state actors.”76 In his 2010 National Security 
Strategy, President Obama dedicates a section to 
strengthening security and resilience at home and 
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acknowledges he has no greater responsibility 
than to protect the American people and the 
homeland.77 Similarly, the Department of 
Homeland Security, which was established for 
this very purpose, published a Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review in 2010, noting, “A 
safe and secure homeland must mean more than 
preventing terrorist attacks from being carried out. 
It must also ensure that the liberties of all 
Americans are assured, privacy is protected, and 
the means by which we interchange with the 
world—through travel, lawful immigration, trade, 
commerce, and exchange—are secured.78  
 
Regardless of how it is defined, defense of the 
homeland is the primary vital interest focused on 
what Morgenthau considered the second area of 
vital interest—sovereignty or territorial integrity.   
  
The Role of Values in Foreign Policy 
 
While we have argued for a shift away 
from a values-based foreign policy, the role of 
values in American political life is of great 
significance. In the nation’s external actions, the 
departments of State and Defense have long 
sought to advance civil rights and liberties—a 
laudable desire. In establishing the United States, 
the Founding Fathers developed a model of 
government that would guarantee liberty—a 
central value at the founding—for the nation’s 
citizens. Confident in the success of the American 
experiment, President Eisenhower, on a world 
goodwill tour in 1959, told the people of India, 
“We believe freedom ultimately will be won 
everywhere.” In Athens, he defined freedom as a 
state “…in which, under the rule of law, every 
human will have the right and a fair chance to live 
his own life, to choose his own path, to work out 
his own destiny.”79  
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Consistent with Eisenhower’s view of America’s 
role in advancing liberty, we advocate a policy 
where the United States serves primarily as a 
“shining city upon a hill,” setting an example in 
the exercise of virtue at home, rather than, as John 
Quincy Adams warned against, going abroad 
“…in search of monsters to destroy.”80 
Admittedly, much of U.S. foreign policy over the 
past two decades has centered on maintaining a 
liberal social order in parts of the world where 
one-party regimes oppose liberal democratic ideas 
and practices. Francis Fukuyama’s early thesis 
centered on whether it was America’s proper task 
to promote global democratization, that is, to 
“make the world safe for democracy.”81 Most 
realists believe American foreign policy has been 
prone to a naïve belief in American 
“exceptionalism.” They suggest Lord Palmerston 
offered sage and timeless advice when, in 1856, 
he said of Britain, “We have no eternal allies, and 
we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are 
eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our 
duty to follow.”  
 
This is not to suggest that realists reject the role of 
values. Morgenthau argued that the nation derives 
its identity from its dedication to certain universal 
truths about men, including respect for the 
fundamental and natural liberties and rights 
delineated in the Declaration of Independence.82 
However, realists such as Morgenthau and 
Kennan would argue that America’s foreign 
policy and military intervention should not be 
driven by attempts to promote global 
democratization. Rather, they suggest that liberal 
values and foreign policy can and should be 
separated.  
 
Post-Cold War presidential administrations, 
Republican and Democrat, have developed 
foreign policy based on a political tradition that 
places emphasis on the defense of human liberty. 
The current National Security Strategy states: 
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The United States believes certain values 
are universal and will work to promote 
them worldwide. These include an 
individual’s freedom to speak their mind, 
assemble without fear, worship as they 
please, and choose their own leaders; they 
also include dignity, tolerance, and 
equality among all people, and the fair 
and equitable administration of justice.  
The United States was founded upon a 
belief in these values….And nations that 
embrace these values for their citizens are 
ultimately more successful–and friendly 
to the United States – than those that do 
not.83 
 
A wide acceptance among policy makers of the 
“democratic peace theory” and empirical evidence 
that democracies and countries with strong trade 
relations do not fight one another has fostered a 
renewed interest in the promotion of democracy, 
liberal economic regimes, and globalization.84 
Although the means by which the United States 
furthers its promotion of liberal economic and 
political systems will likely change in the decades 
ahead, it will remain a priority for the nation.85  
 
While the post-Cold War period has seen a 
significant move toward free markets and 
democratic political systems, there is some reason 
to believe that “autocratic capitalism” may 
become more prominent in the decades ahead. 
With political systems that are less free, these 
regimes will maintain stronger control over their 
populations while continuing to promote market 
oriented policies. Not all scholars agree, 
however.86  
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In the course of dialogue regarding the national 
interest, it is important to remember the historical 
debate surrounding distinctions between 
American values versus vital interests, and the 
benefits and dangers associated with developing 
foreign policy and military strategy that focus on 
amorphous values at the expense of concrete 
interests. We argue American values present a 
range of issues for governments to address, but 
they do not necessarily represent America’s vital 
national interests. It is the nation’s interest that 
must drive foreign policy, not abstract notions of 
values and morality, which clearly are defined 




While some readers may question the 
specific interests discussed above, they are likely 
to agree that a vigorous debate concerning the 
national interest is a necessary undertaking for a 
free and open society. Although the National 
Security Strategy purports to describe the national 
interest, it is more accurately described as a 
partisan political document designed to describe a 
sitting president’s foreign policy agenda. To better 
establish a broadly accepted conceptualization of 
America’s national interest, we recommend the 
President and Congress jointly re-establish a 
Commission on America’s National Interests. 
Much like the one established in 1996, it should 
be composed of respected persons from both 
political parties and with a diversity of experience. 
Its purpose should be to reach a broad consensus 
on the nation’s vital interests. While we have 
suggested six vital interests in the preceding pages, 
such a commission may develop an alternative set 
of vital interests.  
 
We also recommend a shift in the focus of 
American foreign policy from one based on the 
advancement of values to one based on the 
advancement of concrete interests. Such a policy 
would, in many ways, raise the bar for the use of 
military force, much like the Weinberger-Powell 
Doctrine was designed to do. The objective of 
such a shift is both to de-politicize foreign policy 
and ensure that American foreign policy is more 
closely tied to the nation’s material interests. 
Absent such an effort, American foreign policy 
will continue to vacillate between presidential 
administrations and serve as a point of division 
amongst Americans. 
  
We do not suggest that recommendations 
provided here can be implemented merely through 
a simple exercise to agree upon vital national 
interests. One of the most daunting obstacles to 
this undertaking will be accounting for 
organizational interests.  There are many agencies 
and individuals within the federal government and 
within society that prefer ambiguity on this topic.  
Once the nation agrees upon a specific set of vital 
interests and seeks to prioritize and protect those 
interests, organizations and interests may see their 
favored cause fall from prominence. Over the last 
several decades, for example, the nation has seen 
the growing role of cyberspace rise above other 
interests in the level of resources dedicated toward 
its protection. This is to be expected as the 
nation’s interests slowly evolve over time.87  
   
Another challenge for any administration seeking 
an interest-based approach to foreign policy is that 
it serves to hold decision-makers accountable for 
actions taken in the international arena. 
Ambiguity not only serves organizational interests, 
it can also serve personal political interests, giving 
policy makers the flexibility to make popular 
decisions on a whim, rather than making difficult, 
consistent decisions that require thoughtful 
deliberation and explanation. Nevertheless, we 
continue to recommend that as a global leader and 
representative democracy, America’s allies and 
citizens deserve more than ambiguity and 
populism. It is time for courageous leadership to 
speak out on this important topic because the 
choice between interests and values is great, but 
the implications for the future of American 
foreign policy are greater.   
 
Finally, we acknowledge that while a clean list of 
constant enduring vital interests is preferable, 
there are also evolving interests that can develop 
as a result of both technology and international 
commitments. The important concept to 
                                                          
87 While we believe vital interests are largely enduring 
in nature, this does not mean that there is never change. 
Instead, we suggest that vital interests are not simply 
whatever a sitting president deems them to be. Stability 
does not require an absence of all change.  
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remember in regard to such evolution of interests 
is to anticipate and accept these new interests, not 
because they have emerged from economic 
benefit or popular opinion, but because the 
nation’s own innovation has allowed for new 
interests to develop. Similarly, some actions may 
be driven by international treaties or allied 
commitments, but these too must be approached 
with thoughtful deliberation—with U.S. national 
interests always in mind.   
 
It is essential for the United States to clearly 
articulate its own vital interests in order to 
continue to serve as a global leader. Such an 
undertaking will serve both America’s allies and 
the nation’s national security. If the United States 
does not play this role, either because Americans 
cannot reach a consensus or refuse to identify vital 
national interests, other rising powers will step 
into the void. It is very likely that Americans will 
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The purpose of this study is twofold:  first, 
to determine to what extent multilateral 
agreements to limit disruptive actions in space 
and/or establish norms of behavior are verifiable; 
second, to consider under what circumstances 




 It is commonly said, especially by 
military spokesmen, that space is becoming more 
congested, contested, and competitive.  These 
trends are predicted to have increasingly negative 
consequences for national security.  If this is the 
case, three alternatives present themselves for 
policy makers:  do nothing, in which case the 
negative trends presumably will continue until all 
of space becomes more dangerous and some of it 
un-useable; hope that a rough order emerges as 
independent players attempt to maximize their 
interests—an “invisible hand” solution; or take 
positive steps to create order out of the emerging 
chaos.  This last alternative will probably require 
that all major actors accept some inhibition on 
freedom of action in space, as has been clear for 
some time regarding mitigation of space debris.  
In an increasingly congested and contested 
environment, it may become true of other 
activities as well.  But no sovereign actor will 
accept such limitations unless it can be assured of 
the compliance of others.  Hence, verification 




Verification is any process designed to 
demonstrate a party's compliance or non-
compliance with an agreement or treaty.  For our 
purposes, verification is relevant to all agreements 
that place constraints on specific and observable 
actions in space or directed at space, including 
deployment, testing and/or maneuvers of weapons 
or other systems as well as physical or electro-
magnetic interference with the operation of 
satellites.   It therefore differs from monitoring, 
which is the technical ability to observe activity.  
Intentions are not verifiable, although an effective 
verification regime can detect patterns of activity 
from which intent may be inferred.  The same is 
true of unilateral declarations of good faith, best 
behavior or resolve to promote various laudatory 
outcomes in space.  Multilateral agreement on 
norms of behavior represents a gray area.  Those 
expectations that grow over time to create 
political inhibitions against certain actions in 
space may be a proper subject for verification, and 
knowledge of behavior in space created by 
verification regimes may help in building the case 
that such norms exist.  But this applies only to 
norms against specific and observable behaviors 
and may be more apparent than real.  It can be 
argued, for example, that a norm against kinetic 
ASAT tests in space existed for more than two 
decades after the mid-1980s, when both the U.S. 
and the USSR ceased testing.  As the Chinese 
ASAT test of 2007 showed, however, one nation’s 
norm may be another’s target of opportunity. 
Verification does not apply to rogue actors whose 
intent is to disrupt the system and whose actions 
can only be monitored.  A verifiable regime 
among major actors does not, therefore, eliminate 
the possibility of disruptive actions in space.  It 
does, however, create a common interest among 
the most influential space powers to isolate 
outliers and bring international pressure to bear 
against such behavior. 
Both arms control and verification of compliance 
can contribute to strengthening deterrence, since 
well-conceived measures make it more difficult 
for an adversary to test and deploy offensive 
weapon systems, and may enhance warning of 
potential threat.  It should be emphasized that 
such measures limit behavior in peacetime, but 
not in war.  If deterrence fails, only those 
agreements specifically applicable to hostilities 
(like the Geneva and Hague Conventions) 
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continue legally to apply.  Accordingly, arms 
control, norms, rules of the road and other 
schemes to foster a stable and predictable 
environment in space do not limit war-time 
options, any more than laws of peaceful transit at 
sea or in the air limit freedom of action if 
hostilities occur.1 
Premises 
• Any regime in space requiring U.S. self-
restraint can only be sustained politically 
over time if the U.S. can be assured of the 
compliance of others.  This includes 
systems of “norms,” “best practices,” and 
“codes of conduct” as well as treaty 
restraints. 
• Accordingly, U.S. policy on specific 
proposals for normative measures in 
space whether of the “hard” or “soft” 
variety should be based from the outset on 
consideration of whether or not 
compliance can be verified within 
reasonable limits. 
• No major space actor is likely to accept 
meaningful constraints on its freedom of 
action in space unless it can verify 
independently the compliance of others.   
The capability of verification by the least 
capable major actor will therefore define 
the limits of agreed constraints. 2 
 
What are “reasonable limits”?  All agree that 
verification can never be exact.  Even in the 
                                                          
1 On this point, see inter alia, Jonty Kasku-Jackson and 
Elizabeth Waldrop, “Understanding Space Law,” in the 
Eisenhower Center’s book, Space and Defense Policy, 
(London:  Routledge Publishing, 2009), p. 65. 
2 Hays describes how nuclear limitations “could only 
be as precise as could be ‘seen’ by national technical 
means” in Peter L. Hays, United States Military Space: 
Into the Twenty-First Century, INSS Occasional paper 
#42, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 
September 2002), p. 57.  Hence, according to Hays’ 
account, limitations of nuclear testing in space only 
became possible with the deployment by the United 
States of the Vela Hotel satellite series that allowed 
such activity to be detected.  The assertion here, in 
short, is that neither the U.S. nor other major actors 
would rely on data from potential adversaries affecting 
real national security interest.   
absence of intention to evade (which cannot, of 
course, be discounted) there can be non-
compliance at the margins, viz., operator mistakes, 
disputes about how agreements apply in particular 
circumstances,3 or ambiguity in the terms of the 
agreements themselves.4  Parties may push the 
edges of the interpretive envelope or probe the 
capabilities of the others’ sensors.  The term of art 
is “circumvention” and refers to “exploitation of 
imprecise treaty language, loopholes, omissions or 
ambiguities” that may have military significance.5  
The question is: when does such behavior cross 
the boundary from nuisance, or the normal friction 
of competitive relationships, to become a concern 
for national security?  
 
For the purposes of this analysis, verification 
within “reasonable limits” means the ability to 
detect non-compliance that alters or might in 
future alter the relative strategic position of the 
United States in space, with sufficient warning 
time to respond appropriately.  This includes 
restrictions on the orbiting of certain types of 
satellites, the use of certain critical orbits, the 
maneuvering of satellites, and the testing of either 
ground based or space based ASAT capability.   
 
A verification regime that met this standard might 
not detect individual instances of non-compliant 
behavior.  But the contention here is that the 
constellation involved in U.S. security space, both 
government and commercial satellites, has 
expanded to the point that it presents a dispersed 
and difficult target for any would be attacker.  
Weakening the relative strategic position of the 
United States in space by attacks on satellites 
would therefore require patterns of behavior over 
                                                          
3 On this point, Chayes and Chayes argue nations may 
simply not have enough information to comply.  The 
New Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995). 
4 For a discussion of the negative impact of ambiguity 
on verification of arms control agreements, see 
“Verification and Compliance,” in Albert Carnesale 
and Richard Haass, eds., Superpower Arms Control 
(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1987), Chapter 11, 
where Haass argues that pressure to achieve agreement 
may result in purposeful ambiguities in language which 
are then reflected in disputes about verification.   
5 Ibid., 304. 
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protracted periods of time and directed at space.6  
Such patterns would create opportunities for 
detection and make the larger effort visible.  
Many claim that this process is currently 
underway.  Supposing this analysis is based on 
fact, it underlines the conclusion that the problem 
is not detection, but concerting action both 
nationally and internationally to respond.  
 
SPACE AS A DOMAIN FOR 
VERIFICATION 
 From the point of view of verification, the 
most obvious attribute of space is also the most 
relevant:  space is transparent.7  Moreover, space 
is a medium and long-term environment where the 
process of research, development, and deployment 
is measured in decades.  The provision that the 
U.S. be aware of significant changes “in time to 
respond” is therefore less stringent, especially 
since the appropriate response may be in domains 
other than space.    
 
Technology has sometimes held out the hope (or 
the threat) of making space less transparent as a 
way of bestowing unilateral strategic advantage.   
This would be the effect, for example, of “stealth” 
technology in space.  There are reports in open 
sources of programs to create stealthy satellites, as 
well as reports that such programs proved 
technologically infeasible and have been 
abandoned.  Such technologies would obviously 
pose challenges for verification; indeed, the 
proliferation of stealth technology might well 
hasten the trend toward congested and contested 
space, with no obvious remedy.  The unilateral 
possession of stealth technology (or its equivalent) 
                                                          
6 As distinguished from denying space services to a 
particular battlefield at a particular time, a capability 
which military planners should assume potential 
adversaries have or will soon have. 
7 The contrast is with the terrestrial arms race, where 
crucial behavior was often opaque.  The United States 
had no physical description of the Soviet SS-20 
MRBM (which changed the strategic balance in 
Europe) until it was deployed, and no imagines of it 
until the INF treaty was signed.  Chemical and 
biological weapon production can, and has been, 
successfully disguised.  There is no direct analogue in 
space. 
by the United States could well provide military 
advantage.   
But history teaches that such a technological 
edge—from tanks to ballistic missiles to nuclear 
weapons to SLBMs to MIRV’s—is usually short-
lived.  The general proliferation of stealth 
technology in orbit would make establishing a 
stable environment much more difficult, if not 
impossible, and would be very disadvantageous to 
the United States as the predominate player.  It 
would, by definition, defeat efforts for constraints 
on specific and observable behaviors and would 
necessarily degrade situational awareness for all 
actors. 
There are also stealth implications in the recent 
trend toward miniaturization of satellites.  Small 
satellites could in theory be used as co-orbiting 
kinetic kill or close proximity explosive devices 
(the euphemism is “non-cooperative rendezvous”) 
and in this guise would be, in effect, intelligent 
space mines.  They might not be too small to see, 
but conceivably too small to track and therefore to 
counter.  There is no restriction in international 
law against orbiting a space mine in proximity to 
military satellites.  It has been technologically 
feasible since the advent of maneuverable 
satellites, but the option—though explored by the 
Soviets in the 1970s—has not been pursued.8 
Making such devices small in size would, in 
theory, also make them deployable in larger 
numbers at lower cost.  Still, a program 
significant enough to meet our threshold of 
verifiability “within reasonable limits” would 
have to be extensive and involve launch, 
command and control, and testing activities that 
would potentially leave signatures observable in a 
variety of domains, including the electromagnetic 
spectrum.  If very small satellites do represent a 
potentially undetectable threat, they would fall 
into the category of those things—like bans on 
laboratory-based research and development—
which are neither observable nor verifiable and 
therefore fall out of the realm of any regime of 
reciprocal constraints.  This is a judgment for 
                                                          
8 Nicholas Johnson, Soviet Military Strategy in Space 
(London: Jane’s Publishing Company, 1987), p. 172. 
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others with better access to information about 
actual programs. 
A Short History of Verification and of Space 
Arms Control 
All treaties that contain binding 
obligations are subject to verification, whether or 
not the treaty language includes verification 
provisions.9  The Limited Test Ban Treaty 
(1963)—the first arms control agreement that 
mentions space—contained no reference to 
verification.  Verification had been a central issue 
in negotiations, but distrust between the two sides, 
and the closed society that was the Soviet Union, 
made cooperative measures impossible, and space 
reconnaissance was still in its infancy.   
The Soviets took the position that both sides 
possessed adequate means to verify compliance 
without intrusive measures like on-site inspection, 
and that compliance would be compelled by the 
pressure of international public opinion.  President 
Eisenhower responded that only the largest tests 
could be detected with certainty and that an 
effective test ban would therefore require 
“inspection and control”—i.e., that adequate 
verification would require a combination of 
unilateral, cooperative, and multilateral measures, 
including seismic monitoring stations and a 
multilateral control commission empowered to 
make on-site inspections on demand.    
In the end, the scope of the treaty was limited to 
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer 
space, and under water—i.e., the scope of 
constraint was reduced to what the parties were 
confident each could verify unilaterally without 
the more intrusive verification measures that more 
extensive constraints would have required.  In the 
aftermath, each of the superpowers made 
considerable effort to monitor compliance, and 
each raised compliance issues with the other, 
although there is no evidence that either side was 
ever in violation.  For our purposes, the LTBT 
was both the first agreement constraining 
activities in space, and the first Cold War example 
                                                          
9 By the same token, voluntary or declaratory measures 
that are not specific and not binding cannot be verified 
in the sense the term is used here. 
of the practice of limiting constraints to those that 
could be verified unilaterally by the parties.10 
That practice continued through the nuclear arms 
negotiations of the following decades; viz., as 
national technical means improved, counting rules 
evolved from counting launchers to counting 
warheads, the key being, as Hays comments, 
“what could be seen.”  An exception to this 
pattern was the Biological Weapons Convention 
(1972) which, like the LTBT, contained no 
verification regime, but, unlike the LTBT, 
constrained activities (the production of biological 
weapons) that were inherently undetectable by 
outside observers.  
The BWC was the last agreement in the Cold War 
era that did not include specific verification 
measures.  The trend beginning with bilateral 
U.S./Soviet nuclear limitation agreements in the 
1970’s was to incorporate verification measures of 
increasing complexity and intrusiveness in treaty 
language, including a variety of “cooperative 
measures” by which the parties were obliged to 
take steps to enhance the visibility of their 
programs.  Generally speaking, the extent and 
intrusiveness of verification measures depended 
on: 
• The “transparency” of the domain 
involved, i.e., the inherent ease of 
disguising or difficulty in observing non-
complaint behaviors;   
• The “criticality” of agreed constraints, 
i.e., whether small changes in the existing 
balance of forces might be difficult to 
detect and have disproportionately serious 
consequences;   
• The general state of relations or “trust 
factor” between the parties, and therefore 
the possibility of cooperative verification 
measures to increase transparency.    
Verification also became more prominent in the 
negotiations of arms control as skepticism grew, 
                                                          
10Clay Moltz argues that the LTBT, and the subsequent 
agreement (General Assembly Resolution 1884) not to 
deploy weapons of mass destruction in space were 
“critical” to allowing the further development of space 
for satellite reconnaissance and manned missions.  See 
Moltz, Politics of Space Security, p. 141. 
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particularly in the U.S. Senate, about the 
reliability of the Soviets as a partner, and the 
benefit of arms control regimes in general.  This 
trend is well illustrated by the detailed on-site, on-
demand inspection regime of the last of the Cold 
War treaties, that dealing with chemical weapons, 
but it had already been evident in the treaty 
eliminating intermediate range nuclear forces in 
Europe (INF).  
The Outer Space Treaty 
The Outer Space Treaty contains only one 
provision that might be said to have the purpose 
of verification:  a provision that all parties with 
facilities on the moon allow reciprocal visits by 
others with similar facilities (Article VII).  The 
background was fear of the strategic value of the 
moon both as a base for nuclear attack and for the 
surreptitious testing of nuclear weapons.  Such 
fears proved unfounded.  Otherwise, the OST was 
silent on the issue of verification, although it 
contains several provisions that impose 
constraints on freedom of action in space.   
The most prominent example is the stationing of 
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass 
destruction in space, on the moon, or on other 
celestial bodies (Article IV).  But states parties are 
also enjoined to carry on their activities “with due 
regard to the corresponding interests of all other 
States Parties to the Treaty” and to avoid “harmful 
contamination” of the space environment (Article 
IX), provisions that might be interpreted to apply 
to debris-causing ASAT tests in space.  The OST 
also obligates parties to consult with others when 
they have reason to believe their activities in 
space will cause “harmful interference” with the 
space operations of other parties (Article IX), a 
provision that Hays interprets as forbidding 
jamming, blinding, or otherwise disrupting space 
activities without prior consultation.11  
                                                          
11 The range of possible activities requiring prior 
consultation are described by Hays as, “should not jam, 
blind, or otherwise disrupt unless required for self-
defense or during hostilities.”  See Hays, United States 
Military Space, p. 51.  Hays also points out that the 
International Telecommunications Convention 
prohibits “jamming or disruption” except in self-
defense or war. 
The absence of verification provisions reflected 
U.S. confidence that it possessed the independent 
means to verify satisfactorily the constraints 
contained in the Outer Space Treaty.  The absence 
of verification measures was also a function of 
limited superpower interest in undertaking banned 
activities and U.S. desire to minimize focus on its 
NTM capabilities or expose them to international 
scrutiny.   
 
During ratification hearings for the OST in the 
Senate, Administration witnesses argued that 
although the U.S. national technical means (NTM) 
could not verify the purpose or content of any 
particular object in space, it could detect mass 
deployments before they became “militarily 
significant.”  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
Wheeler also said the United States would prefer 
using its own resources for verification rather than 
relying on any international on-site inspection 
regime, and Secretary of State Rusk claimed that 
the United States was confident of its ability to 
detect any deployment of nuclear or weapons of 
mass destruction in space.12 
 
ASAT Negotiations 
The Carter Administration undertook ASAT 
limitation negotiations with the Soviet Union 
beginning in 1978.  Three sessions were held, but 
the results were inconclusive.  The United States 
opened with a proposal for a complete prohibition 
on anti-satellite weapons.  The Soviets seemed to 
have been without specific instructions but 
generally opposed an outright ban.  The Soviets 
alleged that the Space Shuttle could be viewed as 
a potential ASAT weapon.  They also argued that 
certain satellite operations by third parties could 
threaten state sovereignty and anti-satellite 
capability was a legitimate means of self-
defense;13 the Soviets had begun to consider the 
threat posed by Chinese space capability, against 
which their ASAT program was also directed.14  
                                                          
12 Hays, p. 70 describes the Administration arguments 
on verification during the Senate debate on ratification 
of the OST.  General Wheeler elsewhere noted for the 
record that the “Joint Chiefs of Staff remain concerned 
about the assurance of verification capability with 
regards to weapons in orbit,” quoted in Stares, p. 104. 
13 Carnesale and Haass, pp.144-145. 
14 Ibid. 
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Verification was a subject of concern, but other 
factors were more important, among them 
asymmetry in capability.15  By 1978, the Soviets 
had an operational ASAT system, which they 
refused to dismantle; the U.S. capability was in 
development, but a conventional system had not 
yet been tested or deployed.  The Pentagon was 
also concerned about the vulnerability of the U.S. 
security space constellation, which at this point 
was still relatively small.  According to John 
Wertheimer, OSD and JCS preferred to rely on 
U.S. technological superiority rather than arms 
control to address what they saw as a dangerous 
ASAT imbalance.16   
 
In response to DoD concerns, President Carter 
adopted a “two-track” policy, i.e., continuation of 
ASAT development while negotiations on 
banning ASAT continued.  Like most “two-track” 
approaches (the INF negotiations of the 1980’s 
are another example) the tactic was intended as 
much to assuage differences of opinion within the 
Administration as to impress the Soviets with U.S. 
resolve.  Given fears about Soviet plans to deploy 
systems in space to launch or facilitate attacks in 
the atmosphere—particularly satellites to enable 
targeting of carrier battle groups—there was also 
reluctance to give up U.S. offensive ASAT 
options.   
 
In terms of our analysis, none of the variables 
conducive to agreement on verification were 
optimized.  Rudimentary capability of space 
situational awareness meant that space, though 
inherently transparent, was not practically so.  
Because the United States relied on a very small 
number of military satellites, small changes in the 
balance had potentially disproportionate 
consequences.  And trust between the parties was 
very low.  
 
Stares, who conducted a number of interviews 
with U.S. negotiators, reported fundamental 
disagreement between key players on the U.S. 
                                                          
15 Stares claims that DoD concerns focused not on 
verification difficulties but on limitations to U.S. 
freedom of action.  See Paul B. Stares, Militarization of 
Space (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 197. 
16 Carnesale and Haass, p. 146-147. 
side.  The State Department and Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency pressed for 
comprehensive ASAT restrictions; DoD coalesced 
around a non-use/non-interference ban.  The 
Soviets were unwilling to discuss a non-use ban 
extending beyond the two superpowers; the U.S. 
wanted to extend coverage to its allies.  This 
mutual recalcitrance and the failure of the U.S. to 
agree on a unified position (rather than concerns 
about verifiability) were the chief impediments to 
agreement.  With the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the climate for arms control 
deteriorated, and after adjournment the ASAT 
talks were never resumed.17   
 
In the intervening thirty years, some of the 
projected threats to, and military uses of, satellites 
have proved illusory.18  Weapon platforms in 
space continue to have proponents, but 
vulnerability issues have not been resolved, and 
feasibility has not been proven.  Predictions that 
armadas of orbiting ASAT vehicles were 
inevitable if negotiations failed proved unfounded.   
Formal arms control limitations aimed at space 
were replaced by tacit agreement between the 
superpowers.  Of this tacit approach it might be 
said that the two sides decided independently that 
an arms race in an offense-dominant environment 
like space would be technologically challenging, 
ultimately futile, and meanwhile would divert 
vital resources in large amounts from more 
immediate security needs.  Research continued; 
testing and deployment did not.   
 
                                                          
17 This account is taken from Stares who also claims 
that a draft non-use agreement was prepared, seemed to 
represent “common ground” but was not concluded.  
Regarding the two-track strategy, he comments: “But 
like all bargaining chip arguments, the two-track policy 
could be maintained so long as the question of what the 
US wanted to  prohibit, or put differently, what it was 
willing to forego, did not need to be addressed.  Once 
negotiations with the Soviets began in earnest, the 
basic incompatibility of goals within the administration 
made conflict inevitable.”  See Stares, p. 200. 
18 A High Frontier civilian panel noted “strong 
indications” in the early 1980’s that the Soviet Union 
was going to deploy “power directed energy weapons” 
in space and thereby “alter the balance of world power”  
(RAND, p. 14). 
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Categories of Arms Control and Normative 
Restrictions 
 
Because the general nature of threats to 
satellites has been well understood for decades, 
the categories of possible arms control and 
limitation agreements is also well known.  These 
include limitations on orbiting in proximity to 
certain satellites (so-called “keep out zones”),19 
operations in transfer orbits or other critical 
regions of space, the testing or deployment of 
dedicated ASAT weapons (whether in space or 
within the atmosphere) or of other systems such as 
BMD “in ASAT mode,” and on electro-magnetic 
or other interference with satellites.  The last of 
these is arguably already prohibited by the OST 
and the International Telecommunication 
Convention.20 
   
The verification requirements of various regimes 
would differ in intrusiveness depending on the 
inherent visibility of prohibited actions; 
verification of bans on some categories of 
weapons, viz., ground-based laser generators, 
might require on-site inspections.  Other 
constraints—for example, bans on kinetic ASAT 
testing—could be verified with less intrusive 
measures.21  Activities grouped under the general 
heading of research and development are 
inherently ambiguous and therefore probably 
outside any regime of mutual constraint.   
                                                          
19 Keep out zones might be challenged as violations of 
the OST prohibition on claims of sovereignty in space 
(Article 11) 
20 There is an obvious overlap in capability between air 
defense, ballistic missile defense, and anti-satellite 
weapons.  The distinction comes not so much in the 
capability as in the testing of such weapons and is 
based on the assumption that no country will rely on a 
system which has not been tested in its intended role.  
The use of this approach as a means of distinguishing 
SAM and ABM interceptors during ABM negotiations 
is discussed in Johnson, pp. 184-185. 
21 It has been argued that a viable kinetic kill ASAT 
capability could be tested via near encounters without 
impact and the resultant, and highly visible, debris 
field.  This argues for equipping satellites with sensors 
to detect activity within the neighborhood of their 
obits.  Deploying a system to threaten a significant 
portion of U.S. satellites with this sort of single 
encounter, hit-to-kill capability would be an extensive 
and time-consuming effort.   
Probably for this reason, no ban on research and 
development has been proposed by any 
responsible player.   
 
A prohibition on stationing of weapons of any 
nature in orbit or on celestial bodies (although not 
of potential ASAT devices on the surface) is the 
central feature of the Chinese/Russian “Draft 
Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of 
Force against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT).   
The sixth article of that draft treaty does not so 
much deal with as dismiss the question of 
verification, putting it off to “possible future 
protocols.”   
 
Verification and the Current Regulatory 
Regimes in Space 
 
Characterizing space as the “last frontier” 
may blind us to the fact that it is already, at least 
in theory, a highly regulated environment.22  
Requirements for and constraints on behavior in 
space are subject to a variety of administrative 
requirements, U.N. resolutions, and treaty law, 
including, most prominently, the Outer Space 
Treaty of 1967.  The OST grew out of a UN 
“Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space” (1962) and had the effect, as 
described by William Durch, of  “(transforming) a 
nonbinding, international consensus on the 
political/military conduct of space into legal 
obligations.”23  But the Treaty was perhaps less 
foundational than often described, in part because 
it placed specific constraints on activities (such as 
the stationing of nuclear weapons in orbit or on 
celestial bodies, or creation of military 
installations on the moon) that the only two 
                                                          
22 A full description of the regulatory regime in space 
can be found in Kasku-Jackson and Waldrop, Chapter 
4 of Space and Defense Policy (op cit).   
23 Durch, William J.  National Interests and the 
Military Use of Space (Ballinger Publishing, 1984), p. 
176.  Hays and others argue that the OST provided 
reassurance to U.S. policy makers that space would not 
be an arena of strategic completion, and sent the 
message that the U.S. itself did not see space has 
having ‘a great deal of military utility’ (see Hays, p. 
71). 
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significant space powers had already decided not 
to pursue.   
Even  in areas of  Treaty-imposed constraint that 
remained pertinent,  particularly the prohibitions 
against “interfering with other states’ space-
related activities” and “damaging the space 
environment,” the OST had less than decisive 
impact—not because of an inability to verify but 
an unwillingness to enforce.  This unwillingness 
apparently stemmed from concern about 
disclosing sources and methods, and a reluctance 
to contribute to the establishment of norms that 
might limit freedom of action. 
For example, although there have been numerous 
cases in the last forty years of heedless creation of 
debris and crowding of spectra, none of the major 
space actors has ever accused another of violating 
the Treaty.  Even in the case of the most flagrant 
recent example of “damage” to the space 
environment—the debris created by the 2007 
Chinese ASAT test—only the Japanese protested 
on the basis of the Outer Space Treaty.  While the 
OST can reasonably be read as prohibiting 
“jamming, blinding or otherwise disrupting unless 
required for self-defense or during hostilities,”24 it 
has not been interpreted by any major party to 
prohibit the sorts of activities that have led 
officials to describe space as increasingly 
“contested.”  Indeed, far from strengthening 
verifiable norms of behavior in space, lack of 
enforcement of the OST has arguably weakened 
them—to the point the authors of the European 
Code of Conduct thought it appropriate to include 
a highly qualified and voluntary pledge to refrain 
from intentional interference, even though most 
nations are already bound to such a provision in 
the OST as a matter of treaty law. 
Why is this?  Moltz comments on the modus 
operandi that arose between the Soviet Union and 
the United States during the Cold War that each 
side appeared to value its own assets more than it 
valued the ability to destroy the assets of its 
adversaries.25  So it might be said of the parties to 
the OST that all seem to value their own freedom 
                                                          
24 Hays, p. 51. 
25 Moltz, p. 50. 
of action in space more than they value 
constraining the freedom of action of others.   
Another agreement from the Cold War era not to 
interfere with “national technical means of 
verification” (NTM), on the other hand, had 
considerable—though generally 
unacknowledged—effect on ordering the space 
environment.  Non-interference with NTM was a 
key element in the verification regimes of nuclear 
arms control.  It appeared in successive strategic 
arms limitation and reduction agreements and in 
the INF agreement of 1987.26  Because neither of 
the two Cold War superpowers wished to specify 
which of its satellites were engaged in verifying 
compliance, both extended the general ban on 
non-interference to the entire national security 
space constellation of the other.   
It can be argued that restrictions on interference 
with NTM reflected rather than caused the modus 
operandi in space between the United States and 
Soviet Union that began in the 1970s and 
continues to our day.  What is clear is that such a 
modus operandi did emerge.  Despite a period of 
extended development and testing in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, both sides eventually abandoned 
kinetic ASAT programs.  Some ASAT weapons 
imagined in the 1960s like rail guns and directed-
energy weapons were not pursued.  There was no 
offensive arms race in space, and neither side 
made space a primary focus of either offensive or 
defensive action in the case of hostilities.  There 
were also technical, political, and budgetary 
reasons for this of course.  But, as Moltz argues, 
both sides saw the benefits in mutual restraint, and 
constantly improving NTM technology meant 
increasing confidence that restraint was 
reciprocated and not a source of strategic 
disadvantage.  The nuclear sanctuary in space 
fostered by the LTBT provided further assurance 
of stability, and therefore encouragement to 
exploit the domain for both military and civil 
purposes.  
 
                                                          
26 A discussion of arms control treaties and their 
relationship to NTM is found in Jonty Kasku-Jackson 
and Elizabeth Waldrop, “Understanding Space Law,” 
Space and Defense Policy, p. 73 as well as Pete Hays, 
“Space and the Military,” ibid, pp. 56-59. 
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A Typology of Verification Regimes 
 This brief history leads to the conclusion 
that verification and enforcement are inextricably 
linked.   It is not enough to detect non-
compliance; it must also have negative 
consequences for the perpetrator.  That requires 
both publicizing violation and concerting 
international efforts to respond.  Some verification 
regimes are more likely to be effective in this 
regard than others, and combinations of several 
types might solve what emerge from our analysis 
as the twin problems of detection, on the one hand, 
and deterrence on the other. 
We have identified four categories of verification 
regimes, three of which have been well studied in 
the past, and one of which (at least in its emerging 
form) is new.  These are: 
• Unilateral Verification:  This includes 
National Technical Means (NTM) 
discussed above, but can also include 
other forms of reconnaissance, 
intelligence, and surveillance carried out 
by assets under U.S. control or that of 
trusted partners. 
• Cooperative Verification:  Cooperative 
verification requires that participants 
agree to forego certain measures to 
disguise behavior, and/or take other steps 
to enhance transparency.  Verification 
“regimes” in arms control agreements are 
usually composed of such cooperative 
measures.  For example, the INF Treaty 
required the parties to allow on-site 
observation of destruction of the systems 
by means specified in the treaty.  Non-
interference with means of verification is 
an essential element in any cooperative 
regime.  Cooperative measures are also 
useful as early indicators that one or more 
parties may have decided that an agreed 
regime is no longer in its interest, i.e., that 
the equilibrium sought in the agreement is 
no longer applicable.  In that case, friction 
may arise in the system as cooperative 
measures become less cooperative. 
• Multilateral Verification.  Multilateral 
verification is usually accomplished 
through on-site inspection by groups of 
international observers.  The principal 
example is the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime incorporated in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and overseen by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.  
Multilateral verification has the advantage 
of allowing concerted international action 
for enforcement of violations.  It can also 
create new norms or strengthen existing 
ones.  It has the disadvantage of requiring 
agreement between multiple international 
actors who may have differing interests or 
interpretations of events.    
• “Open” Verification:  With regard to 
space, open verification is a new concept, 
leveraging the increasing transparency of 
space to private observers.  A precedent 
was established in the 1970s by the 
spontaneous organization of “Helsinki 
Watch Groups” to monitor Soviet 
compliance with the human rights 
provisions of the Helsinki Agreement on 
European Cooperation and Security 
(CSCE).  The reports of these groups 
were both more detailed and more 
credible than information other CSCE 
member nations had been able or willing 
to provide.  The groups were enabled by 
the mandatory publication in all CSCE 
member states of the provisions of the 
CSCE agreement, and by the existence of 
new (albeit still rudimentary) channels for 
communicating their findings to the West.  
The potential of “open” verification 
increases enormously because of instant 
and worldwide cyber connectivity, as was 
graphically demonstrated in the recent 
past by DARPA and its Network 
Challenge experiment.27  It also increases 
                                                          
27 In brief, DARPA tethered ten, eight-foot diameter, 
red balloons at random spots on public land throughout 
the contiguous 48 states and issued an open challenge 
to find them, offering a $20,000 prize.  The winning 
team from MIT offered $1,000 to anyone who could 
refer them to someone with information about the 
balloons, and $1000 to the person with that 
information.  The challenge quickly went viral on the 
web, and all ten balloons were found in under nine 
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with the volume and accuracy of orbital 
information made available by 
governments.  With regard to space, an 
“open” verification regime would be 
based on the worldwide private space 
observer community.  This community 
already collects volumes of information 
about the behavior of objects in space and 
discusses it over the web, noting 
anomalies to include spotting satellites 
not registered as required by international 
agreement, the United Nations’ 
Registration Convention.  If international 
“norms” for behavior in space, such as 
those suggested by private groups and the 
European Union, are to be adopted, open 
verification is the obvious, and perhaps 
the only, verification method that would 
be applicable.  It might provide a vehicle 
for calling attention to aberrant behavior 
in space without compromising sources 
and methods.  But open verification lacks 
any enforcement component except for 
“public pressure,” and might therefore 
create more obstacles for open, 
democratic societies where public 
pressure can be brought to bear than in 
closed societies where it has little 
relevance. 
These categories of verification are obviously not 
mutually exclusive.  Generally speaking, all 
treaties or agreements of any kind that require 
nations to engage in or forego specified activities 
are subject to verification by unilateral means.  
The fact that SALT and other nuclear arms 
treaties specified that verification was to be by 
“national technical means of verification” did not 
create a new right for countries to verify in that 
way; the innovation was in mutual recognition 
that the ability to verify was in the strategic 
interest of both parties.  In effect, the parties 
agreed that strategic stability required not only 
self-restraint but transparency.  This would not 
have been possible without a minimal level of 
trust.  But as President Reagan often emphasized, 
the requirement was to “trust but verify,” 
                                                                                          
hours.  Details can be found at 
https://networkchallenge.darpa.mil/ProjectReport.pdf.  
reflecting the melding of cooperation with the 
independent ability to confirm compliance.28    
 
Implications for Policy Makers 
 
This foregoing analysis points to the 
central (and familiar) dilemma for U.S. policy.   
Any measure that affects U.S. freedom of action 
in space imposes a cost.  This includes not just 
measures to restrict certain behaviors, but 
verification measures that make U.S. space 
operations more visible to potentially unfriendly 
or disruptive observers.  The question is whether 
this short-term cost is offset by longer-term 
benefits to the United States of a more stable and 
predictable space environment. 
   
There has always been a contradiction between 
the desire of the United States (and other major 
actors) for freedom of action in space, and a 
common interest in a well-regulated domain.  This 
contradiction is not limited to space policy.29  
Until recently, that contradiction was overcome—
for many U.S. theorists—by the prospect of space 
control, i.e., the notion that the United States 
would use its dominant position to impose order 
on the cosmos by enlisting willing collaborators 
on the one hand, and using superior force against 
                                                          
28 Similarly, an element of cooperative verification 
intruded into what was supposed to be a regime of 
multilateral verification by force majeure, i.e., the post-
defeat inspection of Iraq for weapons of mass 
destruction.  What was supposed to be a regime of 
anywhere-anytime surprise inspection became instead a 
process of negotiated access because the defeated party 
continued to control the facilities to be inspected. 
29 The Chief negotiator of the INF agreement with the 
Soviets commented with regard to the debate over INF 
limitations:  “It  was, and remains, difficult to find 
common ground between those who believe that, in 
general, the national security of the United States 
would be strengthened if no limits were placed on the 
weapons it could have, even if that would mean there 
would be no limits on the same type of Soviet (or some 
other adversaries) weapons, and those who believe the 
national security of the United States would be 
strengthened if limits were placed on the Soviet (or 
some other adversaries) weapon systems, even if it 
would mean limits on the same type of U.S. system.” 
Maynard Glitman, The Last Battle of the Cold War, 
(New York:  Palgrave McMillan, 2006), p. 229.  
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outliers on the other.30  The model often cited is 
Mahan and the control of sea lines of 
communication; the underlying assumption is that 
space, as all other domains of human competition, 
will inevitably be a theater of conflict.31  Space 
control remains an article of faith for many, but it 
has become a residual element in the Obama 
space policy.  The dominant theme for the new 
Administration is the necessity of cooperation.  In 
a congested and contested environment, a 
cooperative approach assumes a measure of trust.  
But as President Reagan pointed out in another 
context, trust is not sufficient in itself.  There is a 
vital role as well for verification, i.e., our ability 
to assure that U.S. impulses to collaborative 
efforts in space, especially those involving U.S. 
self-restraint, will not be exploited by others to 
gain strategic advantage.  
 
Improvements in U.S. space situational awareness 
will enhance the timeliness and certainty of 
verification.  But these improvements are less 
likely to come in future from unilateral U.S. 
sources, if only because of constraints on 
spending.  This is what some have identified as 
the “SSA challenge.”  In a world of limited 
resources, the emphasis will have to be on 
improvements in SSA by other means, and in 
particular by exploiting the possibilities of the 
other three forms of verification, i.e., multilateral, 
cooperative, and ‘open’ verification.  There is 
some reason to think that U.S. military services 
recognize this reality, and also the associated 
dilemma: taking full advantage of information 
exchanges, reciprocal measures to increase 
transparency (cooperative verification), and the 
potential of the internet-empowered observer 
                                                          
30 See, for example, Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: 
Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, and Steven 
Lambakis, On the Edge of the Earth: The Future of 
American Space Power, (Lexington:  University Press 
of Kentucky, 2001).    
31  No one thinks conflict in space is inevitable this 
week or even this year.  In that sort of timeframe, all 
would agree that conflict or its absence depends on 
decisions of policy makers.    Inevitable conflict always 
takes place in what might be called “ideological time,” 
i.e. a time remote enough in the future that particular 
circumstances are necessarily unknown to us, and 
ideological preconceptions can therefore be liberated 
from the sobering influence of facts.   
community means becoming ourselves more 
transparent.  Where to draw the line? 
 
To a degree, reality may make the choice for us.  
Some measures, particularly expanded exchanges 
of information, are already taking hold among 
commercial operators.  There is pressure from the 
commercial community for expanded information 
exchanges with governments, combined with a 
willingness to facilitate improvements in SSA by 
hosting (albeit not funding) SSA payloads.  As 
well, there are autonomous developments—
facilitated by greater U.S. openness—which have 
potential both to aid detection of non-compliance 
and make such acts politically more consequential.  
These include what we identify as “open” 
verification, i.e., harnessing the power of the 
private observer community and the connectivity 
of the internet to monitor activities in space.  
Internet communities are good at finding things 
and identifying anomalies; they may also be 
credible in a way that national actors are not.  The 
effectiveness of such programs depends on:  1) the 
existence of agreed, specific, and observable 
norms of behavior, and 2) the amount and nature 
of information governments are willing to make 
available.  
 
Increasing the openness of space operations and 
the availability of SSA information inevitably 
involves inequity for the United States.  Because 
we can see more and see further, others stand to 
gain more in the short run than we do.  A political 
judgment will be needed as to whether the long 
term gain in stability and predictability outweighs 
this short term, relative disadvantage.  One thing 
is certain; some operations will always be kept 
from public view, not just by the United States but 
by all major space-faring nations. 
 
On the other hand, this aspect of the emerging 
situation—the trend, both intentional and 
autonomous—toward greater transparency also 
plays to U.S. strengths.  What we call “open” 
verification is a new category, enabled by the 
greater availability of information on the one hand 
and internet connectivity on the other.  In this 
“emerging networked world,” as Anne-Marie 
Slaughter has argued, “. . . the state with the most 
connections will be the central player, able to set 
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the global agenda.”32  This raises the possibility of 
a system of public-private verification, drawing 
on public and government resources, which has 
both potentially positive and negative aspects, but 
may be—in our interconnected world—an 
inevitable next step.  The advantage the United 
States has in connectivity, transparency, trust, and 
situational awareness makes it the nation best 
positioned to be the central player in space.  It 
also makes possible extra-national capabilities for 
space awareness and verification that could not 
have been imagined in the Cold War. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The central conclusion of this analysis is 
that verification is not an obstacle to arms control 
or other agreements that include reciprocal 
restrictions on the freedom of action in space of 
the United States and other major players.  This is 
not to say that all potentially disruptive activities 
in space are verifiable or proper subjects for arms 
control agreements; but means are available to 
increase predictability and stability in space by 
reciprocal constraints on disruptive actions,    
including certain maneuvers, operations in certain 
orbits and/or the testing of dedicated or other 
ASAT systems whether space based or surface 
based, that are observable and in regard to which 
compliance can be verified.  A well-constructed 
verification regime will incorporate a necessary 
element of unilateral capability along with 
measures to make verification more certain and 
politically effective by making use of the inherent 
strengths (and limiting the potential costs) of 
international consensus, multilateral inspection 
regimes, and the credibility of public oversight of 
potentially non-compliant activity.    
For those variables we have identified as affecting 
the scope and intrusiveness of verification 
measures, the transparency of the domain is much 
                                                          
32Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America’s Edge,” Foreign 
Affairs, January/February 2009.  Although she doesn’t 
deal specifically with space, Slaughter argues that 
“connectivity is power” in all realms of human 
endeavor.  Slaughter manages to synthesize the sort of 
national dominance exemplified in space by the “space 
control” model, with the cooperative paradigm inherent 
in a world of connectivity.  All will be connected; but 
the United States will be more connected than others. 
greater than it was even five years ago, the 
criticality of small changes has diminished (as the 
number of satellites engaged in national security 
activities has multiplied many fold) and the trust 
between actors—though far from perfect—is 
nonetheless greater than it was in the Cold War. 
Verification does not ensure against cheating, and 
neither norms nor treaties may apply in a wartime 
environment.  But a well-constructed verification 
regime can make evidence of violation timely and 
less ambiguous, providing a stronger case for 
collective efforts to respond before a crisis 
becomes a conflict.  An adversary seeking to 
exploit mutual constraint to gain unilateral 
advantage would have to mount a significant 
program over a protracted period of time that 
would leave signatures in a variety of domains.   
A broad spectrum of verification methods, from 
independent national capabilities, to multilateral 
or cooperative regimes, and even open approaches 
using private observers, will increase the 
probability of detection and give greater 
credibility and legitimacy to the analysis of 
disputed activity.   
We conclude that the ability of the least 
competent major actor to verify compliance will 
define the outer boundaries of what is possible in 
arms control.33  Our conclusion is based on the 
assessment that if meaningful strategic 
consequences are possible as the result of non-
compliance, no strategic actor will rely for 
information from any source it does not control.  
For that reason, the most competent player is 
unlikely to be faced with international consensus 
for constraints that exceed its verification 
capabilities.  The requirement independently to 
verify is less true of second tier space powers, 
who have limited independent space surveillance 
capability.     
We predict the emergence of “trust groups” 
clustered around major countries that do have 
such capability.  It follows that a possible locus 
for competition in space (which may already be 
taking place) is the competition among major 
actors to expand their trust groups, and therefore 
                                                          
33 By “least competent major actor” we mean the state 
with the most limited capability that is nevertheless 
critical to enforcement or implementation. 
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build international support for the interpretation of 
events in space that reflects and serves their 
individual interests.   
In this competition, the nation with the most 
comprehensive, credible and available 
information—and the greatest willingness to share 
it—will have a decisive advantage.  At the 
moment, and for the foreseeable future, that 
country is the United States.  The United States, 
as the predominant player, also has the most at 
stake in regimes that limit freedom of action, and 
therefore the greatest interest in ensuring that, if 
such restrictions are put in play, they can be 
adequately verified, incorporated in binding 
agreements rather than amorphous systems of 
‘norms’, and that non-compliance will be visible 
to a wide international community.  Sharing 
information and opening space to greater public 
scrutiny is relevant to enforcement of restrictions 
on activities in space, since these may well be 
invisible to many international actors whose 
cooperation is necessary to make sanctions or 
other collective actions to punish non-compliance 
more effective.  On the other hand, if public 
transparency does have such an inhibiting impact, 
that effect is likely to be greater in open societies 
than in those where both information and public 
opinion are tightly controlled.    
Fortunately, the emphasis on verification plays to 
U.S. strengths.34  The Chinese/Russian draft treaty 
prohibiting the stationing of weapons in space 
(PPWT) is precise on what should be limited but 
vague on verification.  The Chinese in particular 
have presented this as a concession to U.S. 
sensitivities about its activities in space; but it 
may also reflect a relative weakness of capability 
and reluctance by the authors of the PPWT to 
make their own space programs more transparent.   
The United States is in a far different position 
regarding both openness and capability.  It can 
therefore ensure its interests and capitalize on its 
strengths by taking precisely the opposite tack, i.e., 
by making verification the first rather than the last 
                                                          
34 This is, in essence, an extension to space of 
Slaughter’s argument that “In the twenty-first century, 
the United States’ exceptional capacity for connection, 
rather than splendid isolation or hegemonic 
domination, will renew its power and restore its global 
purpose.” (Slaughter, ibid.)  
focus of international discussions on binding 
constraints in space.  Since satellites themselves 
will play an increasing role in space situational 
awareness, non-interference with satellites will be 
both the objective for any new agreement as well 
as the standard by which compliance is measured.   
 
Verification is not synonymous with enforcement.   
Indeed, verification without enforcement—as has 
been the case with the Outer Space Treaty—
arguably weakens rather than strengthens the 
incentive for restraint.  There is a tendency in any 
negotiation to use vague or ambiguous language 
to achieve consensus.  Ambiguous norms provide 
the appearance of regulation without imposing 
specific constraints, and thereby may satisfy both 
those who favor greater structure in space and 
those who insist on freedom of action.  But that 
ambiguity will be multiplied several times in the 
resulting verification regime, increasing 
uncertainty, suspicion, disagreement, and 
generally conducing to disorder rather than order. 
Precision should therefore not be sacrificed to 
consensus in either the terms of agreements or the 
description of how compliance will be verified.  
Indeed, precision of language may be more 
important for establishing verifiable constraints on 
activities in space than the form such agreements 
take, i.e., whether voluntary norms or treaty 
language.  Unfortunately, the trend seems to be 
precisely in the opposite direction, i.e., to 
transform the relatively precise obligations of the 
Outer Space Treaty into vaguely worded, highly 
qualified, and voluntary undertakings.  This is true 
of the various schemes of “norms” for behavior in 
space.  In short, verification is only potentially 
stabilizing if it establishes compliance with 
specific and observable rules (whether established 
by “hard” or “soft” law), and parties are willing to 
call others to account.  Otherwise, such schemes 
may serve only to verify that no real agreed order 
exists.    
We conclude that verification is a natural area for 
U.S. leadership and presents an opportunity to 
achieve objectives formerly couched in terms of 
being able physically to dominate space.  The 
United States does have—and will likely 
maintain—information dominance.  This presents 
policymakers with two options for continued 
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protection of U.S. space assets.  The first is to 
maintain a “closed system,” keeping national 
security systems out of public catalogs and relying 
on its own capabilities to verify the activities of 
states that do the same.  The disadvantages with 
this approach are twofold.  It fosters suspicion 
about U.S. actions and intentions that cannot be 
publicly dispelled and hampers its ability to hold 
others accountable for disruptive activity since to 
do so would reveal the extent or limits of U.S. 
surveillance capability.  A clever and dedicated 
adversary will be apt to push the limits of 
tolerance for disruptive actions, confident that 
leaders in Washington will choose to remain silent. 
 
The alternative course of action would be to 
capitalize on the principle of non-interference 
with systems involved in verifying compliance 
with any agreement.  This includes placement of 
sensors on a variety of space platforms, 
whether hosted on commercial systems or 
integrated into government vehicles (civil and 
military alike).  It applies as well to those 
observation and analysis systems based on the 
ground involved in such work.  There are two 
potential advantages:  first, detection 
capabilities are improved through means that 
can be used publicly to hold disruptive actors 
accountable to international scrutiny while 
protecting sources or methods.  A 
proliferation of government, commercial, 
multilateral and public observation 
mechanisms makes it more difficult for a 
disruptive actor to escape public exposure.35  
Second, by entangling an ever-increasing 
number of satellites in the verification regime 
the principle of non-interference is broadened 
to include a greater number of satellites.   
Non-interference is, in the end, a primary goal 
of any peacetime protection efforts and may 
                                                          
35 Public scrutiny of space activities has increased 
significantly in its specificity in recent years, as 
exemplified by analysis of Chinese orbital rendezvous 
maneuvers concerning the Shi Jian 12  and Shi Jian 
06F satellites.  See Brian Weeden, “Dancing in the 
Dark: The Orbital Rendezvous of SJ-12 and SJ-06F,” 
The Space Review, 30 August 2010, found at 
www.thespacereview.com/article/1689/1. 
be achieved without formal negotiation of any 
new agreements or arms control, building on 
existing traditions as discussed above.  
Entanglement of government and commercial 
systems, both domestic and foreign, can also 
contribute to deterrence by complicating an 
adversary’s decision-making calculus.36 
 
Shifting the focus to verification will help 
define the range of constraint and/or arms 
control measures that follow and will provide 
a basis for hope of their achieving broad 
international consensus and impact.  More 
importantly, it will allow the United States to 
reassert leadership in an area of its relative 
strength, help fend off proposals by others 
designed solely for tactical diplomatic 
advantage, and set a practical agenda likely to 
have broad international appeal.  This would 
be an appropriate initiative to take up in the 
Committee on Disarmament or any other 
international venue where the security and 













                                                          
36 For a discussion of entanglement as a component of 
deterrence see the Eisenhower Center’s Space 






Publisher’s Corner: Don’t Call It Cyberspace 
 
Roger G. Harrison 
 
 
It is said of human beings that we are a 
pattern discerning species.  We tend to search for 
or invent patterns even where none exist—hence 
the popularity of power point.1  When we deal 
with something truly unprecedented, our tendency 
is nonetheless to find some precedent for it, or, 
failing that, to fall back on analogy, metaphor or 
simile, all tools the mind uses to confront the 
unknown future with the familiar—which is one 
reason that large organizations faced with unique 
challenges almost invariably get it wrong. 
We are in danger of doing that again as we 
organize to deal with challenges to national 
security presented by the unique phenomenon of 
cyber, and do so based on comparisons between 
cyber and space—or, more radically, on the 
notion that these are, for practical purposes, 
aspects of the same thing.  This is the synergy 
thesis, on the basis of which Air Force Space 
Command is now charged with the responsibility 
for cyber as well.  Former Assistant Secretary of 
the Air Force Jeffrey Harris told a recent 
symposium at CSIS that in his view space and 
cyber were ‘merging and aligning.’ 
It isn’t immediately clear what any of this means.  
How do you ‘merge’ a tangible, physical 
                                                          
1 It is a mark of the essential difference between cyber 
and space that the latter can be represented adequately 
on a power point slide (or more commonly a very large 
number of them) whereas the former cannot be.  Power 
point is good at describing structure but very bad 
dealing with abstraction, and cyber is an abstraction, 
representing our efforts to imagine a universe 
compounded of billions of independent transactions 
from millions of sources, some known, some unknown, 
and some potentially generated by the environment 
itself.  Such a phenomenon cannot be represented 
visually, which saves it (or should) from power point’s 
intellectual death grip.  Note that the cyber ‘cloud’ 
(itself a metaphor) is most often represented in power 
point presentations not by lengthy explanation, or by 
bulleted talking points, but by a drawing of a cartoon 
cloud. 
environment like space, with an intangible, virtual 
environment like cyber?  In what way do they 
align?  How do we capitalize on the mutually 
reinforcing (synergistic?) characteristics of a 
domain like space where doctrine changes at the 
speed of bureaucracy, and a domain like cyber 
which is so much in flux that even the concept of 
doctrine doesn’t seem to apply? 
The thesis here is precisely the opposite, i.e., that 
cyber is something truly new and unique in human 
experience.  Nothing like it has existed before.  So 
we will have to do the tedious work of conceiving, 
ab initio, an entirely new approach to 
management, collaboration, procurement, 
organization, and strategy.  And we will have to 
cultivate a new kind of strategic mind that can 
lead in this unique environment. 
Defenders of the synergy thesis will point out in 
rebuttal the similarities between cyber and space.  
For example, attribution of attack is a problem for 
both space and cyber warriors; deterrence 
therefore presents some of the same problems in 
the two domains.2  Satellites are one conduit 
(although only one) for cyber communication, and 
cyber is one possible vector for interfering with or 
disabling satellites.  Both space and cyber depend 
on electromagnetic spectrum, and this dependence 
makes both vulnerable to attack from a variety of 
national and non-national actors with relatively 
limited resources.3  Both are arguably offense-
                                                          
2  The problems are much more difficult, and perhaps 
impossible, to resolve in cyber, another mark of 
essential difference between cyber and space.  Both the 
Eisenhower Center and Rand Corporation published 
studies of how deterrence might apply in space, given 
the right combination of hardware and policies.  The 
most prominent study of cyber deterrence concludes, 
on the contrary, that it is simply not possible. 
3 This mutual vulnerability is not symmetrical.  An 
interruption of that portion of cyber communication 
carried by satellites would be a serious inconvenience; 
a compromised cyber network could render the 
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dominant environments, i.e., environments in 
which technology favors the attacker—
particularly preemptive attack—over defense.  
And mission assurance in both domains is critical 
to national security. 
Still, these “points of contact” are to some degree 
incidental4 and in any case pale before the 
differences between the two domains.  Indeed, 
space and cyber are not just different but 
essentially antithetical, and the real question is not 
how we combine their strengths (although we 
should when we can) but how we keep them 
safely distinct and prevent the culture of space—
with its endless procurement cycles, hierarchical 
management structures, overlapping and mutually 
hostile bureaucracies, glacial response times, 
derivative strategic concepts, and aging, 
entrenched work force—from seeping over into 
the cyber environment.  
Is antithetical too strong a word?  It might be 
argued that some differences between the two 
domains are simply matters of degree.  The most 
obvious example is the need in cyber for much 
greater speed in research, planning, procurement, 
and training.  The problem—a problem inherent in 
the nature of the environment—is that the 
traditional bureaucratic space management 
structures are incapable of that kind of speed.5  
Because operating in space is so expensive, their 
emphasis is (properly) on redundancy and 
robustness of systems, adherence to proven 
protocols, and, above all, avoidance of mistakes.  
Cyber, on the other hand, changes so rapidly that 
yesterday’s protocols may be obsolete today and 
self-defeating tomorrow.  Because the cost of 
entry in cyber is low, the opportunity and reward 
for experimentation and innovation are 
correspondingly high.  Space may be ‘contested,’ 
                                                                                          
information provided by satellites useless—or, at 
worst, malicious. 
4 Lists like this do not imply any existential connection 
between cyber and space.  Similar lists could be 
constructed in relation to any two strategic domains, 
for example space and air, or space and undersea. 
5 The business plan of “new space” companies like 
SpaceX is based on bringing cyber management 
practices to traditional space operations, especially 
launch.  Whether it will work or not is open to 
question. 
but in relation to cyber it is truly a peaceable 
kingdom where the incidents of intentional 
interference are rare.  Our cyber networks, by 
contrast, are attacked thousands of times every 
day. We may be surprised in space as potential 
adversaries attain capabilities more quickly than 
we had anticipated, but that evolution will likely 
measure in years and even decades.  We can only 
vaguely discern the challenges that will face us in 
cyber a year from now; indeed, we are uncertain 
of our grasp on those we confront at present.6  
These are not just differences in degree; they are 
differences in kind and will require different kinds 
of management structures, a different lexicon of 
terms, and a new sort of strategic mind.  Applying 
the slow but certain model to cyber (treating it as 
we treat space) is not just inappropriate but 
potentially disastrous. 
The commercial world provides a model of the 
sort of management structures that work.  
Companies that succeed in the cyber world tend—
at least initially—to be small and entrepreneurial.  
Management structures are flat; talent is rewarded 
regardless of rank (and rank in the traditional 
sense is rare); innovation is favored; received 
wisdom is treated with skepticism; power is 
dispersed; doctrine is suspect; dogma is rejected.  
The atmosphere reminds many in the older 
generation of that which existed in the space 
community forty years ago.  The problem for 
cyber companies is how to maintain those 
characteristics as they succeed, and therefore 
become larger and more bureaucratized, that is, 
more like government.  This raises the question of 
whether government—and in particular the 
military—can run a successful cyber operation.  
How can it become more like these 
entrepreneurial companies?  More of that below.  
                                                          
6  The Obama Administration Space policy refers to the 
possibilities of international agreements, including 
arms control, for space.  Historically, arms control 
agreements only become possible when contending 
sides believe that they understand the terrain 
sufficiently to conclude that neither they nor their 
adversaries can achieve unilateral advantage at 
acceptable cost.  This is, arguably, true of space, but 
not of cyber, where the terrain is so uncertain that even 
the parameters of theoretically stabilizing international 
agreements are far from clear.  
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In the meantime, it is likely that success in 
national security cyber will require an 
unprecedented level of cooperation with 
commercial operators, whose experience is vital 
and whose interests in cyber are essentially the 
same as those of government.  The old divisions 
between government and industry, the public 
sector and the private, will have to be (and are 
being) re-drawn.7 
The sort of new lexicon we will need is more 
difficult to describe.  Perhaps the key here is to 
understand the state of mind we need rather than 
the concepts themselves, which are beyond the 
scope of this brief paper.  This state of mind might 
be described as radical skepticism when it comes 
to the application to cyber of any concept 
(metaphor, analogy, or simile) developed in other 
domains for other purposes.   
To resort to these will be the inevitable tendency, 
not because the concepts are applicable but 
because we are comfortable with them and 
because adopting them requires no new and 
painful bureaucratic consensus building.  What 
constitutes offense and defense in cyber?  What is 
meant—or can anything be meant—by deterrence, 
by escalation, by security and preemption in the 
cyber domain?  It may be that some or all of these 
terms are useful, just as the concept of merging 
domains may be useful, but only if we can 
describe (and then agree on) what they mean in 
this unique new world, and only if cyber stabilizes 
sufficiently to ensure that they mean the same 
thing from one planning cycle to the next. 
Finally, we will need a different kind of strategic 
mind, accustomed to irregularity, ready to make 
mistakes, free of doctrine, hostile to dogma, and 
alert to the principal thing (among many) that 
makes cyber as a strategic environment something 
new—that it is, in every sense, a product of our 
imagination.  When we enter space we encounter 
what amounts to a toxic sea that erodes our bodies 
                                                          
7 Large cyber companies like Google and Intel already 
operate as quasi-sovereign entities, as the recent 
contretemps between Google and China (a severing of 
relations, then partial rapprochement) demonstrate.  
This is also true, not incidentally, of supra-national 
commercial space operators like Intelsat, now 
headquartered in Luxembourg. 
and our machines; but space is indifferent to our 
presence and imposes the same limitations on all 
who operate there.  When we enter cyber, we 
encounter ourselves—the human psyche 
electronically enhanced.  Cyber exhibits all the 
virtues and vices of our species:  it is creative, 
dynamic, perverse, innovative, evolutionary, 
elusive, and constantly evolving.  We can (at least 
in theory) develop a doctrine for space and be 
reasonably certain that it will still be applicable a 
decade from now.  Opponents can counter 
strategize, but they labor under the same physical 
limitations we do.  In a sense, every punch will be 
telegraphed; whether we are agile enough to react, 
of course, is another issue. 
There is no such assurance in cyber, where threats 
come from everywhere, opponents appear and 
disappear, motives other than greed can be 
obscure, and doctrine (if we have any) will have 
to be ad hoc, developed on the fly and discarded 
just as quickly.  We are not on a level playing 
field in cyber; we are limited by law, others—
freelance individuals or non-state networks—are 
not. 
Which begs the previous question: where, aside 
from the commercial sector, will we find 
examples of how this threat can be countered, and 
the leaders to do it? 
The answer, paradoxically enough, is:  the 
military, or more specifically the Army and the 
Marine Corps under pressure of combat.  The 
habits of mind that cyber requires are being 
developed at the moment in the conflict with 
insurgencies, particularly in Afghanistan.  Brian 
O’Keefe described the phenomenon in a recent 
issue of “Fortune” magazine (March 22, 2010).  
Industry was, O’Keefe wrote, “skeptical of 
structure” and therefore looking to the military 
veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for 
the kind of young leaders who are “comfortable 
with complexity,” and capable of “dealing with 
ambiguity” and “challenging paradigms.”   
A former Army captain now at Google was 
quoted as saying this: “I think the people who are 
doing interesting stuff in the military are 
entrepreneurial in mindset.  And they don’t look 
up for approval and permission to do stuff.  They 
are just doing it, and then after a while, the chain 
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of command recognizes that what they’re doing 
has value, and they kind of put a veneer of 
respectability around it.”  In other words, doctrine 
in fast developing environments like counter 
insurgency and cyber follows rather than informs 
tactics.  Confusing that kind of world with the 
world of space—or, for that matter, the cyber 
challenge with any other we have faced in our 
history—is to mire ourselves in false analogy.  
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